Military-Civilian Relationship

[Allen Wiener]

Interesting take on the evolution of the relationship between the civil and military spheres:

opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/a-legacy-of-insubordination/

[Chuck T]

Allen: The article was quite interesting. I have often thought in the Civil War context that there was no better organizer than MacClellan and no better fighter than Grant. As far a civil-military cooperation goes the Grant message to Lincoln - I will stay on these lines if it takes all summer - was basicly one of you handle the politics, I will handle the war. Don't call me. I will call you. An altogether interesting approach which Lincoln had the good sense to honor.

[Hiram]

On the subject of military-civilian relationships; a pertinent letter.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, D.C., January 26, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER:

GENERAL: I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

Yours, very truly,
A. LINCOLN.

[loucapitano]

Every political leader who has had to fight a war has had to cope with managing his or her military leadership. Some handled it well, others failed. Washington was fortunate in that there was no chief executive to report to, just a congress. Given the number of fellow generals who lobbied to replace him, he did remarkably well. Yet a single ball of lead could have left the colonial army in the hands of Gates or Greene or (Benedict) Arnold.

Jumping ahead to the Civil War, it's amazing that Lincoln could not prevail on his Generals the grand strategy for defeating the South:
1. Blockade the seaports against trade
2. Split the South by taking the Mississippi
3. Defeat the Army of Norther Virginia
Admiral Farragut had no problem understanding the first point. Grant had no problem seeing the wisdom of taking the Mississippi. But McClennan amd most of the subsequent commanders of the Army of the Potomac could not grasp the last point. You can see how close to exasperation Lincoln was in the letter to General Hooker.

President Wilson was certainly on the same page with Pershing. FDR had full confidence in George Marshall and Earnest King and their brilliant subordinates, MacArthur, Nimitz and, of course, Eisenhower. Yet, the stakesof the global conflict could have lead to cases of civilian/military confusion. Occasionally, on reletively small matters, it did.

Since World War II, the incidents seem to grow, notably with MacArthur, Westmoreland and McCrystal. They were not a problem for Schwartzkoff or Petreaus.

This is an interesting thread. Hope it keeps up.

[Chuck T]

Lou; We would have done measurably well with Greene, fairly well with Arnold, and still be drinking tea had Gates commanded.

As some of you might know MacArthur is not one of my all time favorites. In fact I think he stinks but what do I know.

Nimitz was the greatest admiral this country ever produced, and his only rival is the great Nelson.

Eisenhower was the right man at the right time in the right place.

I don't personnaly subscribe to the Petreaus way of doing things, but he seems to get the job done.

I would not give you two hoots in hell for Stan McCrystal

Ernie King was a nasty old man who held grudges, ruined careers for petty revenge and probably the finest Chief of Naval Operations in the 20th Century.

George Preston Marshall was the most brilliant soldier ever produced in the United States of America, including U S Grant.

Westmorland was a powder puff of a general who should have resigned in 1946 and spare the nation the strife he caused.

Schwartzkoff, was a very hard man to work for.

Every president before and since has been measured by the standard of Lincoln

Now Lou if that is not enough to get this thread going and keep it going for several months let me know I may have a few more gems in my pocket.

My Best--------------Chuck

[Hiram]

One of the greatest fighting generals this country produced was Medal of Honor recipient Frederick Funston. At 5'5" and 120 pounds, Funston barely cast a shadow, but made his presence felt in the Cuban Revolution, the Spanish-American War, and the subsequent Philippine Insurrection. Only his premature death due to a massive heart attack at the age of 51 prevented him from leading the AEF into Europe during the Great War.

In 1902, Funston was officially reprimanded by Roosevelt as a result of disparaging remarks concerning U.S. Senator George Frisbie Hoar concerning American involvement in the Phillipines.

Not a man afraid to publicly voice his opinions, Funston was quoted thusly "I personally strung up thirty-five Filipinos without trial, so what was all the fuss over Waller's 'dispatching' a few 'treacherous savages'? If there had been more Smiths and Wallers, the war would have been over long ago. Impromptu domestic hanging might also hasten the end of the war. For starters, all Americans who had recently petitioned Congress to sue for peace in the Philippines should be dragged out of their homes and lynched."

Strong words to be sure, at least you knew where the man stood. Mark Twain was neither amused nor a fan, penning A Defence of General Funston for the North American Review in May 1902.

