|
Post by jamesg on Apr 18, 2012 16:24:34 GMT -5
the reliance on Fannin I also believe a key issue.
Fannin let them down..... His Leadership (or Lack of) is Probably why Goliad with a larger loss of Life Is Less focused on than the Alamo in overall Texas History.
|
|
|
Post by daverothe on Apr 18, 2012 17:55:43 GMT -5
if you look at it from defensive point of view, the ability to sustain a siege for a long duration was entirely possible. Fannin had anywhere between 350 to 500 men at Goliad. If they travelled light and not worried about oxen carts, they could have been able to reach the Alamo with ease. Instead, they procrastinated and tried to bring much more than was necessary.
600 people could have defended the Alamo long enough for Houston to finish assembling the rest of his conditional Army.
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 18, 2012 19:01:38 GMT -5
I'm not sure that's really true. That many more men would have made a lot tougher fight of it, but if the Mexican siege guns arrived, plus the reiforcements they received on March 3, the north wall would not have held indefinitely and a successful assault might still have been possible. I do think it would have been a lot tougher, especially if the men were not all asleep in the barracks and taken by surprise. Also there is the question of how/if Fannin's men could have fought their way into the Alamo, with whatever artillery, wagons, oxen, provisions they had brought along. Santa Anna was aware that there might be reinforcements on the way and had sent Sesma and others out to intercept them. There could have been a pitched battle far from the Alamo with Fannin's force and, given his performance at Coleto Creek, every possibility it would not have ended any differently.
The lone factor in Fannin's defense is that he did have intel that Urrea was in his area and he had an obligation to maintain some defense of Goliad. Thus, he could not have taken the entire garrison with him anyway. At least some military analysts have supported him sending no reinforcements, given his responsibilities in holding Goliad.
Fannin's position is another indication of how bad the so-called provisional government really was. It had already ruptured into rival factions (Gov. Smith on the one side, the Council and its governor, Robinson, on the other), with each side giving out conflicting orders, as if the other didn't exist. Thus, Smith regarded Houston as commander in chief; the Council faction named Fannin CIC of the army, which, to paraphrase Groucho Marx, will give you some idea of the army. You have to wonder how Fannin got or held such a position, since he wrote to the Council several times clearly stating that he had no leadership qualities, was not a fit commander, and wanted to be replaced. This is the guy the Alamo was hoping would defend them.
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Apr 18, 2012 19:48:37 GMT -5
I am going to go way out on a limb here, a concept not unknown to me.
Were I Santa Anna, and the exact same deployments (The Alamo, Goliad, with Houston gathering together the bits and pieces in the interior) the government, expressed in kind terms, in disarray, and given that I had in place intelligence assets keeping me informed of events, I believe I would have done the following.
1) Ordered Urrea to back way off Goliad, but keep it under observation, in hopes that a false sense of security would "encourage" Fannin to go to the relief of the Alamo.
2) So encouraged Fannin moves, Santa Anna backs off San Antonio, at least back to the Medina, preferably further. Fannin walks right into and sits right down in the Alamo. If he leaves a garrision at Goliad, no problem, fruit for later picking.
3) The above accomplished Santa Anna and Urrea's forces swiftly reverse direction, and both rapidly concentrate on San Antonio and sit for a long siesta until additional forces arrive on 3 March.
4) Leaving enough forces in place to contain those in the Alamo, 1200 should do, take the bulk of the enlarged force, choose ground for a defensive battle north and east of San Antonio, and wait for enough pressure to be applied to Houston by that government of incompetent baboons until he marches to the relief of the Alamo, or resigns in disgust and one of those young firebrand incompetents takes his place and marches to San Antonio and defeat. Meanwhile the Alamo is contained and starving and there would be plenty of time to pick rotting fruit, during the encore.
Time is on Santa Anna side here. He has the makings of a first class logistical base in San Antonio. There is no reason to hurry, except possibly a self imposed hurry brought on by inflated ego.
