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Post by Hiram on May 30, 2013 14:33:29 GMT -5
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 31, 2013 10:11:55 GMT -5
That's a very succinct account that comports with the most recent work on the battle (at least as far as I can recall, especially regarding Donovan's book). Although there is nothing new here, it is a very concise account that channels the most recent research on the LBH. It does make sense that, at some point, Custer got the idea of capturing hostages and using them to get the warriors to surrender. The fact that he got no help from the rest of his command (Reno and Benteen) sealed his fate, but I think Custer himself has to bear the lion's share of the blame for that, even though I think Reno was a lousy commander and Benteen was unresponsive to his commander. Custer devised this plan by the seat of the pants, despite several warnings from scouts that it would not be easy to take the large village. He broke up his command and hastily ordered an attack without even knowing the size or configuration of the battlefield (hence, among other things, his inability to find a ford to cross in time to support Reno).
As to the last stand, I think whether it was a rout, a roll up of Calhoun and Keough and, finally, Custer, depends on how you read the archeological evidence. No doubt each unit stood its ground and fought until overwhelmed, with any survivors retreating toward Last Stand Hill, where the warriors finished the rest of the soldiers.
I think we have a much better understanding of the battle today than we did, say, ten years ago, thanks to a lot of new research, especially the archeological work done at the battlefield and a more serious look at the testimony of Indian participants than was previously the case. As to what, exactly, Custer was thinking, we are not likely to ever know. I think he unwittingly got himself into a bind that he couldn't get out of.
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Post by loucapitano on Jun 1, 2013 16:58:31 GMT -5
Back and forth it goes. Every Custer book has an opinion and many, like Donovan's minute by minute account, make persuasive cases for their conclusions. But as Allen said, we'll never know. The Paul Hutton article is excellently concise and to the point. I think his conclusion is that, the sight of 200+ plus soldiers (Benteen's command) appearing from the south might have taken the pressure off Custer and Yates and either diverted the Indian attack from the Medicine Tail Ford or enable Custer to capture the Indian non-combatants at the Squaw Creek sanctuary. Of course, this conjecture is based on Benteen arriving more than 30 or 40 minutes before Lt. Weir's advance that was pressured to turn back. Custer was practically overrun by that time. Hutton is not the first to suggest that Custer was so offensively minded, that the thought of "hunkering down" defensively was never in his mind until it was too late. Glory hound or seat of his pants hero? I do have to admit that a key tenant of military thought is to always be aware of where the enemy is, what's his strength and what if he should suddenly appear in an unexpected place. Custer was either wrong or forgetful of these rules of command. Glad to ad my two cents.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 3, 2013 8:48:45 GMT -5
Another factor that Hutton didn't mention (although he's made a point of it in the past) is that Custer didn't really expect the Indians to fight. The whole strategy, including Terry's column moving toward LBH from the north, was based on the belief that the Indians would scatter and flee. Once Custer believed that he'd lost the element of surprise (which, apparently, he had not), he saw urgency in attacking right away, before the Indians could scatter. The idea was to force a surrender end the free roaming of the "hostiles," and force them onto reservations. Had Custer known how aggressive these same warriors had been at the Rosebud vs. Crook only a week earlier, he might have rethought his strategy.
Lou - you have a good point about the balance that a timely arrival by Benteen might have shifted, but Custer didn't really know where Benteen was, although Boston Custer had reported to him that Benteen was not far behind (because Boston believed that at the time). With that in mind, Custer may have fixed on a strategy of crossing the river, taking hostages and forcing a surrender, once Benteen had arrived. Benteen's orders also were to "bring packs," meaning ammunition, but the supply train was far behind and there's no way Benteen could have gotten the ammunition and still reached Custer in time to make a difference. In fact, given the warriors aggressiveness, it's not at all certain that Benteen would have accomplished anything at LSH, other than adding more casualties.
