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Jun 4, 2007 20:02:31 GMT -5
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 4, 2007 20:02:31 GMT -5
RR, kudos on connecting the dots on William Patton, Crockett's kin. I don't think I've seen anyone else answer the questions about his whereabouts to anywhere near that extent. You ought to consider writing something on it for publication before someone beats you to the punch. Jim I agree; virtually nothing has been written about the fate of Crockett's little group, especially Patton but also Tinkle and Bugner, both of whom apparently returned to Tennessee, wanting no part of the Texas war. Many of us know and understand little of how Texan units were formed, how leaders were chosen, and how these various groups all over Texas resonded to the chaotic government situation. The government literally collapsed at one point and there was no leadership, leaving units in the field very much on their own. AW
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Jun 4, 2007 21:55:34 GMT -5
Post by Jim Boylston on Jun 4, 2007 21:55:34 GMT -5
I don't think he thought the war was over, I believe he would have been as up to speed as anyone else. Someone else at one time (I can't remember who) suggested that Crockett may have been looking for Houston when he was in Texas. It's possible, they were friends at one point, but Crockett's antagonism and bitterness toward the Jackson contingent might have had an effect on his relationship with Houston, a Jackson supporter. It's something to consider. Jim
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Post by stuart on Jun 5, 2007 0:52:37 GMT -5
Its certainly something that needs to be considered. We've already touched on how Travis probably didn't include the Tejanos because they were Federalistas rather than secessionists and the problems caused by Grant are well known both as regards Bexar and in South Texas, but what about further east? What was the effect of the breakdown in government back at Nacogdoches, where the "land men" were in control. Crockett certainly didn't think the fighting was over because he initially announced he was heading for the Rio Grande, ie; going to Matamoros, before ending up at the Alamo. Without looking it up I can't be sure but I think Davis' itinerary has him almost getting to Goliad before swinging north.
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Post by Herb on Jun 5, 2007 9:45:43 GMT -5
Crockett certainly didn't think the fighting was over because he initially announced he was heading for the Rio Grande, ie; going to Matamoros, before ending up at the Alamo. Without looking it up I can't be sure but I think Davis' itinerary has him almost getting to Goliad before swinging north. I think that comes from some of Tom Lindley's research/conclusions. IIRC, Tom believes Crockett actually did go to Goliad, where he was then "sent" to Bexar. Tom also believes, writes in "Traces", that Crockett wasn't in Harrison's Company but in charge of his own "spy" (scout) detachment. On another note, the comments about Patton's enlistments bring up a question, did the new government - after March 2d change the type of enlistments or was it simply just a case of reality setting in after March 6th? I mean prior to the Alamo/Independence the Volunteer Auxiliary Corps of short enlistments (specially for men coming from the US) seems pretty popular. The men forming Houston's Army, seem to all be Volunteers, ie enlisting for the duration of the War. Was there a change in policy or just in fact?
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Jun 5, 2007 10:36:14 GMT -5
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 5, 2007 10:36:14 GMT -5
I took a quick glance at Hardin's Osprey book "The Alamo 1836: Santa Anna's Texas Campaign," pp. 19-20, which portray the Texian army as nothing that any real officer would want to call an army. He describes a disorganized, non-centralized hodge-podge of small units all over the place, each operating independently, electing officers based on friendships, or who could buy the most whiskey, and doing pretty much whatever they pleased, regardless of anyone's orders.
This is only a thumbnail impression and doesn't even address the question of enlistments.
AW
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Jun 5, 2007 10:39:05 GMT -5
Post by TRK on Jun 5, 2007 10:39:05 GMT -5
Maybe that's why nobody, to my knowledge, has tackled drafting a table of organization of the Texas Army in early 1836; you'd probably have to do it day by day, and then you wouldn't be certain if it was entirely accurate.
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Jun 5, 2007 10:44:15 GMT -5
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 5, 2007 10:44:15 GMT -5
No doubt a nightmare when trying to reconstruct the units or assessing numbers, like who and how many actually died at the Alamo. Hardin uses estimates of how many were in each general location (like Gonzales, with Grant, under Neil's command), but I don't think anyone actually knows for sure. I guess the best that can be done is to examine all the post-war records of land claims, muster rolls, etc., and come up with the best guess estimate.
I believe that Hardin is right in saying there were never more than perhaps some 3,500 max under anyone's command among the Texians at any given time, and far fewer in any one location at a given time. Better organization might have made the Texians more difficult to defeat, but even then they would have been greatly outnumbered and still facing a much more professional army, especially the cavalry.
