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Post by Herb on May 14, 2008 11:02:09 GMT -5
I picked up Donovan's book yesterday, and while I haven't done much but page through it, it looks to be a valuable addition.
There's a lot of what Mark and Jake call informed speculation, Donovan endnotes are a mixed bag, imo. In some cases the endnote is a very thorough explanation of why and how he reached the conclusion in the narrative and in others simply just a reference to another source. When you have such good explanatory endnotes, explaining some conclusions, it's disappointing that only references are given for others (I'm not talking about direct quotes).
I'm not a Custer fanatic, so I don't buy everything published, but this does look worthwhile.
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Post by Herb on May 19, 2008 10:17:34 GMT -5
I finished reading the book, yesterday. It's a truly well written narrative, that I read in two settings. I would highly recommend it to anybody that is interested in the subject.
Donovan is a Custer apologist, though I doubt he would say so, but I only found two arguments that weren't well supported. He claims that the Custer portion of the fight lasted two hours, a very prolonged and organized resistance. Almost all time analysis of the battle, places the last time Custer was seen at around 1600 and that the end of the battle was NLT 1730. Given that Custer marched at least another 15 minutes hidden from view, before making contact with the village its hard to see how a "2 hour fight" is possible. He does conclude that the collapse on the Custer battlefield started with C Company, Tom Custer's company and domino'd from there. However, it appears to me that he missed how rapidly resistance crumbled after this collapse.
The second "weak" assertion is about the oft debated "South Skirmish Line" from Last Stand Hill. While Donovan asserts that it was indeed a skirmish line - he is talking about Company E and the Deep Coulee - not the traditional South Skirmish Line where Mitch Boyer's remains were found, as I understand his argument (while the maps are nothing to brag about, here they are a galling weakness).
Donovan, argues that Benteen indeed had a case of the slows after being told to "Come Quick" in fact in some foreshadowing Weir got frustrated and led off with company while Benteen and the remainder of the Battalion still rested at the Morass.
However, Donovan, biggest criticism is for Reno, who he claims was both drunk and a coward during all of the action on the 25th. Donovan provides plenty of sources to support his contention, but sometimes glosses over the contrary evidence eg the dismounted advance of the skirmish line, G company's continued movements (directed personally by Reno) against the village after the retreat to the wood line, and the number of noncombatant Indian causalities killed in the village by Reno's Battalion.
I don't think anybody can argue that Reno's actions on the bluff were those needed from a commander - but when the breakdown occurred is a matter of argument. As a side note Moylan the experienced, veteran combat commander of the Company A (part of Reno's battalion) was broken down after the retreat from the Valley and was totally ineffective and Weir, commander of Company D (part of Benteen's Bn) cowered in a hole after the retreat from Weir Point. In fact, according to Donovan, Wier and Reno, who despised each other, shared the same hole (and same bottle) for the remainder of the 25th.
Donovan goes on to cover the Reno Court of Inquiry, and makes a strong case that the surviving officers of the 7th collectively lied on the stand, and that the members of the Court were pressured by Sheridan to whitewash their findings.
Overall, as I said a very well written book, and I'd think a welcome addition to anybody interested in the Battle of the Little Bighorn.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 20, 2008 9:42:05 GMT -5
Thanks for the summary Wolf; this is definitely in my "to read SOON" pile, along with the new Boone book.
Does this book add anything to the LBH battle accounts that we discussed a while ago, especially the two Gray books (I still need to read "Centennial Campaign")? Or, is it more a new interpretation of information already published earlier?
AW
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Post by Herb on May 20, 2008 10:05:29 GMT -5
It is a different book. Donovan obviously has more current research and it's a totally different narrative.
There is a lot more speculation than in Gray's book, imo, but Donovan generally make a pretty good case in his end notes for his conclusions. One of the things, I didn't like, is the way he wrote "factually" about Custer's (and others) thoughts and orders on the Custer portion of the battlefield. While it made the narrative more compelling, obviously the thoughts and orders were Donovan's conclusions based on what is at best pretty fragmentary evidence. Personally, I'd prefer less conclusive language for such obvious speculation, but then of course the narrative would have suffered.