Also, the same point applies to Custer's failure to support Reno, as he had promised to do. Even after Reno halted his charge and began a defense that shifted to the timber, it would have been possible to draw warriors away from him by Custer hitting the camp from the east, behind those warriors. In fact, the reason the Indians broke off the attack on Reno was that they had learned of the presence of Custer's force further north and feared another attack there. Reno's retreat had freed the Indians to shift the bulk of their attack to Custer, just as Custer's inability to support Reno and enabled the warriors to focus on him long enough for his attack to completely break down and end in a disorganized, disastrous retreat. Then the Indians were able to turn to face Custer with little fear of Reno's force. Meanwhile, of course, Benteen was far away.
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Post by loucapitano on Jun 4, 2013 17:42:23 GMT -5
Thanks Allen - as always, you make great points. The question of Boston Custer really sticks in my mind. If this civilian was able to locate Custer (and die near him) it stands to reason that he did not have hostiles in his way. In other words, the Sioux had not yet crossed the Medicine Tail Ford. It just seems strange that he was able to get through safely. Perhaps, Benteen, even without the pack train, could have appeared and possibly disrupted the attacks on Calhoun and Keogh from the river. Again, just idle speculation. I still don't think Custer had a chance and could have just as easily lost his entire command of 600.
I've read about the archaeological digs at LBH also. Did they include the first Reno battle line and the first retreat sight? It would seem the forensics would point out how much ammunition his men expended on the line and the retreat into the woods. The sight of the village would also indicate how close his fire came to their tee-pees. I didn't real about that in the Fox study. Can anyone illuminate me on this?
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Jun 4, 2013 18:07:15 GMT -5
Thanks for the link, Allan. I agree, it's a well-written, concise account of the action at LBH. Maybe there isn't a lot "new" here, but the article lends support to those (like myself) who believe Custer remained on the offense until near the end. Few disasters, which LBH was for Custer, are the result of a single error. As a read accounts such as this, it becomes increasingly year that any number of things could have changed history and spare Custer the losses he suffered at LBH. It might have started with his splitting his command, but there were other opportunities for him to prevail that day. But, like has been said, we will never know for sure what might have been.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 5, 2013 17:23:17 GMT -5
Lou -- there is some info on digs at Reno Hill here: www.friendslittlebighorn.com/custerslaststand.htmFriends of LBH is an excellent organization and anyone with a serious interest in the battle should consider joining. They publish a newsletter and arrange special tours of the battlefield every June, near the anniversary of the battle. Here's another interesting read: www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/How-the-Battle-of-Little-Bighorn-Was-Won.htmlThere was never any question that Custer was on the attack until he found himself overwhelmed and forced into a defensive mode. The whole idea was a surprise attack, create chaos in the camp, and force a surrender. Reno was to hit the camp at one end, which did, in fact, create chaos and panic for a time; Custer was to hit the camp at the other end, completing the plan and holding the Indians in a pincer move, while Benteen would be in position to intercept fleeing Indians. It all went out the window when Custer failed to locate a crossing in time to support Reno, Reno's attack broke down and turned into a rout, and Benteen never showed up before Custer was done for. If the scenario we are discussing is accurate, then the taking of hostages fit into this plan, even though the idea may have come to Custer after he was on the move and noticed where the non-combatants were located. I think Philbrick put forth exactly the same theory in his book "Last Stand," and said that Custer couldn't move to take the hostages until he had more men, hence the need to wait for Benteen. Boston Custer did pass Benteen on his way to join his brother and clearly assumed Benteen was not far behind him at the time that he caught up with Custer. He believed the Benteen should arrive very soon. Of course, we've had this discussion about Benteen's actions before. Regarding the question of whether Custer could have won -- I can only repeat something one of the Rangers at LBH told me while I was there. Some time after the battle, Sitting Bull discussed it with someone and told them "it was a very near thing," meaning that he, too, believed it could have gone either way. I think that's true and the reason it went the way it did was that Custer's plan just broke down, he went into a battle with only a vague idea of the terrain, and he badly underestimated his opponent that day.
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Post by Chuck T on Jun 7, 2013 12:08:53 GMT -5
Allen: It has been a long time since we discussed George. Hope you are well.