AW
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Jun 5, 2007 10:46:01 GMT -5
Post by Herb on Jun 5, 2007 10:46:01 GMT -5
I took a quick glance at Hardin's Osprey book "The Alamo 1836: Santa Anna's Texas Campaign," pp. 19-20, which portray the Texian army as nothing that any real officer would want to call an army. He describes a disorganized, non-centralized hodge-podge of small units all over the place, each operating independently, electing officers based on friendships, or who could buy the most whiskey, and doing pretty much whatever they pleased, regardless of anyone's orders. AW Two years ago Hardin led a battlefield tour of San Jacinto. One of the very clear things he brought out, is how the rudimentary training Houston conducted at Groce's enabled the Texian Army to just march across the plain of San Jacinto and deploy into line to attack Santa Anna. I'm not really a Houston partisan, but you have to give him credit for at least instilling the limited discipline and training that he did.
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Jun 5, 2007 11:06:01 GMT -5
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 5, 2007 11:06:01 GMT -5
That's true. Houston did seem aware of what a motley crew he inherited and, whether they met up with the Mexicans or joined with Gates his men would have to be better trained and disciplined than they were. I wonder how he got so many to go along with him since he seems to have been generally disliked by his men and were not prone to following orders. Something about the Alamo, Goliad and the Mexican persuing them must have changed the Texians. They seemed more sobered and willing to accept discipline and leadership and wanted to fight. Obviously, the earlier disorganization and attitudes had led only to disaster and they must have been willing to accept Houston's leadership with the goal of punishing the Mexicans at some point.
Houston did see things for what they were and seems to have realized that their best hope was to bring the U.S. into the war, or at least prepare as best as they could for one big fight with everything riding on it; he knew that's all his army was capable of. Another loss, and especially another slaughter, would have ended the revolution.
Houston is a mercurial character (I'm looking forward to reading the books on him that were recommended here, which I've ordered). He knew what his goals were and what he thought ought to be done, but he was political in always leaving other options open and in later covering his tracks. In the days leading up to the first battle of Bexar, he tried to undermine Austin and wrote to Fannin that they should pull back from Bexar and wait for a better opportunity. I wonder if he just wanted the Texians out of the southern part of Texas, away from any Hispanic/Mexican influence, and build his effort for an all-Anglo, independent Texas and quick annexation.
AW
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Jun 5, 2007 15:41:11 GMT -5
Post by stuart on Jun 5, 2007 15:41:11 GMT -5
I took a quick glance at Hardin's Osprey book "The Alamo 1836: Santa Anna's Texas Campaign," pp. 19-20, which portray the Texian army as nothing that any real officer would want to call an army. He describes a disorganized, non-centralized hodge-podge of small units all over the place, each operating independently, electing officers based on friendships, or who could buy the most whiskey, and doing pretty much whatever they pleased, regardless of anyone's orders. This is only a thumbnail impression and doesn't even address the question of enlistments. AW I have to say that in my view this is very much an over-simplification and perhaps a slightly romanticised oversimplification at that; a little reminiscent of TRL's old argument about the innate fighting qualities of the legendary "Scotch-Irish Frontiersman". I have for example done a lot of tracking of individuals and units trying to establish just who did serve under Grant and while some units do seem to have been a bit leaky, and occasionally even broke up, there were usually good reasons behind this and it is possible to trace what happened and where most of the men went. The Texian Army certainly wasn't as well organised as historians would like, but sweeping statements like Steve Hardin's (and to be fair there isn't a lot of room for detailed discussion in an Osprey) can simply be an easy way out. Tugging this particular discussion firmly back to the subject of this thread, there are a few loose ends which need puzzling out but nothing I've seen or read so far leads me to believe that establishing a proper idea of numbers and organisation in the Alamo garrison is an impossible task. It needs doing properly but it can be done.
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Jun 5, 2007 20:57:41 GMT -5
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 5, 2007 20:57:41 GMT -5
The two-page summary in the Osprey is obviously very superficial. I didn't see any real discussion of this in Hardin's "Texian Illiad" either though. You have a lot better understanding of the source material on which to build such a project, which I think is crucial to a new understanding and description of what happened at and around the Alamo. "The Secret War for Texas" has brought to light how widespread these events were and what different agendas were in play and I think that should be a major part of any new discussion or description of the Alamo story. I think this is revisionist history in the best sense of the term. So much of the literature has oversimplified the "brave stand at the Alamo" as if it took place in a vacuum and I believe that impression has permeated the common impressions of the event.
AW
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Jun 8, 2007 19:33:06 GMT -5
Post by sloanrodgers on Jun 8, 2007 19:33:06 GMT -5
RR, kudos on connecting the dots on William Patton, Crockett's kin. I don't think I've seen anyone else answer the questions about his whereabouts to anywhere near that extent. You ought to consider writing something on it for publication before someone beats you to the punch. Jim I really appreciate the vote of confidence. Although I enjoyed doing a little research on this kid, it seems like such a silly issue. Was he there or wasn't he? Clearing nothing points to his presence at the Alamo, so basically there is no controversy worth writing about. That's just my opinion, but if one of you wants to write about Patton, go on ahead. Adios.
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