Funston was acting commander at the Presidio 18 April 1906 when the earthquake struck. As a result of his actions, he became known as "the Savior of San Francisco." His actions included declaring martial law, ordering all looters to be shot on sight, and mobilizing every US Army camp in California to send men and materials.

Frederick Funston died on 19 February 1917, while sitting in the lobby of the St. Anthony Hotel in San Antonio, and was the first person to lay in state at The Alamo. He also lay in state in the San Francisco City Hall rotunda before being laid to rest in the San Francisco National Cemetery at the Presidio (Section OS, Grave 68-3).

Funston's Memories of Two Wars is recommended reading.

[Chuck T]

It is quite interesting that Funston was called on the carpet for his remarks about the U S Senator and allowed to retain his postion in the Army. I have never compaired the Articles of War to the post WWII Uniform Code, but I suspect that the article about derogatory remarks about the president and other elected government officials is a direct carry over one from the other. This of course is what got McCrystal in a jam. I am surprised that Funston did not face courts martial for his remarks in that day and time. Altogether interesting guy though.

[Herb]

An interesting article, and though it's hard to disagree with his individual points - I think he missed the key. Army command was political, is political and always will be political.

What the author missed is that the peacetime army (of that era) leadership was almost solely determined by seniority. HOWEVER, wartime command, was largely determined by volunteer rank, which was almost totally a political determination.

Strategy is 'simply' the term used for the process of determining the objectives (political) and all the means (including miitary) the nation will use to reach that/those objectives. The relationship between the President and his chief military commander(s) is of necessity political. But to pigeon-hole and catagorize all such relationships is impossible for they are largely determined by the personalities and personal realtionships of the men involved. Looking at specific examples is however a totally different matter.

The great failings in US military history are largely the result of not properly identifying what the objective is ie goal, endstate. Often we stumble because we start a war with no true endstate identifed at the highest level. The secondary causes are most often an unwillingess to commit the resources (means) to accomplish those goals or the failure to effectivily communicate those goals (or limitations on the means) to commanders in the field.

[Herb]

Chuck,

A couple of comments on your comments. ;D

I'm not a fan of Eisenhower, I believe just about any Lieutenant Colonel serving in the Pentagon with Ike under Marshall could have done as well if not better. IMO, Eisenhower, was a great staff officer.

MacArthur was great in WWI, but was an old man (by Army standards) by WWII and acted it.

Westmorland, was a very nice man, and it's hard for me on an open forum, to put him down, but he should never have promoted to 4 star rank (and is argument against the system). His (and MacNamara's) devolution to a strategy of attrition was no strategy but the abscence of strategy. His sucessor, Abrams, was a very hard man as I understand it. But his strategy was far more sucessful, with far less, and probably would have suceeded, but Westmorland had squandered the public good will and time had run out.

Schwarkopf was a hard man to work for. I had the fortune/misfortune a couple times (very low on the food chain).
The criticism of Freddie Franks (who I also worked for) and VII Corps during Desert Storm may be valid - but not by Schwarzkopf. Schwarzkopf was content to sit in his palace in Rydah, playing God with the media and believing the Air Force reports and screaming at Franks over the handset. As you well know, if Schwarzkopf was that unhappy with Franks, Schwarzkopf should have (or had Yeosock, the 3rd Army Commander) fly to Franks' headquarters and put the spurs to him. The greatest tell on Schwarzkopf to me, was it was only when Franks was escorting him to the cease fire meeting that Schwarzkopf, became aware that Franks had just fought the largest tank battle in history.

I knew Petreaus when he was a senior captain and I was but a lieutenant. The whispers may not be fair, but way back then he was called Courtney Massengale. To his credit, he adapted ways and means to the situation in Iraq (and I would say correctly used the lessons learned in Bosnia) instead of trying to force the situation in Iraq to adapt to a war in Central Europe model. Quite honestly, I don't know what is going in Afghanistan, and I have no idea (and don't think too many of our leaders do) on what the desired endstate is.

[Chuck T]

Herb: I am in complete agreement with both of you post above.

As to Eisenhower, I was refering more to his relationship with Winnie who was himself a hard man to handle. The right time, place, etc was in that context.

Nice men are not always the stuff of good commanders.

Coutney Massengale, now there is a blast from the past. For those that don't know, the slime ball climber from "Once an Eagle". I have heard the same things, but also know a couple of civilian, but military related, types who know him and think of him out of context as a throughly decent person. Again persons that are throughly decent otherwise, may still have pretentions.

