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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 28, 2007 15:36:14 GMT -5
I was allowed out of my research cage long enough to pick up the August issue of Military Heritage magazine (with T.R. on the cover).
Page 20 has an interesting, brief article on the Little Big Horn by Adam Lynch that focuses on the actions and motivations of Reno and Benteen. The gist of the argument is that both were fully aware that Custer was under attack and fighting fiercely to the north and could have gone to him instead of hunkering down on the bluffs to the south of the Indian encampment.
Among what's new to me is the suggestion that the Indian attack on Reno Hill broke off very quickly as the Indians became aware that they were now under attack by more soldiers to the north (Custer) and all hurried to that position. The gist is that, after that point, Reno and Benteen (who had just joined him) were under no threat and could have gone to Custer's aid.
There are plenty of caveats, including testimony of survivors that it probably wouldn't have made any difference anyway. It's not certain how many able-bodied troops Reno and Benteen had anyway, given that Reno had suffered considerable casualties during the rout across the river. No one quoted in this piece disputes that it was, indeed, a rout. Reno didn't lead an orderly retreat; after Bloody Knife was shot in the head and his brains and blood were splattered onto Reno, he leapt on his horse, took off and yelled to the men that, if they wished to save themselves, they should, literally, head for the hills.
I also either didn't know or had forgotten that a small detachment, let by Capt. Thomas Weir, did start off for Custer, but turned back. By that time, they would only have been added to the body count.
Custer himself is portrayed as having ignored a number of warnings from Mitch Boyer, Curley and others that the camp was bigger than anyone had ever seen and filled with more Indians then they could handle. He had taken on more than he had anticipated and, after the Reno debacle, had no one to count on.
I get the feeling that the author believes that Reno and Benteen could have gone to Custer but simply elected not to do so. They clearly lied about their actions in later years and changed their story more than once. But the lion's share of the blame really does lie with Custer for having rushed into an ill-conceived attack that fell apart as soon as the Indians proved more resistent and aggressive than he had anticipated. Had Reno actually succeeded at the south end, or merely kept up his engagement of the Indians, it's possible that Custer could have created enough panic to put the Indians into disarray when they found themselves under attack at both ends. That was kind of demonstrated when they all left Reno on his hill and took off for the north when they learned of the attack there.
In any case, Lynch notes that there was only a window of 15-20 minutes for Reno to act decisively after Benteen's arrival and he was in no mental condition to mount an effective relief force. Weir took off on his own after arguing heatedly with Reno, but got only far enough to see that the troopers were already dead and the Indians were firing into the corpses.
It's been years since I read Gray's "Custer's Last Campaign," so I'm not sure how much of this is new thinking, but I recommend this piece to anyone interested in the Little Big Horn.
AW
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Post by Herb on Jul 28, 2007 18:40:22 GMT -5
Gray's time lines, excellent work, pretty well disprove most of that.
The problem is looking at where each of the columns were at a particular time.
Example:
1610 Reno's lead elements arrive Reno Hill. 1620 Benteen's lead elements arrive Reno Hill 1625 Firing heard from Custer position 1655 volley firing heard from Custer position, Weir request permission to move out. 1705 Weir, with his Company,D, advances without permission 1710 Last firing heard from Custer position 1720 Benteen with companies H,K, M advances to join Weir 1725 Pack Train + McDougal's Company arrive Reno Hill 1740 Reno leaves to join Weir 1750 Companies A,B, G and Pack Train leave to join Weir. 1800 Weir's advance halted by Indians begin withdrawal back to Reno Hill.
Times from Gray.
A few points:
In Reno's battalion Companies A and G had been pretty heavily mauled in the Valley and plain weren't capable of advancing until reorganized. Even in units that suffer only minor losses it's going to take a few minutes to reorganize (tend the wounded, redistribute ammo, reorganize the chain of command, issue new orders, etc.) to begin a new mission.
Although, the Custer fight began about 1620 or so, at that time the bulk of the Indians were still facing Reno.
Custer had departed Reno Hill at roughly 1515, He arrived at Weir Point at 1524 departed 1534 entered Medicine Trail Coulee at 1604 further split his command , Yate's Battalion makes contact at the Ford at 1618, While Custer moves to Luce and then Nye Cartwright Ridges with Keogh's Battalion. Keogh's Battalion makes contact at Nye-Cartwright 1632. Custer's command reunites at Calhoun Hill at 1646, fighting ends 1712. (times from US Army Command and General Staff College's Atlas of the Sioux Wars).
