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Post by Kevin Young on Nov 12, 2011 10:50:29 GMT -5
Going back to the original question...if you take the aftermath of the Civil War and the unsettled Texas frontier, it is understandable that the Alamo was not a priority one for historic preservation. The Army rented the property until 1876, and keep in mind, San Antonio was "the west" for the next twenty some years.
We still tend to forget that despite everything, the Alamo was the first building to be preserved west of the Mississippi for its historic importance. I would (once again) suggest that anyone in the subject take a look at Ed Linenthal's Sacred Ground or Fisher's Saving San Antonio.
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Post by Herb on Nov 12, 2011 13:36:48 GMT -5
On the other hand, the 20th Maine beat back a Confederate brigade's assault on the rear of the Union line on Little Round Top. Like the 1st Minn, they launched a bayonet charge against the advancing Confederates - but only after their ammo ran out. The 20th flung the Confederates, who outnumbered them 4 to 1, down into the valley between Big and Little Round Tops. But they didn't stop there. Pivoting on their center and then their right flank, they proceeded to hit a second confederate brigade and sent them flying back to Devil's Den. David, we're going to have to disagree here. Little Round Top was defended by Vincent's Brigade of 4 Regiments, it was attacked by Law's Alabama Bde (3 regiments) reinforced with two regiments from the Texas Bde (it should be noted that the Texas Regiments had been fighting through the Wheatfield, Peach Orchard, and Devils' Den and were already sorely depleted. The 20th Maine held Vincent's left flank and was attacked by Law's right flank REGIMENT, Oates' 15th Alabama. The 20th Maine outnumbered Oate's regiment by a handful of men (a dozen or so) - it was in fact a 1:1 battle as was the whole battle for Little Round Top. what made it such a near run thing was not fictional Confederate numbers, but the fact that Vincent's Brigade arrived only minutes (15 minutes at most) before Law attacked. It was almost a meeting engagement with almost none of the traditional advantages of the defense- the sole Union advantage was gaining the high ground before the Confederate attack. On the 20th Maine's side even that doesn't seem that much of an advantage as the slope on that portion of Little Round Top is fairly gradual, and the elevation difference from the valley floor, Oate's position, to Chamberlains wasn't that great. However, it was a significant enough advantage given the winded condition of Oates men. I don't disagree with your assessment of what would have happened had the 20th Maine failed - and therefore it is arguably one of the most important actions of the 2d day. I do think you underestimate the importance of the 1st (thank you) Minnisota's action. The center of Cemetary Ridge was unoccupied, the positions at Cemetary Hill and Little Round Top were seperated by a vaccum of troops except for remenants of Sickles Corps who were being driven hard by the Confederate Bdes of Wright, Wilcox and Lang. Hancock's orders for the 1st Minn to attack this host (Wilcox's Bde in particular) and the 1st Minn's action were key, giving time to Hancock and allowing Hancock to shift troops to the unprotected center. As it was these Bdes, breeched the Union line and if they had been properly supported by the remainder of Anderson's division, the result would have been even more disaterous than the loss of Little Round Top ( Auserlitz is probably the closest paraell). As it was it still was a very near run thing. The whole action of the 2d day to me come down to the energetic actions of two officers Hancock and Warren, and the lackidasical actions of a third Longstreet.
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Post by Chuck T on Nov 12, 2011 13:48:21 GMT -5
David: I attended the same school and the same courses. I do believe you missed the point of this instuction. It was not a lesson in tactics. It was a lesson in leadership, specifcally how a leader reacts to the stress of the battlefield and keeps his cool under trying conditions. It is then not about out-thinking and outmaneuvering. It is about how a leader leads, thinks, and reacts under battlefield conditions. That is the lesson of Chamberlain and Little Round Top.
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Post by davidpenrod on Nov 12, 2011 21:42:11 GMT -5
Herb,
Well, I naturally and respectfully disagree with your numbers. But first, I want to address your perception of my attitude toward the the actions of the 1st Minnesota:
I did not mean to give the impression that I believe their actions on the 2nd and the 3rd were unimportant or commonplace. They were not. Their sacrifice on the 2nd allowed Hancock to form a defensive line on Cemetery Ridge and repulse the Confederate advance. Also, I did not mean to demean their valor and fighting qualities in comparison to the 20th. My point was that the 20th's fight was decisive while the 1st's was not.
As to Confederate formations and manpower on Little Round Top: the Confederates attacked Little Round Top with 2 Brigades from Hood's Division, Robertson's Texas Brigade of 3 regiments and Law's Alabama Brigade, also of 3 regiments. Law detached 1 regiment, the 48th Alabama, to support the left flank of Robertson's attack across the open ground between Big and Little Round Tops. Robertson's Brigade (+) hit the 83rd Pennsylvania, 44th New York and 16th Michigan Regiments. Law's Brigade (-), consisting of the 15th and 47th Alabama Regiments, advanced through wooded terrain and hit the right flank of the 20th Maine and the left flank of the 83rd Pennsylvania. The 47th struck the center and right of the 20th and the 47th struck the left flank of the 20th and the right flank of the 83rd Pennsylvania.
