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Post by Herb on Aug 12, 2010 11:30:50 GMT -5
From the evidence of the Mexican newspapers, a number of after-action reports WERE sent back to Mexico. Again, we have the examples of Santa Anna at the Alamo and Urrea in his actions farther south, not to mention Portilla and Filisola. (The examples are NUMEROUS, in fact). Nonetheless, the divisions obviously carried copies of the reports with them as they proceeded deeper into Texas. That's been my impression, and I never knew that it was so arguable. Gary, I can't really talk to Urrea, for I haven't really done enough work on the southern campaign to do an intelligent analysis. But, his reports and paper work should have made it back as he was not at San Jacinto, the same for Filisola. Even if the copies sent to Santa Anna were lost at San Jacinto, their personal file copies should have existed. I would argue that what Santa Anna wrote on March 6th and sent to Mexico was not an after action report but a victory bulletin. The details (see Sesma's report) that should be in an after action report just aren't there. As Jim as been pointing out, Santa Anna never wrote his after action report until 1837. When you read his Manifesto it's painfully obvious that the documentation that should have supported his report just wasn't there.
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Post by garyzaboly on Aug 13, 2010 5:41:15 GMT -5
Gary, there's no argument that some reports reached Mexico, but one can reasonably explain how they might have gotten there, as we've mentioned on this thread. Sesma's copy was filed later, for example, and he wasn't captured at San Jacinto. It seems, however, that none of the reports have been found from Mexican officers who were captured at San Jacinto. There's the rub, and the gist of this discussion. Why haven't these reports turned up in the Mexican Archives? Wolfpack's original point was that we shouldn't expect to find them there if the Mexican Army was following protocol. Those reports would have been with Santa Anna (or his staff), and thus captured. I know this seems a minor point, but it's what sparked this exchange. That's where our focus should be if this debate continues. Jim Jim, The evidence does indeed confirm that some reports were sent to Mexico City; whether they have survived the years in a south-of-the-border archive, or had been filed efficiently enough to be located, are the main questions. Lieutenant Colonel Jose Batres was one of the Mexican officers killed at San Jacinto, yet we have his correspondence with Jim Bowie on February 23rd published in the March 22 issue of El Mosquito Mexicano. Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez-Navarro, while not one of those in the battle of San Jacinto, did send his personal account of the Alamo assault to a Mexican paper---and it's one of the better ones we have. In terms of Santa Anna being one of the officers captured at San Jacinto, the newspapers also printed a fair amount of his campaign reports DURING that campaign...dating as far back as the army's gathering point at Saltillo. Two of them were written in Bexar, in fact, during the 13-day siege. His attack orders were also widely printed both in Mexico and later in U.S. papers (the latter copying from the Mexican papers). Obviously it can be assumed that none of these campaign documents could have been printed without the tacit approval of "His Excellency." But printed they were, if not ALL of the reports and accounts that were sent back. I've not made a study of the protocol of the Mexican military regarding how such reports or accounts were disseminated, but by the above evidence, and because documents such as orders and battle reports from the other Mexican columns were also published in the Mexican papers DURING the campaign, I would suggest, again, that an open mind be kept on this issue.