The LBH is really very simple. Custer overextended the capability of his regiment. Then to compound the error he overreached with the unit under his personal command to the point where he could not recover. Then he died.
Two things of note:
Custer first observed the village in part from the vicinity of Bench Mark 3411 (along the battlefield road and located on the border of the Reno Field as you go toward the Custer Field). From that point of observation, if he did not know that he had to few troops to take hostages and hold them, even with a full regiment he needed his head examined.
The business of Boston is troubling. Many think that he saw Reno in retreat as well and conveyed this news to George. I don't think so, because I see no alteration in plans that I believe would have to be present if he understood the ramifications of this news.
Reno in retreat, Benteen with the packs trailing behind, could not help but cross the path of Benteen, the packs, or both. Had Custer known of this he also must have known that a defeated Reno would cause a period of consolidation and reorganization, with Benteen and the packs assisting in that effort, therefore delays. Looking at what Custer did from MTC onward, shows no cognitive awareness that any delay was in the offing.
You know I don't play favorites, and call a spade a spade, but I don't believe Benteen has one bit of blame for Custer. He did the only thing he could in stopping to help Reno, and that stopping took time. He exercised his judgment in an ever changing situation and that is what we pay officers for/
Custer, as the commander, was responsible for everything his regiment did or failed to do. They followed his orders, so responsibility rests with Custer.
Sometime late this year, or early next hopefully, there will be a new book out with a complete timeline, by a good friend of mine Fred Wagner. The latest issue of Little Big Horn Research Review has a portion of the book published dealing with the Reno Valley fight. The book will have the first timeline since Gray. Fred has shared with me some new and very revealing things brought to light by his research. Some of it will not sit well with many people, but I am convinced of the validity of his arguments, and I am very hard to convince. Look for it. I don't believe you will be disappointed.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 7, 2013 15:46:03 GMT -5
Hi Chuck - Hope you are well too; I'm doing tolerable!
This all sounds pretty close to what likely transpired and why. I just never got why Custer just kept going and never seemed to realize what a sink hole he was going into. I can't recall where (Fox, Gray, Philbrick, Donovan or somewhere else) that a plausible case was made for Custer learning about Reno's collapse in plenty of time to pull back and regroup his forces on Reno Hill. I seem to recall the news coming through Mitch Boyer, passed down by Curly, who (IIRC) observed Reno's retreat along with Boyer.
The scenario involving Boston and Benteen is puzzling. I'm can't recall if Boston actually saw Reno's retreat, but I'm sure he passed Benteen and felt sure that he would be following.
I think Benteen has often been exonerated of any blame or responsibility based on what he saw as the pressing need to help Reno and shore up Reno Hill. Also, Reno outranked him and told him to stay there. There was plenty of heated discussion about going to help Custer, most famously kindled by Weir, and a belated effort was made to do that, which culminated at Weir Point and a hasty retreat that narrowly avoided another massacre. By then, it was too late to help Custer, but they did try.
I can't disagree at all that the bottom line, after all is said and done, is that this was Custer's doing and he (and his men) paid the price for it. I often wonder if his thinking might have changed if he had known about Crook's battle at Rosebud a week earlier and also knew that these were the very same Indians in front of him. It is not likely he would have thought they were going to run rather than fight. On the other hand, he may have seen another Washita in the making, if he could just surprise and panic the Indians.
Thanks for the lead on the new book and the LBH Research Review; I am a member of the Friends of LBH, but was not aware of this group; I just signed up for a year, so I'll look forward to reading the review and newsletter. I'm also looking forward to this new book. Like the Alamo, fascination with, and speculation about LBH never ends.
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Post by Chuck T on Jun 7, 2013 16:49:31 GMT -5
Allen: I am doing fine, a creak here, and a pain there notwithstanding.
Since Stewart the basic narrative has not changed. Custer sees, moves into MTC then to MTC Ford (Ford B) to recon, thence to battle ridge, leaving Keogh with three and taking two to Ford D where he is surprised-repulsed-or has a picnic, take your pick, and from there back to LSH for the final act. Forty-five to fifty minutes from B to D to LSH is a good average time elapsed. Everyone has tried to tweak that basic narrative with something new-revealing-sensational discovery, and all have failed.