There's a lot more weaving of personal accounts into this narrative, which to me makes it more interesting, and readability-wise, it is much better than Gray. Although, I'd still recommend Gray for anybody that wants to study the battle, Gray's scientific analysis of time-distance relationships is just invaluable, and his research into the size of the village, and the key decisions Custer made at the various decision points, remains the basis for most other works - including Donovan's.
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 20, 2008 12:20:43 GMT -5
Thanks for the summary Wolf; this is definitely in my "to read SOON" pile, along with the new Boone book. Does this book add anything to the LBH battle accounts that we discussed a while ago, especially the two Gray books (I still need to read "Centennial Campaign")? Or, is it more a new interpretation of information already published earlier? AW For the record, I was disappointed with the new Boone bio. Despite the brevity of the Lofaro bios, I found them far more engaging and informative. It's been a long time since I read the Bakeless Boone book, but I remember enjoying it more than this one. This Boone just didn't connect for me. There's a lot of digression and, for a narrative, it didn't seem "Boone centric", if that makes any sense. Jim
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Post by TRK on May 20, 2008 12:49:57 GMT -5
Thanks for your assessment of the book, Wolfpack. I intend to get a copy this summer.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 20, 2008 17:48:10 GMT -5
OK - I broke down and moved Custer to the top of the pile and got about 80 pages into it this afternoon. It's a great read so far and does a nice job of encapsulating the history of U.S.-Indian relations up to the Plains Wars. I enjoyed the biography of Custer and the groundwork chapter on how the Seventh was somewhat poisoned by internal animosity, much of which seems to have been Benteen's fault, but Custer also seems to have offended some of his men. Donovan seems to lay to rest Benteen's accusation that Custer ditched Elliott at the Washita and offers evidence that Benteen himself admitted there was nothing Custer could have done for Elliott.
AW
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 20, 2008 17:52:39 GMT -5
For the record, I was disappointed with the new Boone bio. Despite the brevity of the Lofaro bios, I found them far more engaging and informative. It's been a long time since I read the Bakeless Boone book, but I remember enjoying it more than this one. This Boone just didn't connect for me. There's a lot of digression and, for a narrative, it didn't seem "Boone centric", if that makes any sense. Jim I read Bakeless years ago and really enjoyed it. I then read Faragher's book soon afterward and honestly didn't thing he added much, if anything, to Bakeless. I haven't read the Lofaro books; isn't the second one a revised edition of the first one? I don't know if this is a factor in the new Boone book, but the writer is really a novelist and I think this is his first non-fiction book. AW
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 20, 2008 18:04:30 GMT -5
Yes the newer of the two Lofaro books is a revision, but I didn't know that when I ordered it. Morgan is a novelist, and a pretty good one. I just never felt like he "got" Boone. He never really comes to life in the book.
You guys are killing me...now I'm going to have to order that Custer book. Jim
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Post by marklemon on May 20, 2008 22:50:34 GMT -5
A few weeks ago, I met Donovan at a Western Artists and Writers Symposium at the Booth Museum of Western Art, (here in Georgia!), and stupid me, I spoke with him, answering his questions about my book, never realizing who he was, and that he had a book out of his own (I had arrived late, and didn't hear his introduction, and thus didn't realize he had a book out)...Being an avid student of the LBH, I'd have loved to have known who he was, and to have asked him several hundreds of questions! But for the record, he was a very astute, personable and very nice guy. Of course, now I have to get the book.
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 21, 2008 8:49:47 GMT -5
Well, I threw down. Now it's all up to Amazon.
