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Houston
May 22, 2007 13:35:05 GMT -5
Post by Jim Boylston on May 22, 2007 13:35:05 GMT -5
We all know the controversy about whether or not Houston really gave Bowie orders to blow up the Alamo. I think the consensus is that he left it up to Bowie, at least technically. I've been reading Utley's "Lone Star Justice", and notice that this hedging on commands happened again during Houston's presidency. The orders Houston gave to Alexander Somervell, before his ill-fated expedition were to move south "...if and when he thought success attainable..." thus, according to Utley, "freeing Houston of responsibility for whatever happened. Of course, Somervell lost control of his command in Laredo, leading to the eventual misadventure in Mier. Are there other examples of Houston operating in this manner, issuing vague orders that would let him of the hook in the event of failure? Jim
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Houston
May 22, 2007 13:43:28 GMT -5
Post by stuart on May 22, 2007 13:43:28 GMT -5
Well the obvious one is the earlier set of orders he gave to Bowie, telling him to take command of the Matamoros expedition. They were just as vague and full of get outs, but the same is also true of his behaviour in the confrontation with Grant's men at Goliad and Refugio
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Houston
May 23, 2007 0:59:39 GMT -5
Post by stuart on May 23, 2007 0:59:39 GMT -5
In fact I'd give a lot to know what really happened there. Although he obviously had his own agenda when Grant led the Bexar volunteers down to Goliad he could legitimately claim that he was acting in accordance with the orders of both Houston and the Council as both up to that point were publically backing the Matamoros expedition. Houston after all had successively ordered both Bowie and Fannin to concentrate all the men they could find pending his own arrival and if he didn't turn up in time to go on ahead without him.
Now thanks to the change in the political situation he had indeed turned up in time - I suspect much against his will because some of his own dates don't add up and I think he was dragging his heels just as he would do when ordered to relieve the Alamo.
Then once he did catch up, what happens? The volunteers recognise his authority and Grant is off down on the Rio Grande, but he does nothing to stop them going down to Refugio. There he makes his appeal (which may have been a lot less dramatic and a lot less effective than painted afterwards) and supposedly it all falls apart, but just what was the arrangement he then came to with Grant because it wasn't his appeal but a desperate shortage of horses which really slowed everything down
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Houston
May 23, 2007 1:23:32 GMT -5
Post by stuart on May 23, 2007 1:23:32 GMT -5
And another example (or rather a whole set of examples) is his behaviour during the San Jacinto campaign...
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Houston
May 23, 2007 5:26:01 GMT -5
Post by Jim Boylston on May 23, 2007 5:26:01 GMT -5
It's hard to believe that Houston was really that indecisive. I suspect this was more him covering his political backside. Jim
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Houston
May 23, 2007 7:04:32 GMT -5
Post by stuart on May 23, 2007 7:04:32 GMT -5
Absolutely. There was nothing indecisive about Houston, but he was just a very slippery Teflon-coated political animal. The San Jacinto campaign illustrates that perfectly. Houston is aiming for a rendezvous with Gaines in the Redlands, but he knows he’s going to lose the army if he takes the road to Nacogdoches. So what does he do? He hangs about at the back and lets the men at the front take the decision to head for Harrisburg instead. The battle of San Jacinto is won and Houston spends the rest of his life insisting that he was in command and that the battle was fought and won at exactly the right time and in the right place. The fact he was forced into it was then dismissed as sour grapes. Now turn it around. Santa Anna was really unlucky on this one. He planned to cross at Lynch’s not to rejoin the main army but to intercept Houston on the Nacogdoches road. Instead he found Houston right in front of him, with his back to the river. If he’d been strong enough to attack there and then the result would have been a bigger massacre than the Alamo. And what then? Was it Sam Houston’s fault? Oh no Sir, he wanted to join with Gaines remember, it wasn’t his fault the army decided to go to Harrisburg…
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Houston
May 23, 2007 13:59:24 GMT -5
Post by Herb on May 23, 2007 13:59:24 GMT -5
Returning to Somervell/Mier, perhaps trk, or RangerRod, will jump in here, but I seem to recall while Houston's instructions to Somervell were vague, that he gave pretty specific instructions to Jack Hays.
I think, we always have to consider that Houston's two prime motivations were 1. Political Power, and 2. To unite Texas with the Union.
We have to contrast that with Lamar, the Republic President Houston had just suceeded. Lamar wanted an independent Texas stretching to the Pacific. As such he maintained a standing Regular Army and Navy, and mounted miltary/naval campaigns to secure Texas and push her boundaries/influence.
Houston wanted a weak Texas, that was militarily dependent on the US. Now this may indeed have been from his publically stated fiscal concerns, but I think it owed more to his desire to have Texas, if not part of the Union dependent on her. The Mexican Bexar incursions put Houston on the horns of a dilemina: politically he had to respond, but he didn't want a strong, decisive response further establishing a truly independent nation. His contradictory instructions to Somervell, I think reflect this dilemina.