So given all that had the healthy units Benteen's Battalion and Company M, moved out as soon as firing was heard from Custer's position, 1625, (and abandoned two damaged companies and their wounded) Benteen would have arrived at Weir Point at roughly 1635. He would have entered Medicine Trail Coulee at roughly 1705 and reached Calhoun Hill at earliest 15 minutes and more probably 30 minutes after the last shot was fired and this is assuming his horses with two hours extra traveling would have been able to cover the same distance in the same time as Custer's minus the rests and pauses.
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Post by Herb on Jul 28, 2007 19:06:47 GMT -5
The real problem with Benteen, in my mind is what he did before arriving at Reno Hill. At about 1455 Benteen and his command was at the Morass, where they had already received one of Custer's earlier messages. Boston Custer, further back, with the Pack Train passes Benteen's command at the Morass and of course reaches his brother and joins his fate.
It takes Benteen 88 minutes to cover the same ground that Custer did in 70 minutes (from the Morass to Reno Hill). Plus Custer paused several times en route and stopped to water his horses at Reno Creek. Benteen received three messages to hurry and rejoin the Regiment and for the last 30 minutes of his march he could hear the Reno fight. While Benteen had a clear responsibility not to kill his horses en route to the battle - there very definitely appears to be a lack of urgency.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 28, 2007 20:46:41 GMT -5
The real problem with Benteen, in my mind is what he did before arriving at Reno Hill. At about 1455 Benteen and his command was at the Morass, where they had already received one of Custer's earlier messages. Boston Custer, further back, with the Pack Train passes Benteen's command at the Morass and of course reaches his brother and joins his fate. It takes Benteen 88 minutes to cover the same ground that Custer did in 70 minutes (from the Morass to Reno Hill). Plus Custer paused several times en route and stopped to water his horses at Reno Creek. Benteen received three messages to hurry and rejoin the Regiment and for the last 30 minutes of his march he could hear the Reno fight. While Benteen had a clear responsibility not to kill his horses en route to the battle - there very definitely appears to be a lack of urgency. Thanks for that enlightenment, Wolf; I'm rusty on this, but you've jogged my memory a bit. I think "Son of the Morning Star" goes into detail about Benteen deliberately taking his time and really having it in for Custer after he abandoned some soldiers following Washita. I recall Custer sending two messages to him to hurry up and join him and that he'd found very large camp and urging him to "bring packs," meaning the ammo wagons. (maybe there was a third message too). This article has one of those messengers quoting Benteen as saying "If I'm to come quickly, how can I bring the packs?," meaning the pack train would slow him down. Yet you point out that Boston went to Custer and got there (with the packs, I guess?). There is no mention here of Reno or Benteen making any effort to go to Custer and quotations from both of them at later hearings explaining why they didn't go. So their moving out is news to me (other than Weir; his move is even depicted in the TV movie "Son of the Morning Star," which I thought was pretty decent). An awful lot seems to have happened very quickly and things did not develop as Custer had planned. All of his actions seemed strange and by the seat of the pants to me; he kept dividing his forces; first Reno, Benteen, himself and the pack train; then his own immediate command of 210 troopers. At a minimum I'd have to say it wasn't his best day in the field. AW
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Post by Herb on Jul 28, 2007 21:14:11 GMT -5
No, Boston, started with the pack train, but left them when word filtered back, still he passed Benteen. The Pack Train did not arrive at Reno Hill until 1725 an hour after Benteen did.
I seem to recall Benteen's comment about the pack train and has actually demonstrated, he was right. I've forgotten how many packers were with the train, but with 7 soldiers per company plus McDougal's Company the Pack Train was at least as strong as Benteen's Battalion by itself.
As far as leaving Reno Hill, eventually every man did start forward, but by the time the last units began to move the Indians had already halted the advance. Weir did go off by himself and his company was alone for 15 minutes, before Benteen moved forward with the rest of his Battalion and Company M. Once the advance halted, the rearguard was mounted not by Weir, but by Godfrey and his company.
