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Post by loucapitano on May 5, 2012 10:45:15 GMT -5
None of the Mexican witnesses to the battle ever claimed that the attacking columns used volley fire against the Alamo. It appears the soldados fired on the run if they fired at all. To reload, the soldier had to stop and likely be whipped on by NCOs and officers who knew how important it was to reach the shadow of the walls. Soldiers fumbling with ammunition in the dark would provide stationary targets for the few Texan riflemen and certainly inviting targets for artillery. One of the interesting scenes in the 2004 Alamo was the young soldados who reloads at the foot of the North Wall. It demonstrated how cumbersom reloading a Brown Bess musket could be, even with pre-measured cartridges. Yet apparently, enough reloading was done to "consume" thousands of rounds as Hirem points out. Whether the Mexicans achieved complete surprise, will be long debated. Those who believe the Texans on the North Wall were quickly overwelmed in 5 to 10 minutes probably favor the complete surprise scenario. Those who see the battle for the North Wall taking 15 to 25 minutes must assume that the attack was not a complete surprise and the Texans could mount a defense that took time to overwelm. Personally, I favor the latter, but, like all things Alamo, I try to keep an open mind and follow what little evidence exists. What could be more fun than that?
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Post by jamesg on May 5, 2012 12:05:19 GMT -5
sound much like more Mexican soldados than bullets could be fired..overwheming
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Post by Herb on May 5, 2012 12:10:11 GMT -5
There is one major problem with the "not surprised" scenario, the Mexican Army occupied positions within 300 yards of the walls - some accounts say within musket shot, for at least two hours prior to the actual attack. Very clearly, they were undetected, the garrison was not alerted, and the Mexicans were not fired on until AFTER the noise of the attacking columns alerted the garrison. This is by definition, surprise.
If you have Hansen reread all of Joe's accounts, he makes it very clear that there were indeed guards on the wall (as Hiram points out) as well as the pickets outside, but that the garrison as a whole were asleep in their barracks. Whether, the Texans expected an attack before a breech was made or not, doesn't matter, they were still surprised with the predawn attack on the 6th.
I have no problem that the battle at the north wall lasted more than 15 minutes, it would almost certainly take that long for the attack to stall, and DLP run back to report Duque's wounds, Santa Anna to send in the reserves and for them to reach the wall. Remember, the commander of the reserves was one of the first men to reach the top of the wall (and survive) according to the Mexican accounts.
As far as the number of cartridges, given several skirmishes early in the siege, a major battle, normal replacement for damaged cartridges and the normal waste in all military supplies while on campaign, and the example of other battles, it doesn't seem excessive.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 5, 2012 12:50:58 GMT -5
I also wonder how many rounds were fired into the defenders' corpses after the battle. I agree the attack could have foundered for 15-20 minutes before the troops made it over the wall, as Herb explained. As I saie earlier, they were clearly milling around along the walls for some period of time and did take some hits from some of the Alamo artillery.
I also have to wonder why there wasn't more resistance at the south end or (as far as I know) any Alamo artillery fire from there (the SW corner) toward Morales' unit. How many defenders were there and how surprised were they? Morales did come under fire, probably from the tambour and the SW corner, but no cannon fire that I can recall. Then they too were overwhelmed by numbers. I have to wonder if that attack was somehow timed to take advantage of Texan preoccupation with the bulk of the attack coming at the north.
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Post by Herb on May 5, 2012 13:22:42 GMT -5
Assume the fight at the North Wall took 20 minutes, according to Huffines a soldier in a Mexican line company only carried 20 cartridges. If he only fired one round a minute, a slow rate of fire, he expended all his ammunition before the wall fell.
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Post by TRK on May 5, 2012 15:28:14 GMT -5
according to Huffines a soldier in a Mexican line company only carried 20 cartridges. Contrast this: Santa Anna's attack orders of 5 March 1836 specified that each fusilero was to be issued four paradas of cartridges, and each granadero and cazador was to be issued six paradas. A parada was a packet or bundle of cartidges. The number in each parada was ill defined. Gregg Dimmick estimates that each one comprised 8 to 10 cartridges, and I agree with that. Not that a Mexican parada de cartuchos necessarily translated to an American Civil War packet of musket cartridges, but during that war, 10-round packets were commonplace. If we go by that formula, and if the attack orders were followed closely, each fusilero was issued 32 to 40 rounds, and each member of the flank companies was issued 48 to 60 rounds.
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Post by Herb on May 5, 2012 18:36:22 GMT -5
Agree that the packages were probably 10 cartridges each, haven't checked other translations of the order, but "Blood of Noble Men" says two packs for the line companies. Personally 40 rounds seems more appropriate.