The Confederate regiments attacking Little Round Top were twice as large as the regiments in Vincent's Brigade. The 15th Alabama alone numbered 644 men, as compared to the 20th Maine's 385. Your calculation of a 1 to 1 parity between attacker and defender is therefore inaccurate.
Chuck T,
I don't know how you concluded that I missed the point of the instruction at IOBC and IOAC. I did not. I think I got the point of all that instruction quite well, thank you. On the other hand, I think you missed my point, which is that the 20th Maine's actions on Little Round Top were decisive whereas the 1st Minnesota's actions, although gallant, were not.
While it is true that IOBC and IOAC courses and discussions about Chamberlain addressed his leadership, you cannot appreciate or even understand his decision making without first understanding the "terrain and situation." Tactical decisions and actions cannot be divorced from the tactical situation in which those decisions are formulated and executed.
So, to make it clear to everyone, we did not study Napoleanic tactics at IOBC or IOAC. More importantly, the Army does not use close-order linear formations when in contact with the enemy, our cavalry is not mounted on war horses, our infantry is not equiped with single-shot muzzle loaders or swords, and we do not communicate using signal flags, bugles and smoke. The Army has advanced much since 1863.
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Post by Herb on Nov 12, 2011 23:48:37 GMT -5
Robertson's bde did not participate in the attack on Little Round Top. Only the 4th and 5th Texas did. By the time these two regiments had fought their way to Little Round Top, they were only about 1/3rd their morning strength with a single field grade between them (US Army War College Guide to Gettysburg). While the 5 total Confederate Regiments were attacking Wheat's bde reinforced the Union position and you had 5 Confederate Regiments attacking 8 Union ones.
At no time were there more than 5 Confederate Regiments on this portion of the battlefield. BTW, Robertson's Bde consisted of 4 regiments, not three, the 1st, 4th and 5th Texas, and the 3rd Arkansas. In the confusion in the wheatfield, etc. The 4th and 5th became separated from the Bde, and ended up in the middle of Law's line. (Robertson's report).
Your numbers are radically different from the battle strength I have of the two regts on July 2d. Both Chamberlain and Oates went into the battle with about 220 men. While on Big Round Top, Oate sent back a water party of about 20 men, that did not rejoin the regt until after the battle.
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Post by Chuck T on Nov 13, 2011 0:01:32 GMT -5
David: You are preaching to the choir to both of us. It might be prudent to stop right about now, because both Herb and I went to the same schools you did and probably a few you have not attended yet, and we both can talk ACW right down to the ground. Now thank you for your views but do not for once think that you are doing anything more than preaching to a very experienced choir that has been singing for a long time.
And Colonel it's good to see you as feisty as ever. Ranch life in Tejas must be agreeing with you once again.
HerB; I am not sure about that 220 for the 20th Maine. I think it was higher, maybe not as high as the 385, but I do believe the numbers were more than approximately 220.
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Post by davidpenrod on Nov 13, 2011 18:36:08 GMT -5
Chuck T, I simply do not understand what you are driving at. Do you have anything constructive to say in this discussion? Or are you just going to attack me without adding anything? Herb, respectfully, your numbers are off. The 20th Maine consisted of 385 men. Your number of 220 may reflect the 20th's strength as of May 19, 1863 before it was reinforced by approximately 150 "3-year" men from the disbanded 2nd Maine Regiment. Every source of information I have reviewed describes the 15th Alabama with a strength of approximately 644 men - some sources have it higher, including Oates, who in his after-action report claimed a total strength of 686. It is probably a good time for us to start citing sources for our numbers and units engaged. Here are some of my online sources: After-Action Report of Col. Chamberlain, 20th Maine (dated July 6, 1863) at: www.civilwarhome.com/chamberl.htm:After-Action Report of Col. Oates, 15th Alabama (dated August 8, 1863) at: thomaslegion.net/fifteenthalabamainfantryregimentbattleofgettysburgreport.htmlAfter-Action Report of BG Robertson, Robertson's Brigade (dated July 17, 1863) at: www.civilwarhome.com/robertsongettysburgor.htm:Other links: www.brotherswar.com/Gettysburg-2e.htmwww.gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/ME/20Me.phpwww.civilwarintheeast.com/USA/ME/20ME.phpwww.civilwarintheeast.com/CSA/AL/15AL.phpwww.civilwar.org/battlefields/gettysburg/maps/gettysburg-devils-den-and.htmlwww.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/getty22.aspxwww.historynet.com/battle-of-gettysburg-fighting-at-little-round-top.htm
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Post by Herb on Nov 13, 2011 19:11:19 GMT -5
I'll momentarily concede the unit strength fight, as I can't find the source I used. I stand firm though on the units involved. No matter how you cut it, there never was more than 5 Confederate Regiments at Little Round Top.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Nov 13, 2011 19:15:00 GMT -5
Fellows, it might just be me, but it seems like this discussion is getting a little heated. If so, please step back for a bit and let things cool before continuing. It's a fascinating discussion that warrants measured response. I'd hate to see it denigrate into something ugly. You're all officers and gentlemen. Thanks, Jim
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Post by Chuck T on Nov 13, 2011 20:34:25 GMT -5
David: I think it would do all of us well to listen to Jim.