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Houston
May 23, 2007 15:09:30 GMT -5
Post by Jim Boylston on May 23, 2007 15:09:30 GMT -5
Lamar also took a harder line with the Indians, which were always a concern. Houston seemed more interested in negotiation, while Lamar was more hawkish. Houston just doesn't seem to have been an agressive decision maker...he leaves himself wiggle-room. As regards annexation though, how realistic was an ongoing ROT? Not too, I'd say, considering how underfunded Texas was at the time with no real prospects of foreign investment. Jim
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Houston
May 23, 2007 15:16:55 GMT -5
Post by stuart on May 23, 2007 15:16:55 GMT -5
As regards annexation though, how realistic was an ongoing ROT? Not too, I'd say, considering how underfunded Texas was at the time with no real prospects of foreign investment. Jim Ironically, if Grant had succeeded in his aim of creating a Republic of Rio Grande, Texas would have had access first to the silver mines of northern Mexico which had been a particular concern of the British government, and then to the California goldfields. With British backing, Texas would have been part of a regional superpower well capable of challenging the US domination of North America - try thinking Canada without the snow. Annexation was needed to keep we British out
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Houston
May 23, 2007 19:47:22 GMT -5
Post by TRK on May 23, 2007 19:47:22 GMT -5
About Houston's orders to Gen. Somervell, the preliminary orders of Sept. and Oct. 1842 giving Somervell command of the expedition had conditional elements, and placed the onus on Somervell, as the point man on the frontier, to make the decision whether to invade Mexico, and to make that decision soon. Orders to Somervell from Houston and his acting secretary of war, Morgan C. Hamilton, were specific on other counts, including that Somervell was to have exclusive command of any invasion of Mexico and was to establish his rendezvous on the Cibolo, and most emphatically not in Bexar, where his forces would be under the observation of disloyal Tejanos. (Somervell violated that order.) Houston advised Somervell that he should rely on "light troops, and the celerity of our movements." Houston also was insistent that Somervell receive only troops that would be "subordinate to your orders and the rules of war. You will receive no troops, but such as will march across the Rio Grande under your orders if required to do so." Houston saw John C. Hays as his eyes and ears on the southwest frontier, and he urged Somervell to "rely upon the gallant Hays and his companions; and I desire that you should obtain his services and cooperation." Houston was quite specific in his orders on how Somervell was to obtain and pay for supplies (in a word: credit). Houston and Hamilton issued Somervell other orders, some of which have survived and others of which are known only through references to them.
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Houston
May 23, 2007 20:00:18 GMT -5
Post by Jim Boylston on May 23, 2007 20:00:18 GMT -5
If Houston hadn't a history of issuing nebulous orders, I'd be inclined to think he was trusting his commander's decision. Unfortunately, it seems that all too often Houston was giving himself an "out" in case things went bad. Utley thinks Somervell was not the man for the job, either way. He speaks highly of Hays. Jim
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Houston
May 27, 2007 14:54:58 GMT -5
Post by Herb on May 27, 2007 14:54:58 GMT -5
Tom's post is a good describtion of mission type orders ie giving a subordinate the mission, his resources, limits, constraints and restrictions and letting the subordinate figure out how to accomplish the mission. Supposedly, mission orders are the preferred way to operate.
The problem with mission orders is it requires a subordinate with a high sense of responsibility, ability and most importantly initiative. Something that Jack Hays typified, but I'm not too sure about Somervell. The other thing it requires is the person issuing the orders, Houston, to have patience, resist interfering, and be willing to accept responsibility if the subordinate fails or exceeds his orders. In probability all characteristics that Houston lacked.
At the same time Houston gave his orders to Somervell, he also ordered the Texas Navy to sea to make war on Mexico. Something the Navy did with great success. So successful was the navy in carrying out Houston's orders, that upon its return to Galveston, he ordered the Navy sold/scrapped and ordered its commander courtmartialed for piracy! A courtmartial where he was acquitted, to Houston's disgust.
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Houston
May 27, 2007 20:55:47 GMT -5
Post by Allen Wiener on May 27, 2007 20:55:47 GMT -5
Does anyone think that Houston may have been seriously unbalanced? He was both a drunk and an opium user and his behavior was very odd at times. Some of this may have resulted from the sudden collapse of what looked like a very promising career when he became governor of Tennessee. After the embarassment of his young bride leaving him (apparently for someone else), he never seemed to recover. He lived with the Cherokee for a while, but also became a "big drunk" during that period. I've not read any bios of Houston, but something about him has always struck me as very odd.
AW
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Houston
May 28, 2007 18:56:38 GMT -5
Post by sloanrodgers on May 28, 2007 18:56:38 GMT -5
I really think one has to read a few biographies and delve into some contemporary research to truly appreciate Ol' Sam Houston. Sure he fell off his horse a few times with personal, physical and mental tragedies, but who hasn't? The interesting and inspiring story is that Houston brushed himself off, got back on his horse and rode into history. Is there any other American that was a wounded veteran of two wars, a governor of two U.S. States and a president of an independant republic? He was a large man with huge appetites, but I've seen no definitive evidence that that he was a frequent user of the once legal opium. Remember this stuff was once given out by doctors as a cure-all for pain.
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Houston
May 29, 2007 0:52:29 GMT -5
Post by stuart on May 29, 2007 0:52:29 GMT -5
I agree entirely. I have a slightly jaundiced view of him for personal reasons and as outlined in my earlier posts I find a lot of room for criticism outside of that, but at the end of the day there's no getting away from what he actually achieved.
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