Fred has discovered something that I think highly relevant, but it too does not change the narrative, only adds part to the understanding of why. What it is will have to wait for the book's release.
Benteen made a judgment call based both on a changing situation and the Cooke note in hand. That note does not meet the basic standard of any military communication then or now. When you read the Travis letter, and he had no military training, there is no doubt as to situation, what he wishes done, and what to bring. The Cooke note tells you absolutely nothing of any great value and is contradictory as to execution.
As to knowing about Reno's situation. I don't think Boyer, any of the Crows or even Ronald MacDonald knew anything about it. I don't believe they saw anything. If they did and told Custer, Custer would be an even bigger mad man than is generally believed. That information was vital, and nothing that was done after he leaves 3411 indicates he had any such knowledge
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 8, 2013 13:20:31 GMT -5
I'm going to try to find that reference to Boyer & Curly seeing Reno's retreat. I think Curly is the only source for that, but I can't recall which book it was in. I also can' remember now if Boston spotted Reno at all on his way to join Custer.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 15, 2013 11:11:08 GMT -5
My source for this account is Gray's book "Custer's Last Campaign" (see pp. 353-356). Gray relies on interviews with Curley done by Roe and Camp. He told Camp that he and Boyer saw Reno's retreat from the Timber from the vicinity of Weir Point. Curley says that Boyer "must have" told Custer that Reno had been defeated.
That is not the only view of this incident, however. See Fox's "Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle," pp. 310-312 and his footnote #84 on page 376. Philbrick discusses it to some extent in "The Last Stand"; see pp. 206-210 and his notes on pp. 380-382.
Donovan ("Terrible Glory") has a very interesting discussion of this in his footnote #22, pp. 440-442, using most of the same sources as everyone else. He casts serious doubt on anything Curley had to say and cites several sources for discounting the young Crow scout. But all of the evidence against Curley is really directed at his claims to have actually been with Custer much later than he could have been. It really does not completely resolve the question of what Custer knew about Reno's condition at the time that he continued moving north or into Medicine Tail Coulee. Donovan doesn't really discuss this in any detail in the text of his book, but (p. 231) he says that Custer saw Reno retreat into the timber and suggests that Custer assumed Reno would keep the warriors occupied there long enough for him to strike the village further up. At this point, Custer told Boyer to dismiss the Crow scouts; that they had done their job. He does not go so far as to say that Custer saw Reno's retreat.
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Post by loucapitano on Jun 22, 2013 17:41:52 GMT -5
Allen, Donovan's observation may be crucial to Custer's action. If Custer knew about Reno's retreat to the woods, but did not know about the eventual route and retreat across the LBH to the defense on the hill, it might explain why he figured the Indians in the Southern part of villiage would remain occupied so he could continue his offense to the North where he expected to trap the non-combatents. With the arrival of Boston Custer, he probably expected Benteen to be only minutes behind which is why he left the Calhoun and Keogh companies to meet with that force and support Custer's offensive to the North. Instead, Reno's route may have freed several hundred Sioux to cross the Medicine Tail Ford and overwelm the Calhoun/Keogh defense. We may never determine what kind of pressure Reno was under when he chose to flee the woods and cross the river, but it may be the reason Reno bore some of the blame for the overall massacre (at least in the eyes of Libby and other Custer supporters.) For me, I like to keep and open mind and while peeling away the "artichoke" known as "Custer's Last Stand."
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Post by alamonorth on Jul 4, 2013 11:47:49 GMT -5
The new book, Uncovering History: Archaeological Investigations at the Little Bighorn by Douglas Scott is a general survey of all major archaeological investigations through 2011. I just started reading it, so can't pass on any opinions yet.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 4, 2013 16:08:56 GMT -5
It's on my bucket list, but I haven't ordered it yet. Let us know what you think of it.
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