I took no offense to what you said. I disagreed with you as to the lesson to be learned from Chamberlain. You said leadership and tactics. That instruction was about leadership. The tactical scenario used in that instruction was merely a vehicle to teach the leadership lesson.
I also disagree when you say that the actions of the 20th Maine were decisive. I don't think the 1st Minnesota's actions were decisive, which you seem to be in agreement with. Neither were decisive, because that word carries with it them implication of decision. Neither action brought the issue to a decision point. While the actions of Chamberlain were important, he in the great scheme of things successfully defended a piece of key terrain, the loss of which would have severly hampered Union operations and caused a great deal of both casualties and mayhem. But had the Confederates captured Little Round Top, had they done what you suggest, the issue would not have been decided. There was an entire Union corps unengaged at Gettyburg, arriving at about the same time this action was taking place. What is to say that corps or perhaps other forces could not have been used to eject Confederate forces from what they had just taken?
The decisive engagement at Gettyburg was Longstreet's attack on the third day. It failed, and and the Confederates sat out the next day and then went home. That then was the decisive moment at Gettysburg. The actions of 2 July were important, Culp's Hill, The Wheatfield and Peach Orchard, and Little Round Top, gutted Lee's Army. They all contributed to the decision point. None of them would have mattered though, had not Hancock and others shattered three divisions on the afternoon of 3 July.
You might also want to think back to 1 July when if Ewell had captured that stinking little hill he should have, all other descussion, we are having here would be unnecessary.
So while I applaud the stirring story of Chamberlain and his gallant band, the very narratives that are made to order for leadership manuals, including the one used by the U S Army at the time of my retirement, and classroom descussion, and while I personally admire Chamberlain as both soldier and man, his actions did not save the Union Army although they sure helped a lot.
I do think Herb left out the personnel from the 2nd Maine. I doubt that they were on the books of the 20th Maine yet. I also believe that you should be quite careful about Confederate strength figures as well. Confederate units throughout the war had a tendency to report on the books figures and not ready for battle figures. I have run into this many times trying to reconcile on the books reported figures with present for duty numbers. There is often a gap in the hundreds.
I have no wish to rain on your parade here. In fact there was a time that I was full of P and V, the effervessent love of profession. Since then I have become more careful in my use of the terms saved, gallant, and decisive. I guess it comes with age, and the disappointment of all too many myths that I have seen shattered.
PS: You might also want to ask yourself about where the guns were that the Confederates would have put on top of Little Round Top? What were they doing? What were the routes from their present location to LRT? Somehow it is a whole lot easier to say than to do, and your enemy has a vote.
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Post by Herb on Nov 13, 2011 23:09:28 GMT -5
Little Round Top is a good example of the "fog of war". Hood, the Confederate division commander was wounded according to him 20 minutes after the attack began. Laws the Alabama Bde commander, took over the division. But apparently continued to command his Bde (though some sources claim Oates took over the Bde - I can find no evidence of this). Laws Bde consisted of more than the 3 regiments we've been talking about, the other regiments became seperated in the early fighting, and were out of command and control until that night. The Texas Bde became separated (as mentioned earlier). Benning's GA Bde supposed to attack to the left of the Texans, followed the 1st Texas and 3rd Arkansas and became intermixed with them. Andersen' s GA Bde was apparently the only large formation in Hood's Division to make it across the line of departure as organized.
Casualties among key leaders were not limited to Hood, the Texas Bde lost every rental commander and the Bde cdr, killed or wounded save one. A Texas soldier said of Devil's Den every soldier was his own colonel.
Oates' regiment had a 25 mile approach march, before crossing the love of departure at 4 PM, according to Oates he was initially the center regiment of the Bde, but soon found himself on the right (the right regts crossing behind him without orders. Shortly after that Laws Bde came undetermined a galling fire from Big Round Top (occupied by the 2d US Sharpshooters). Oates was ordered to clear Big Round Top which they did after a bloody fight.
Longstreet despite Hood's pleas to attack Sickes corps in its exposed southern flank insisted Hood attack obliquely across Sickles ie exposing Hood's flank. Whether Hood deliberately disobeyed or Laws and Robertson decided on their own, the resulting frontal attack saved the south from a disaster and resulted in the virtual destruction of Sickles Corps. After all this confusion, and fierce fighting for w to 3 hours, Law with 3 of his regts and 2 of Robertsons prepared to attack a fresh force on Little Round Top.
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