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Post by garyzaboly on Aug 13, 2010 6:12:15 GMT -5
From the evidence of the Mexican newspapers, a number of after-action reports WERE sent back to Mexico. Again, we have the examples of Santa Anna at the Alamo and Urrea in his actions farther south, not to mention Portilla and Filisola. (The examples are NUMEROUS, in fact). Nonetheless, the divisions obviously carried copies of the reports with them as they proceeded deeper into Texas. That's been my impression, and I never knew that it was so arguable. Gary, I can't really talk to Urrea, for I haven't really done enough work on the southern campaign to do an intelligent analysis. But, his reports and paper work should have made it back as he was not at San Jacinto, the same for Filisola. Even if the copies sent to Santa Anna were lost at San Jacinto, their personal file copies should have existed. I would argue that what Santa Anna wrote on March 6th and sent to Mexico was not an after action report but a victory bulletin. The details (see Sesma's report) that should be in an after action report just aren't there. As Jim as been pointing out, Santa Anna never wrote his after action report until 1837. When you read his Manifesto it's painfully obvious that the documentation that should have supported his report just wasn't there. Wolf, See my reply to Jim. My main point is that such reports---the key ones, anyway---WERE sent back during Santa Anna's siege of the Alamo, as well as before and after it. Also this: Almonte on March 8 noted "Letters were written to Mexico under date of 6th inst. ...Official reports were forwarded to-day." So, clearly and explicitly, "official" campaign/battle reports were definitely being sent back home...we have the evidence straight from the horse's mouth. Santa Anna's account of the seizure of the Alamo was addressed to the "Secretary of War and Marine." It was the only known report of the battle he wrote during the campaign as far as we know. On Feb. 27 Almonte writes that copies of Santa Anna's report of the Feb. 23 capture of Bexar were being sent to generals Urrea, Filisola, and Fernandez. It too, also made its way into the Mexican papers. As for the personal files of military papers captured at San Jacinto, we know that beyond Almonte there are Cos documents dated in February and March that are deposited in the University of Texas and in the Bancroft Collection. (We can go beyond this to also mention the post-Alamo-battle inventory reports of Ampudia). This is why I caution that it's necessary to avoid the extreme mind-set that assumes, because something may not have been done according to the book, it couldn't possibly have been done---so why should we bother to look, since the book tells us it's not "protocol."
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Post by garyzaboly on Aug 13, 2010 6:59:40 GMT -5
PS: Since the original gist of this thread was the assumption that it would be unlikely to find after-action reports of the "column commanders" in Mexico, I must again offer this challenge: if this is a correct assumption, then how to explain the reports that found their way into Mexican newspapers---not only written by Santa Anna, Urrea and Filisola, but in a few cases by their subordinates in command of detached columns elsewhere?
Their reports, as published in those papers, often provide us with details found nowhere else, not just about the Alamo battle, but about the capture and massacre of Fannin's command, the defeats of Johnson, Grant, Ward, and King, as well as lesser episodes.
No, gentlemen: many of these "after-action" reports WERE indeed sent back to Mexico during the course of the campaign, and published. Just because most of them cannot now be located is no reason to doubt this. If Cos wrote a battle report about the progress of his column on March 6 and it cannot now be located, that's not evidence enough, of course, to tell us that he sent it back to Mexico. But even if he didn't send such a copy back to Mexico this does not preclude the evidence that shows us that some of his peers DID.
Then too, we must go back to the "absence of evidence" issue. Consider the case of Almonte's journal---also missing, yet known to have been sent to New York and then on to Washington. A missing document does not necessarily weigh against its earlier existence and peregrinations.
So We must be reasonable about all this, because it's the History that's at stake here.
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Post by gtj222 on Aug 13, 2010 8:14:37 GMT -5
So it looks like some of the officers did not follow Military procedure? Maybe those papers could show up one day.