[loucapitano]

Chuck T - I find I'm in total agreement with your comments on those generals. Hopefully, as this thread extends we'll find some points of disagreement.

Thanks Hiram for the information on General Funston, whom, I regret to say, I'd never heard of until your comments. From what little I know, Pershing also served in the Philipines during the Muslim revolts and was responsible for doing some pretty nasty things.

Herb, you were there and your testimony offers much to consider. It sounds like Tommy Franks was the current day master of massive lightning attack strategy. His attacks worked very effectively in the 100 hours of Desert Storm, but really got bogged down during the Bagdad occupation. Is it true that his battle plan for Iraq was Attack, Pacify and Go Home! Thank you for your service.

I don't think history is through with Petreaus. He emerged from Iraq and Afganistan with a semblance of success, e.g. no combat troops in Iraq and Bin Laden dead. We'll have to see how he does with the CIA. One thing is pretty clear, the armchair generals and their set battle strategies are going to be left to forums like ours to ponder. Intelligence, counter insurgency and small group actions look to be in vogue for current and future conflicts.

[Allen Wiener]

Herb - bingo! The military is one tool that the political leader has available, along with diplomacy, sanctions, forming alliances, etc. When the military is chosen as the means to achieve international political ends, at least in our system, the relationship between the president (commander in chief) and the military leadership is unavoidably political and, really, could not be otherwise. The military leadership has to consider both the military objects and strategy for achieving them in the field, and the political background noise that underlies that.

[Herb]

Lou, my bad, I had a senior moment.

Freddie Franks led VII Corps in Desert Storm. Tommy Franks (iirc a 1 star in Desert Storm) had Schwarzkopf's job during the invasion of Iraq.

IMO, the invasion of Iraq, was a brillant tactical operation, but was both a strategic and operational failure. The planners had unrealistic expectations of what an occupation and deBaathization (?) of Iraq would entail. ie they placed too much "HOPE" that Iraq would be the Liberation of France in 1944, and refused to consider that it could be the occupation of Germany 1945-55, and did not put enough boots on the ground (despite the calls of the Army Chief of Staff. who had just commanded in Bosnia and knew what that mission had required).

Despite what the public has been told, we still have combat troops in Iraq. We just call them a different name. What we normally call Brigade Combat Teams, are renamed before they deploy (sorry I forgot the title), carry that new name in Iraq, then after they return home are once again called their old names.

We played the same games in Bosnia, when President Clinton sent troops to be part of the Implementing Force (IFOR)in 1995, he said US troops would only be part of IFOR for a year. 12 months later, they changed the name (a couple of times) and US troops remained in Bosnia as part of the Stablization Force (SFOR) past 9-11.

[Chuck T]

Allen: Clausewitz tells us that "War is politics by other means" I can never understand those that say that the politicians should get out of the way, and let generals run the war.

FDR was the one who dreamed up some kind of strike back which led to the Doolitte Raid. The objective was not the damage they could bring to Japan, but rather the morale lift for the home front. In pure military terms such a gamble utilizing two of the five carriers then present in the Pacific (actually 4, one was in drydock being repaired) was insane risk. In this instance the politics of the issue trumped good military common sense. It turned out to be not only a morale booster on the home front, but also have far reaching strategic implications, convincing the IJN leadership that they would have to go for Midway.

So it must be both, clear stategic vision on the part of the politician, and candor on the part of the military. Yes Sir, Yes Sir, Three Bags Full is where we get in trouble.

Another risky political/military decision was the recent raid into Pakistan to get Osama. This operation was so risky on the political spectrum that failure could have easily brought down a sitting president at worst or scotched his chances for re-election at best. It could also have started a war. Wars have been started for less cause before. As far as a military operation goes it had the same elements of risk. Risks of this type can be mitigated by meticilious planning and training, not completely but reduced to manageable levels. I think they saw this one as a game changer. The death of one man does not stop a movement in its tracks. What it does do is tell that movements leadership that they are in the crosshairs, and can be reached. That is the real objective. Thugs to carry out their various operations can be obtained from anywhere. Those that plan, lead and finance are another matter.

[Allen Wiener]

That's an apt comparison, Chuck. That's how I see the Bin Laden raid too. A fairly recent example of how that can go south was Carter's attempt to rescue the hostages from Iran.