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Post by TRK on May 5, 2012 19:42:30 GMT -5
Huffines, p. 118, got it wrong when he wrote that the center companies (i.e., fusileros) were supplied with "two packages" of cartridges. For that matter, so did Hansen, Alamo Reader, 338. I have image files from the Archivo Historico, SEDENA (Mexican Secretary of Defense Historical Archive), of Ramon Martinez Caro's certified copy, dated Bejar, March 6, 1836, of Santa Anna's March 5 attack orders, and it clearly states that the fusileros were each to be issured "cuatro" (four) paradas of cartridges. Filisola, in his Memorias (1849) also says four paradas, not two.
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Post by Tom Nuckols on May 6, 2012 1:32:49 GMT -5
Were 36,000 hundred rounds “consumed” during the final battle, or during the 13 day siege? There were several attacks over 13 days, so many rounds were “consumed” before March 6th. And what does “consumed” mean? The soldados’ gunpowder was reportedly so bad that their shots would bounce off the Texians without even penetrating their clothes. The soldados had marched through snow, rain, swollen rivers, etc. How many of the 36,000 cartridges misfired, were discarded when soggy, or were otherwise “consumed” without ever harming a Texian? (This may explain the discrepancy between Joe’s account of Travis’ death and other accounts: Joe thought Travis died instantly from a head shot, so Joe ran away. Perhaps the weak Mexican powder led Travis only to be momentarily stunned by the head shot. After Joe fled in fear, Travis recovered and stabbed the Mexican officer who stabbed him.) Finally, why assume all or most of the soldados’ rounds were “consumed” before they mounted the walls, however long it took? It seems more likely that the soldados "consumed" more rounds afterwards, when the defenders had holed up inside the compound. Would the soldados not have been "consuming" hundreds of rounds of suppressive fire to keep the Texians holed-up and on the defensive while their comrades blasted the holed-up Texians with the Alamo’s cannons?
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Post by cantador4u on May 7, 2012 16:28:18 GMT -5
How does the speculation of a potential surrender fit into the explanation of the Alamo's "deep sleep" the night of the final attack?
- Paul Meske
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 7, 2012 20:03:05 GMT -5
I don't see the connection Paul.
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Post by cantador4u on May 8, 2012 20:19:43 GMT -5
My recollection is that there is speculation that Travis had been negotiating a surrender and though no agreement had been reached this led to the defenders feeling they did not have to worry about an attack because who in their right mind would sacrifice his soldiers by attacking an enemy who is about to surrender. Read reply #2 alamostudies.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=alamohistory&action=display&thread=13Quote: "We know from Travis final letters, that his outlook was far gloomier than before. With the Mexican reinforcement on March 3rd, no significant reinforcements for the defenders and with Bonhams news, Travis may very well looked at the situation as doomed an attempted an honorable surrender. If he indeed reached that conclusion and attempted to do so as related by Filisola only to be rejected, it would seem only realistic that he would NOW plan an escape. However, as the negotiations happened the evening/night of March 5th, Travis has lost valuable preparation time and more importantly the needed darkness to execute an escape. I'd suggest that Travis planned an escape for the night of March 6th. Which may also help explain why nearly the whole garrison was asleep when the attack did come. DLP may have heard of this plan after the battle and simply got times wrong.
Speculative, but I believe the evidence tends to support it. " - Paul Meske
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Post by Herb on May 8, 2012 21:14:33 GMT -5
Paul, a lot of research, later, there is indeed evidence that Travis may have done some negotiations the night of the 5th, but today I wouldn't say the evidence is conclusive. Almonte's complete journal is now readily available in Jack Jackson's book or in Hanson, it shows pretty convincingly that there was never a night time bombardment and thus the events the night of March 5th were the same routine the garrison had experienced since the night attack on the 25th (?). I am sure that at some time after March 3rd escape was discussed, but I don't think there is any evidence of it actually being planned.
Jim Donovan's new book, emphasizes a couple of accounts though that says the garrison expected to be attacked on the 6th. Obviously, they didn't expect a pre dawn attack or more of the garrison would have been alert and the rest would have been sleeping at the walls not in the barracks!
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Post by estebans on May 8, 2012 22:35:07 GMT -5
And by "escape," I have to wonder that might also have meant the exit of a somewhat organized party or parties under covering fire in the event of an assault, due to the possibility that at least one coherent breakout group left with support from the Alamo artillery. It would have helped to talk about that in advance, though of course they could have improvised it.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 8, 2012 22:56:12 GMT -5
Speaking of escape, Donovan's new book has a compelling "Afterword" on the Louis "Moses" Rose story that lends considerable credibility to it. If true, it confirms that escape was possible, although a mass escape would not have been.
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