This to me ain't hard folks. It's a variation of Jackson marching out of the Valley in 62, then swiftly coming back and thumping Banks, Fremont, and Sheilds.
Of course if no one takes the bait, I (as Santa Anna) am no worse off than before.
Your thoughts are most welcome
|
|
|
Post by sloanrodgers on Apr 18, 2012 20:45:08 GMT -5
Time is on Santa Anna side here. He has the makings of a first class logistical base in San Antonio. There is no reason to hurry, except possibly a self imposed hurry brought ion by inflated ego. This to me ain't hard folks. It's a variation of Jackson marching out of the Valley in 62, then coming swiftly coming back and thumping Banks, Fremont, and Sheilds. Of course if no one takes the bait, I (as Santa Anna) am no worse off than before. Your thoughts are most welcome It's even simplier to me with the three Ms, but I'm no generalissimo. Santa Anna had the Men, Muscle (light cannon) and the Momentum for a campagne that the 1836 Texas army never had until Groce's Plantation. What they needed was a miracle or a mistake by Santa Anna and thankfully he provided a few errors.
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Apr 18, 2012 20:56:44 GMT -5
Well, Chuck, the biggest difference between your scenario is unlike Jackson's Valley Campaign is that Santa Anna force was superior in numbers to the total Texas force, unlike Jackson who faced 3 columns of equal or superior size. Plus Santa Anna was far superior in cavalry and logistics.
But, I agree with the over all assessment. A fight west of the Colorado River, even if initially sucessful, would have probably resulted in an ultimate Texans defeat. A Fabian Strategy, or possibly an opposed river crossing were the only ways that Texas could defeat Santa Anna's numbers.
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Apr 18, 2012 21:33:11 GMT -5
For God sake Herb can't I hedge my bets. Never send five when ten are better.
Fabius Maximus was a cousin twice removed on my mother's side who was thought to be somewhat loosely related to the Yellow Rose of Texas. by proxy.
|
|
|
Post by jamesg on Apr 18, 2012 22:14:20 GMT -5
As Long as we're arm chair generaling..I never understood why Houston's army didn't fight San Anna when the Mexicans crossed rivers and at most it weakest. Opposed river crossing is not what any army wants. Time Consuming his men and supplies trying to find other crossings another effort..how far off the Path would he be will to march his army to Find a River Crossing and cross unopposed? Time Spent building Boats to ferry men across? One Texian Army Company Under Mosely Baker fought a good delaying action on a River.... imagine The Texian army doing This Matching the Mexicans as the move up and down river. A long delaying action!!! If They Can't Cross They can't Conquer Longer They Hold them more Texians can get their familes to safety and then join the Army...my 2 cents
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Apr 18, 2012 22:29:11 GMT -5
James: Beating the Mexican Army at a river crossing or in the lobby of the Menger Hotel was not the objective Houston had to set for himself. Beating Santa Anna was the objective. He had to do it with one die roll. He had to catch the bugger. He had to force him into making peace on Houston's terms. He had to give him no choice. You could kill, wound or capture a bazillion Mexican soldiers but if you did not bag the big guy, you efforts were futile.
Read up on Fabius, and the whys and wherefores of Fabius, then insert the grim determination of a Houston, mix it, shaken not stired, light a cigar, sit in your favorite chair and ruminate on the work of the masters. San Jacinto was in my poor inadequetly informed view the most important battle ever fought on the North American Continent, and it was orchestrated by a man who mastered the concepts of Fabius Maximus.
|
|
|
Post by Tom Nuckols on Apr 18, 2012 22:54:28 GMT -5
All told, the key strategic decision that made Texas possible was Houston's pragmatic decision to go to the east and force SA to extend his lines, rather than to surrender to popular passions of the day and make a politicially popular, but militarily foolish, fight at Bexar, the Colorado, or some other place where the odds were even worse than at San Jancinto. Houston's decision to make the battleground in the east lowered the odds against a loose band of Texans defeating an organized Mexican army that outnumbered them tremendously. I say he deserves to have a city named after him.
|
|
|
Post by jamesg on Apr 19, 2012 1:56:10 GMT -5
Chuck, Yes Sir I agree The Battle Of San Jacinto... Defies logic yet it is a Fact of our History and I quite happy with the out come.... and Houston should get the Credit.
my comments about fight at river crossings was I thought we were going thru the "What If ..wargames" and actually had good odds....but not for catching SA.