The very real problem and the one Gray addresses so well is time/distance. We don't really grasp how far 4 miles on a compartmented battle field is when you're moving by foot or horseback. And very obviously when in your in contact or expect contact your speed of march slows down a whole lot. A trot is the fastest sustained rate a horse can maintain (6 mph), a cavalry unit not in contact and in a hurry, would march about half an hour at a trot and another half at a walk (3mph). Otherwise, you'd break down your horses.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 29, 2007 12:50:40 GMT -5
In all fairness to Lynch, he does go into some of this and quotes from Gray and other sources. While he seems to want to expose the later testimony of Reno and Benteen as inaccurate, and his article focuses on what they did or did not do, I think the conclusion still puts the final responsibility for what happened on Custer's own misguided, ill-conceived plan. After all, Custer set up the situation when he split his forces that far apart around an objective that he never clearly saw or appreciated until it was too late.
Citing Gray, Lynch claims that a full hour elapsed from the time Benteen joined Reno until any effort was made to send relief to Custer, and then only after Weir constanly prodded them to move. Lynch says "Even then, it was a half-hearted advance. Benteen and Reno took only three companies down toward Custer's ;position. By then, the window of opportunity had closed. Custer's 220 men had been annihilated in a little less than an hour and the victorious Sioux and Cheyenne were now coming back upstream [toward Reno Hill]."
I think there are two key points here that the author does not emphasize. First, it's doubtful that any relief force would have made a difference; considering how long it would have taken the relief force to reach Custer (as laid out in your post), how scattered Custer's men were by that time, and the sheer numbers and ferocity of the Indian force, it's nearly certain that any additional force would have only added to the body count. Benteen later did openly admit that this was his thinking when he told a court of inquiry, "A movement could have been made down the river in the direction Custer had gone upon my arrival on the hill, but we would have all been there yet."
Second, I think that at least on Benteen's part the thinking was that they were lucky to have enjoyed a period of relief, while the Indians shifted to the north to attack Custer, during which they were able to prepare for a defense of the hill and save the surviving members of the force. Benteen has always been given the credit for organizing this defense and rallying the men, who did come undere repeated attack after Custer's fall. Lynch clearly explains this part of the fight. But I think Lynch is trying to clarify something that he summarizes in his final paragraph:
"The question remains: Could at least part of Custer's five companies have been saved? Whether Reno and Benteen might have pulled it off can never be known. That they didn't even try, and then grossly misrepresented the reasons why they didn't, is no longer open to dispute."
Among the things they apparently lied about was that they never heard any shots coming from Custer's position. All other surviving witnesses mentioned that they clearly heard shots and approximately when they began hearing them. Also, one of the PBS stations had a documentary on this issue where men went to the battle site and positioned themselves at the two points; they demonstrated that the shots clearly would have been heard on Reno Hill.
All of this may be academic; I think the blame lies with Custer himself and whether or not Reno and Benteen made a full, half-hearted or no effort to relieve him, the result would have been the same. I admire Weir for his determined effort to help his comrades, but it wouldn't have mattered.
As a side point, it is interesting that what was really a very small battle, with only around 200 casualties, and which really made little difference to the outcome of the those Indian wars, has been so elevated in importance in the literature. Almost nothing is said about the larger fight and more serious defeat that Crook had suffered only days before the Custer fight. Had Custer himself not been involved, I wonder if we'd even remember it anymore than we remember the equally ill-conceived Fetterman fight.
AW
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Post by Herb on Jul 29, 2007 14:34:48 GMT -5
I think the fate of MAJ Elliot and his men at the Washita was never far from the minds of Reno and his men.
They felt that they were the ones left in the lurch, and that Custer had abandoned them as he abandoned Elliot. Reno's battalion were defeated men in every sense of the word when Benteen arrived. Benteen who had been friends with Elliot, no doubt was enraged by what he saw on Reno Hill. The mental state of the most of the officers upon arriving at Reno Hill was self preservation first, Custer had abandoned them.
A very large number of the survivors of Reno's Battalion were suffering from shock, after having fought a pitched battle in the Valley and the bloody retreat to Reno Hill over the course of almost an hour of constant fighting. (Note that Reno's three companies held out on their own almost twice as long as Custer's five).
A truly good officer would probably have organized the defense of Reno Hill and promptly moved off with at least 3 of the 4 companies in relatively good shape, but even that would have taken 15 - 20 minutes. That the effort began with a subordinate Weir and dragged the remainder of the force is an indictment on Benteen and Reno, but even had it happened in a timely matter it was too late. BTW, I believe Godfrey seeing Weir move out, led his own company out without orders, too.