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Post by Herb on May 22, 2008 10:50:43 GMT -5
I enjoyed the biography of Custer and the groundwork chapter on how the Seventh was somewhat poisoned by internal animosity, much of which seems to have been Benteen's fault, but Custer also seems to have offended some of his men. Donovan seems to lay to rest Benteen's accusation that Custer ditched Elliott at the Washita and offers evidence that Benteen himself admitted there was nothing Custer could have done for Elliott. AW It really doesn't matter who/what caused the poisoned atmosphere. The responsibility for it was Custer's. Custer was the de facto commander of the 7th from its inception and the responsibility for what is called "command climate" is always the commander. Custer had 9 years (he was suspended from command, and the army, for one year for deserting his troops while on campaign) to shape the regiment. One of the most common sayings in the army is that a unit takes on the personality of its commander. The regiment that fought at LBH, was undisciplined, amateurish, and fragmented by disloyalty. There are reasons for this, but after 9 years in command, what they really are, are excuses.
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Post by TRK on May 23, 2008 8:58:01 GMT -5
There's a book just released that's not for everybody, but some here may find it of interest. It's Stricken Field: The Little Bighorn Since 1876, by Jerome A. Greene (University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): www.amazon.com/Stricken-Field-Little-Bighorn-Since/dp/0806137916/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211550475&sr=8-1I just got my copy, and haven't had time to read it, but in a nutshell, it's billed as an administrative history of the LBH battlefield from the aftermath of the 1876 battle to the present. It discusses how the dead were buried and memorialized, and how the battlefield has been interpreted, developed, and maintained by the successive governing entities (War Department and National Park Service), and covers the various battles for the soul, if you will, of the battlefield, between the NPS and Native American groups, LBH buffs vs. the NPS, etc. Jerome Greene has written over ten well-received books on the Indian wars, including several on the 1876-77 Sioux War, so I'm anticipating this will be an illuminating book.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 1, 2008 17:20:16 GMT -5
I finished Donovan's book and found it very engaging and informative. Several things struck me as significant: the lack of training or seasoning of the troops, the difference in their attitude toward Custer and the way his men had respected him during the Civil War; the bad blood among the officers in the Seventh.
Donovan suggests that Custer and his officers paid scant attention to the size of the village and never really considered that there might be a very large force there to reckon with. Instead, they were obsessed with preventing the Indians from scattering and running off. This is reflected in the disjointed nature of the attack, which seemed extremely unplanned and haphazard. Custer ordered the attack without even having seen the village or realizing its huge size and the number of warriors there. He had planned to rest his men and attack the next day, but when he realized his force had been spotted by the Indians he decided to attack immediately. He also decided to split his force into 3 groups, without knowledge of the size of the enemy force.
I had always thought that Custer specifically sent Reno to attack the south end of the village as part of a planned, coordinated pincer move, with Custer attacking the other end. Instead, it would appear that the two moves were not really coordinated at all. Custer ordered Reno to chase a small group of Indians who had been spotted, which took Reno nearly smack into the village itself and the fight in the woods. Custer had promised to support Reno, but gave no specific plans. Reno was left to figure out for himself what Custer was up to when he spotted him leading his troops along the ridge toward the north while Reno was coming under heavy fire. Donovan suggests that Reno should have realized that Custer was going to attack another part of the village and that it was essential that Reno hold his position.
Custer’s decision to attack without a more coherent plan, his splitting of his force and his counting too heavily on Reno and Benteen to join in a vigorous attack, mutually supporting each other, and his lack of good intelligence all worked against him and he is responsible for the role those choices played in his defeat. Add to this the fact that all of the men and horses seemed worn out before the battle even began from days on the march and that the attack didn’t begin until late afternoon. But, Donovan shows other examples of attacks under similar conditions and that Custer’s action was not that unusual. His thinking also was motivated by the wide belief that the Indians were not going to fight a sustained action, but would try to flee, the most difficult job being rounding them up.
Whatever plan Custer may have had in mind (I’m not sure he really had one beyond frightening the Indians, rounding up hostages and forcing a surrender), it came unglued pretty quickly. Although Custer feared losing the element of surprise, the Indians really were surprised and both angered and terrified by the attack. But surprise alone did not work in Custer’s favor.