Ah Yes. Fabius Maximus "the great delayer" against Hannibal.
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Apr 19, 2012 7:37:30 GMT -5
And James, I would agree with both you and my good friend Herb that a river crossing battle was one way to even the odds considerably, and would perhaps be Houston's choice of venue, had it not been for the fact that Santa Anna was not only the Mexican commander in the field, but also the Mexican president.
In a normal situation though, when you stop, even defeat the adversary at the waters edge, the battle is won, and your adversary withdraws to either go back home or maneuver and fight another day. To accomplish his mission of getting Santa Anna in the bag in the aftermath of a river crossing battle Houston would have had to cross that same river and persue, and most likely end up with an empty bag.
|
|
|
Post by daverothe on Apr 19, 2012 8:43:21 GMT -5
Chuck, that was a really interesting point of view. I had actually never thought about it that way before. Tactically, it makes sense. Why commit a full frontal assault when you can starve them out. Make Fannin come and consolidate them all in one place. Unite the Armies of Urrea and SA and make them completely cut off San Antonio from Houston.
As for San Jacinto, I agree that sometimes fate happens to fall on your side. If you consider what would have happened if SA had not been caught taking a siesta, things may have been different. You have to figure that Houston knew his back was to the water and had to do something. He cut off escape when Deaf Smith took out the bridge. This essentially committed both armies and a conclusion one way or another would have to be met. The only way that I can see Houston winning was exactly the way it did.....catch SA in a weak moment and exploit it will ruthless aggression and commit all forces so the enemy cannot retailate.
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 19, 2012 8:58:15 GMT -5
At San Jacinto, I wonder if Santa Anna did not display the same kind of hubris the Texans did after their relatively easy early victories over the Mexicans, especially taking Bexar from Cos. I think they believed the Mexicans were paper tigers who be easily beaten, should they return. Santa Anna had similarly cruised through early victories at the Alamo, Goliad, as well as the smaller victories over Grant and Johnson. At San Jacinto, had he developed a belief that the Texans were less than paper tigers, would be easily mopped up, and were incapable of beating the Mexicans?
He seems to have dropped his guard at San Jacinto, even though he had good intel that the Texans were massed nearby and might attack at any time. Houston hesitated long enough for Mexican reinforcements to arrive, perhaps making Santa Anna feel more secure. Why the siesta and near stand-down instead of full alert? Was Santa Anna pulling a Travis here? Whatever the reason, he miscalulated - fatally.
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Apr 19, 2012 9:18:21 GMT -5
Allen: In my view the most brilliant part of the whole thing was in the waiting for the tail end of the Mexican Army to join up with the main body. The worst thing that could happen to Houston was to fight the main body prematurely and have that last element show up mid battle as Blucher did at Waterloo. It would have thrown everything into a cocked hat.
Don't know much about San Jacinto so I will ask this question confident that someone will know. What was the state of alert of Santa Anna's main body from the time they reached the SJ position until the tail end came in? Was it the same as history tells us was the case when the battle was fought, or was it at a higher level? This could well be the answer to the caught napping part. If they were at higher alert status before the arrival, and that alert status was downgraded after arrival, it could point to the notion that if Houston did not attack when I was weaker, he would not dare attack now that I am stronger. Sometimes winning a battle is reduced to mind games.
Dave: When everything is reduced to the lowest common denominatior, tactics are the practical application of common sense, and battle is nothing more than the ruthless pursuit of objectives.
|
|