Something happened with Custer, that the fight was over so rapidly. The obvious answer is panic, but something had to cause the panic. Based on the archeology, most are convinced, that the panic began in Tom Custer's company WSW of Calhoun Hill, that these panicked men swamped the southern end of Calhoun's skirmish line causing the collapse of that portion of the skirmish line and spread to Keogh's company NW of Calhoun. Up until something caused Tom Custer's company to break, the evidence is that the five companies had been moving, skirmishing, and fighting under control.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 29, 2007 21:54:31 GMT -5
Wolf,
As I recall, a lot of this information is taken from the most recent archeological work at the site. Do you know of an up-to-date text that summarizes these findings?
I think there was some chaos due to the fact that Custer had again further divided his forces when he reached the area of the battle. I also recall reading that at least some of his men did go down to the river itself, where there weren't many Indians at all.; the warrioros apparently were tied up with Reno at the other end of the village and only hysterical, frightened women and children were at the north end. I'm pretty vague on this, but apparently Custer's troops may have wondered where all the Indians were, and then got taken by surprise when they arrived en masse from the south, after driving Reno up the hill and then being told the village was under attack at the north. It does seem they should have been able to make a more organized defense that would have lasted longer. As it was, I understand the Indians did suffer casualties -- more than you'd think given the usual picture of the battle as a quick, overwhelming wipe out. I had not heard the info on Tom Custer's company. I gather what you're describing is a panic by those men, perhaps disorganized running from their position and breaking the southern end of the skirmish line. I still think the outcome would have been the same.
Another issue -- how important do you think the difference in weapons was? The Indians had many repeating rifles, but the troopers were still equipped with single shot rifles (I forget which model), which ammunition that tended to jam in the breach as the guns heated from repeated firing. They could have found themselves seriously outgunned by the Indians, who were also, apparently, really mad as hell and fought with extreme determination that day.
AW
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Post by stuart on Jul 30, 2007 7:26:51 GMT -5
Another issue -- how important do you think the difference in weapons was? The Indians had many repeating rifles, but the troopers were still equipped with single shot rifles (I forget which model), which ammunition that tended to jam in the breach as the guns heated from repeated firing. They could have found themselves seriously outgunned by the Indians, who were also, apparently, really mad as hell and fought with extreme determination that day. AW I'll be interested to hear what the archaeology has to say about this. While not denying that there were sometimes extractor problems with the Springfield I think that the business of the the Souix supposedly being armed with large numbers of repeaters may be exaggerated. After all how else could a bunch of savages wipe out America's finest...
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 30, 2007 9:17:17 GMT -5
Again, I'm rusty on this when it comes to details, but what I recall of the archeology findings, there were many cartridge casings found at the sight indicating a considerable number of repeating rifles among the Indians. The advantage of the Springfield, as I recall, was in its range and accuracy, but not the best weapon when being pressed with that kind of overwhelming attack. The troopers also had revolvers. They did not have sabers; they had been left back at Fort Lincoln along with the gattling guns Custer didn't want.
Again, this is from memory, but I believe the positions of the various companies with Custer was ascertained by the location of large numbers of shell casings. I think the location of the bodies was marked in some way as well, although they may have been moved somewhat by the Indians who stripped and mutilated them.
Something I've always found a bit eerie and, perhaps sad are Sitting Bull's two visions regardng this battle. The first was the one in which he saw "soldiers falling upside down," which he interpreted as a coming victory over the troopers. Whether this presaged the Crook or Custer fights I don't know (maybe he didn't either). The second was his caution to the warriors and women not to strip or mutilate the bodies of the dead because that would lead to their ultimate destruction. Clearly they enjoyed big victories over Crook and Custer, but were doomed from that day forward. I think that was in "Little Big Man" when Old Lodge Skins says "We won today; we won't win tomorrow."
AW
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Post by Herb on Jul 30, 2007 9:52:27 GMT -5
One of the more interesting things, that the archaeological studies did about 20(?) years ago after a fire burned off much of the battleground, was collect and analyze cartridge cases.