The book raises the question of how much Custer brought this on himself and how much blame lies with Reno and/or Benteen. Reno seems to have been in way over his head and also was apparently drunk throughout the engagement and incapable of real command. His retreat may have been necessary, but it was really botched into a chaotic rout. His men were coming under increasing fire and a retreat seems to have been inevitable, but it could have been done in a more orderly way. Reno himself seems to have simply grabbed a horse and his whiskey flask and run for it, while a few others were trying to organize a more orderly retreat. But Custer had promised to support Reno and he hadn’t done so. And Custer had set all of this in motion with no idea about Benteen's whereabouts.
Here and in other books Benteen comes off as a really dislikable, self-serving and somewhat sinister character. Donovan shows all of the man’s faults, but says he was a good soldier and would not have shirked his duties. Like other authors, Donovan praises Benteen's handling of the defense of Reno Hill, which probably prevented another massacre. Benteen hated Custer and defended himself largely by blaming Custer for vague or seemingly contradictory orders, and there is some justification for that considering how unclear Custer’s plan was. He just kept rethinking what to do as events unfolded and only gradually realized what he was really facing – not what he had assumed he would. More motivated officers may have responded more quickly, more forcefully and with more commitment than Reno and Benteen did, but Custer had no reason to believe the two were anything other than what they were.
Could/should Reno and Benteen have rushed to save Custer? I would like to read Gray’s Centennial Campaign next to get a better idea of the time lapses during the various stages of the battle. Most significantly is the question of when Reno and Benteen heard gunfire from Custer and how much time would have been needed for them to reform their troops and go to Custer. Also, would it have made a difference or just added to the cavalry’s body count? Donovan shows that a relief column did start out, despite a lack of action by Reno, but was turned back by an overwhelming Sioux force that had already dispatched Custer’s group and was coming down full-force on Reno and Benteen.
I was surprised by the number of Indian casualties, especially women and children. It emphasized that the overriding motivation of the Indians was to protect the village and to exact revenge on the bluecoats.
To his credit, Donovan notes where he is speculating and where evidence is either too thin or to contradictory to draw any definite conclusions, and where he has thus done his best with the evidence he has.
I came away convinced that Custer badly miscalculated the enemy’s size and how the Indians in an enormous camp would respond to a surprise attack. Custer mismanaged the attack by improvising on the scene, with Washita in mind, when he was actually facing something quite different. His men and horses were tired, his officers either ineffective or unimaginative and lacking in initiative. Maybe Benteen really did stall just for spite, not knowing that time was of the essence. On the other hand, maybe Custer should have kept his units closer and more coordinated. Reno failed miserably, but should Custer have expected much more from him? Also, Custer ignored repeated warnings from his scouts that the camp was the largest ever seen and that the Seventh might not be able to take it.
One area ripe for speculation is what might have happened if Custer had kept the entire unit together and attacked in a more unified way.
Ironic too is the similar motivations of U.S. officers and Indian warriors, both of whom sought personal glory in battle.
The Reno Inquiry is interesting in itself. It was basically a whitewash by mutual agreement among the survivors, either for the “honor of the regiment” or to cover themselves for various violations of their own during the battle.
There is a small section on Wounded Knee at the end, which is hard to take, but does add some details I hadn’t read before. I always come away from books on this topic wondering why some more peaceful way could not have been found to deal with the Plains Indians; why some part of the vast lands out there, much still unoccupied today, could not have been reserved for them.
AW
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Post by Jim Boylston on Jun 1, 2008 20:03:15 GMT -5
I just got my copy and have only read the first 100 pages or so, but I'm curious as to the reason for what seems like a major attitude change for Custer toward his men after the Civil War. Was the change due to the over-all environment? Was Custer so bored during peace time that he was overly harsh, or was it the change in the rank and file after the war?
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