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Post by sloanrodgers on Jul 15, 2012 18:22:35 GMT -5
From what I've gathered about the Comanche, they didn't use their raiding tactics against military targets. They raided brutally and continually on towns and villages, including those of both whites and other tribes, that were virtually defenseless against them. Their objectives were to steal goods and livestock and to take captives that could either be sold as slaves or integrated into their tribe. That's partly true, but the Comanches and allied tribes also on occasion attacked Spanish forts, fought Spanish, Mexican and American armies and numerous Indian tribes throughout the southwest. People placed in conflict with a common enemy are often inspired to step outside their comfort zone, common behavior or tactics, especially with the possibilty of pay or plunder. The majority of early Texans were simple farmers, not warriors. That didn't stop them from dropping their plowshears, picking up arms and enlisting in the Texas Revolution and various plundering expeditions against Mexico in the years afterward. All I'm saying is that with the Indians' good feeling toward Sam Houston, there was a brief opportunity to use the Comanche and other tribes against the Mexicans in some way with guerrilla tactics. As I said before I would have enlisted and trained a regular army to take on the actual Mexican force in a conclusive fight. That's just my alternative strategy to a Texas government in disarray only gathering rag-tag militia units, sending them out on wild goose chases to the border or forting-up in missions. If the Comanche and others weren't feared by the Spanish, Mexicans and Texans, they would not have signed so many treaties with them.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Jul 16, 2012 8:43:16 GMT -5
Hindsight is always 20/20, as they say, and that's the problem with any "what-if" scenario. Still, it IS fun, interesting and even enlightening to consider what might have happened if ...
Perhaps some of these scenarios were considered, even if only briefly, and rejected for reasons we may never know. We talk about recon missions to the Rio Grande, but why not even further south? This was all part of Mexico back then. so the current border really didn't exist back then. The biggest miscalculation in the whole sequence of events leading to the fall of the Alamo was underestimating SA's arrival in Bexar. The Alamo simply was not prepared for such an early arrival. Defenses were still weak and the manpower needed to defend the place just wasn't there.
If the Mexican force's early march and position and size of the force were known early enough, might a decision been made to truly abandon Bexar and wait to fight another day? Once they arrived, it was too late to do much other than stay and fight or surrender. Not much of a choice. Sure, they still could have attempted to bug out, but Travis and company still expected a large number of reinforcements, so they saw no reason to pull stakes at that point.
Of course, I have no clue what I'm talking about, since I'm simply thinking out loud.
Paul
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Post by Herb on Jul 16, 2012 9:45:27 GMT -5
Paul, the problem is they did know about the strength, location and rate of march of the Mexican army, see Neil's letters. With Sesma relativity inactive and Neil's and probably scout Deaf Smith's departure from Bexar, Travis apparently grew complacent - assuming Sesma would remain idle until the main body closed up. This is the only plausible explanation, for assuming an early to mid March arrival of the Mexican army. That Travis failed to keep scouts observing Sesma only a couple of days away from Bexar, after Smith left is absolutely mind boggling!
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 16, 2012 12:44:37 GMT -5
Herb: I completely agree. You always keep your eye on the other guy, even though you may not be able to to do a darn think about his movements or lack thereof. Intelligence, even of the negative kind is still intelligence. An unforgivable sin on the part of Travis, and one never completely understood or accepted by the gallant last standers.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Jul 16, 2012 19:31:19 GMT -5
Well, considering the townspeople seemed to know what was up to the point they were bugging out, it IS mind boggling that Travis and company couldn't sense what was days or hours away. Out of sight, out of mind, I guess.
Paul
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Post by sloanrodgers on Jul 17, 2012 8:25:00 GMT -5
Travis should have certainly deployed a few rangers or Indian scouts. Hammer or Depp at the least.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Jul 17, 2012 13:35:48 GMT -5
Neill said there were no mounts to send out scouts. The garrison pastured what horses they had on Salado Creek, five miles east of town.
I have a tendancy to think that Travis, Bowie and the others -- to a degree -- pretty well knew and believed the location of the vanguard, but kept that information confidential in order to not panic the men or the townspeople by giving credence to what could still just be passed off as local Mexican rumor.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 17, 2012 15:20:28 GMT -5
Rich, lets say that is so then to what do you attribute them getting caught with their pants around their knees on 23 February? Sounds none to smart to me.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 17, 2012 16:33:13 GMT -5
It's the surprise attack on Feb. 23 that strongly suggests that, while Travis may have had some intel, he did not have any sort of really effective scouting operation. He was dancing the night away when reports did reach him of the Mexican advance, but couldn't be bothered, unless those accounts are aprocraphyl.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Jul 17, 2012 18:41:20 GMT -5
It's the surprise attack on Feb. 23 that strongly suggests that, while Travis may have had some intel, he did not have any sort of really effective scouting operation. He was dancing the night away when reports did reach him of the Mexican advance, but couldn't be bothered, unless those accounts are aprocraphyl. BINGO! And that is exactly what led me to say in my initial response. They were caught with their pant's down on Feb. 23, which leads me to believe they had no real clue exactly how close the force was. I might know with relative certainty that it will snow here this winter, but without good intel (weather forecasts, etc.) I can't tell you when. Paul
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Post by Herb on Jul 17, 2012 23:12:46 GMT -5
Iirc, the "horses" letter from Neil was before mounted reinforcements arrived. Neil in fact requested that Travis' cavalry command be expedited to him for use between Bexar and Sesma. One of the thongs he wanted Travis to do is burn the bridges on the el Camino south (or west) of Bexar.
From Almonte, we know that Neil succeeded in burning the bridges and that it basically added two days to Sesma's march. We don't know if Travis did it or Bowie's men (both possible) or more than likely Deaf Smith. We just know it was done some time in early February.
While the lack of horses prevented the large scale movement of the garrison, by the time Bowie's and Travis reinforcements arrived (both companies mounted), there were more than enough horses to keep scouts in the field.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 18, 2012 8:20:23 GMT -5
There sure were horses enough to send Smith and Sutherland out on the morning of the 23rd to find out the Mexicans were almost at the door. Why weren't they or others out there on a routine basis keeping their eye on things?
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Post by loucapitano on Jul 18, 2012 19:25:08 GMT -5
Napoleon had a maxim that rings so true. He advised that commanders should awaken every morning and face each point of the compass and ask himself what would I do if the enemy suddenly appeared. Every great commander has followed that advice. Many did not...like , Montcalm, Hooker, Custer, Maggeneaux...and Travis. They all paid the price. No question of bravery, but fatally flawed as military leaders.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 19, 2012 10:10:33 GMT -5
I don't think by now there is anyone who thinks that Travis rates high in my book as a commander, if for no other reason than his failure to keep his scouts out. I do believe though that a better, well at least a more interesting, question might be what could or would he have done about it if he had kept scouting and detected the vanguard brigade much earlier, say on the 19th or 20th of February? My answer is not much, but I would like to hear your thoughts.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 19, 2012 10:25:56 GMT -5
Good question, Chuck. I'm wondering how much he COULD have done with the limited resources he had. Their only options seemed to be to hole up and hope for help, or retreated, possibly to Gonzales, and tried to improve those resources. They made the first choice, which was partly forced on them with the undetected early arrival of Sesma and partly by the strategy they'd followed all along, even under Neill ("hold until relieved"). I've never thought that was a sound or well-thought-out strategy.
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