I forget how many different weapons, but want to say it was around 700 individual weapons, they identified, from among the Indians, but it was quite a number. Not surprising it ranged everywhere from muzzle loaders to the latest repeaters. Among the repeaters were Henrys, Winchesters, and Spencers (the 7th had originally been equipped with Spencers, but with the standardization in 1873, turned them in for the single shot Springfields).
I want to say they identified over 200 repeaters among the Indians. They identified one Indian position, that they named Henryville for the vast number of repeater cartridges found at the site. The forensic work they did, to me, was incredible. Besides identifying the type of weapon from the cartridge, they went on to identify the specific weapon and tracked individual movements around the battlefield by their specific cartridge case locations. By tracking the soldier cartridges, and tying in their movements with Curley's accounts and the victorious Indian accounts, is where they came up with the conclusion that Tom Custer's C company collapsed in panic and pretty much caused the relatively early total overall collapse. Another example is that for the exception of Company C, the majority of men from every other company died in close proximity to each other. C Company's dead are spread throughout the battlefield. To me one of the troubling aspects of this is that both Tom Custer, the commander, and his First Sergeant were found on Custer Hill, while most of the men died in their original positions, Calhoun Hill, Keogh's position and running from Keogh's position to Custer Hill.
The Regiment had been operating in four 3 company battalions for some time, Reno, Benteen, Yates, and Keogh. It seems Custer, task organized each day based on which companies were ready to march first, ie the last company ready became the guard for the pack train, while the other companies were assigned to an order of march based on when they were ready to go. Obviously, a huge advantage to being first and avoiding the trail dust - and manure - of the lead companies. On the 25th McDougall was apparently lucky by being last - otherwise he would have been with Yates' battalion.
I have one book on the archeology, there's a lot out there. Richard Fox's 1993 Archeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle. There's a lot of things I disliked about the book, to his credit he studied cavalry doctrine and tried to apply it to his archaeological findings, but he did not consider the impact of terrain on doctrine, nor the NCO's role on a skirmish line. He also concluded that the Springfield, based on its long range accuracy was a superior weapon to the repeaters, ignoring the fact that the battle was largely fought at 200 yards or less. (Again, to his credit, I caught a recent TV show where he now considers the repeaters to have played a key role, and he is far less rigid on doctrine). It's still a very good book, for the archaeological findings. Some of his conclusions, don't stand up from a professional military viewpoint, and as I said it appears he has at least modified them somewhat since writing the book.
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Post by stuart on Jul 30, 2007 10:50:42 GMT -5
That's basically how I remember what I've read, less the detail about Tom Custer. I'm just still not entirely convinced about the repeaters. Sure the Indians had them and on the basis of the cartridge case finds at least some of them were going through a lot of rounds, but as you'll know yourself that doesn't necessarily translate into accurate fire, which is why I'm questioning the received wisdom that the troopers were outgunned. I think, on the basis of the archaeology that it was certainly a noisy fight, but something happened which triggered the cavalry's collapse and that wasn't losing the firefight
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Post by Herb on Jul 30, 2007 11:14:18 GMT -5
but something happened which triggered the cavalry's collapse and that wasn't losing the firefight Yeah, that's what I find puzzling, the movements, skirmishing, etc. had all been organized, they'd been in contact for a while, by now they knew the size of their foe, so why the sudden collapse? Two questions, that the popular theories have never answered for me is why was Tom Custer and his First Sergeant not with their company? In fact, they were found with an entirely separate battalion. The other was why was George Custer found/operating with the smaller battalion once the two battalions rejoined at Calhoun Hill? The most popular theory right now is that Custer was still mounting offensive operations against the village with Yates Battalion and Keogh's was acting as a rearguard/waiting for Benteen. To me this doesn't make sense, if I was mounting an attack I'd go with the larger battalion and leave the smaller battalion as my rearguard especially if I thought three more companies would be arriving soon to reinforce it!
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Post by stuart on Jul 30, 2007 11:51:13 GMT -5
I suppose the most obvious answer to the second question is that Yates was killed or wounded early on and Custer came across to rally and take personal charge of that battalion, but it still leaves the first one unanswered.
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Post by sloanrodgers on Jul 30, 2007 12:03:40 GMT -5
You guys may be aware that the June issue of Wild West has a few stories related to Col. Custer and the Bighorn. A fellow named Finkle claims that he survived the battle, but I'm a little skeptical about the evidence. Anyway check it out as it's pretty interesting.
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