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Post by Herb on Aug 13, 2010 10:56:33 GMT -5
Wolf, See my reply to Jim. My main point is that such reports---the key ones, anyway---WERE sent back during Santa Anna's siege of the Alamo, as well as before and after it. Also this: Almonte on March 8 noted "Letters were written to Mexico under date of 6th inst. ...Official reports were forwarded to-day." So, clearly and explicitly, "official" campaign/battle reports were definitely being sent back home...we have the evidence straight from the horse's mouth. Santa Anna's account of the seizure of the Alamo was addressed to the "Secretary of War and Marine." It was the only known report of the battle he wrote during the campaign as far as we know. On Feb. 27 Almonte writes that copies of Santa Anna's report of the Feb. 23 capture of Bexar were being sent to generals Urrea, Filisola, and Fernandez. It too, also made its way into the Mexican papers. Gary, most of your points are valid, but they are not addressing what I've been talking about at all. We are very obviously talking apple and oranges, here. I never said that NO reports were sent back to Mexico, in fact I would be a fool to argue that point. What I have talked about specifically throughout this discussion is the post battle reports of March 6th.Almonte could not have sent the post battle reports to Mexico on March 8th. They weren't written yet. Almonte doesn't record in his journal receiving Sesma's and Romero's report until March 12th. And of course we know that Sesma'a report is dated March 11th. Letters/corespondence are not reports - part of the historical record (valuable parts) but they are still not after action reports. I know you've done too much work in this area and know the difference and how valuable official after action reports are just because of the added detail to include maneuvers, who did what, etc, etc, that just aren't found in most letters. Santa Anna actual words show that he did not consider his March 6th letter a report. I quote from this letter: "I shall in due time send to Your Excellency a circumstantial report of this glorious triumph." Except for Sesma - none of the after action reports of the Alamo have been found, and while there are possiblities they may be found anywhere. The evidence suggests that they won't be found in the Mexican Archives. I've never said that protocol is followed 100%, but in almost every circumstance where it was not, the reasons are fairly obvious. Again, I can't emphasize strongly enough, that without any evidence that protocol was not followed with these particular documents (when every bit of exsisting evidence shows us that it was) it is a dramatic mistake to assume that protocol was not followed. Gary, I have a hard time believing that you believe this statement. Until these documents are found, I can't believe any serious researcher would stop looking for them in any repository that they might be found. I know if I had access to the Mexican Archives and read Spanish, I would look for them and anything else I could think of - even though I don't believe these particular documents are there. There is always a chance no matter how remote. The evidence screams that these particular documents fell into Texian hands at San Jacinto (as your comments about Almonte's and Cos's papers bears out). Looking for these particular documents, the main effort should be mounted in the US not Mexico. Gary, believe it or not. I would love to be proven wrong (I obviously don't think I am ;D ) but I would much rather have the information that these reports would include, than be right.
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Post by stuart on Aug 13, 2010 11:01:40 GMT -5
Urrea was certainly a politically motivated piece of work and totally untrustworthy (a conclusion I came to long before reading Filisola's "analysis"), but to be fair, this was a domestic campaign against rebels, all of them at first Federalistas, and there was a legimate expectation that the political people be kept informed of what was happening.
A parallel is found in the British Army. In Spain and at Waterloo the Duke of Wellington was reporting back to the War Office, but while he was earlier serving in India he was required to report back to the East India Company as well. Had he instead gone to the West Indies in 1795 as intended he would have been reporting to the Colonial Office. Given the Byzantine nature of Mexican society at the time I'm not at all surprised to find officers communicating directly with their political counterparts rather than channelling every word through Santa Anna.
That being the case, if it is established that there are no more surprises to come out of the Army's records, I would widen the search to look at provincial archives.
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Post by Herb on Aug 13, 2010 11:33:01 GMT -5
Stuart, I think there is a lot to still be found in the Mexican Archives. Tom Lindley's researchers, before he died, found some real interesting "nuggets" in the personal files of some of the officers, but no major documents. I expect that is an area that should receive more emphasis.
I avoided talking about Urrea, for two reasons, the first is I never really studied and was able to make sense out of the southern campaign until your book came out. Your book painted a clear picture and sparked an interest, but obviously as new as your book is, I've hadn't had sufficient time to get to what I consider "up to speed".
The other thing is I didn't want to "muddy the waters". Urrea is one of those "special circumstances" where protocol was not 100% followed. But, as I also said the reasons are also obvious. He was operating semi-independently and as such was reporting directly to both Santa Anna, and back to Mexico. Much like Wellington (or should I say Wesley) in India.
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Post by garyzaboly on Aug 13, 2010 14:51:03 GMT -5
Wolf,
I wish I was as certain as you are about this issue. Santa Anna himself noted of his battle report, in his letter to the Secretary of War and Marine dated the 6th but most likely written afterwards, that it was "the OFFICIAL REPORT [my caps] I am sending you" of the battle. He also sent the Secretary "reports...from General Urrea" concerning his victories over other Texian units.
How do we know for sure that Sesma's report and other related ones were not also sent, not only to officials and his own commanders but also to newspapers? The trouble with Mexican newspapers of 1836 is, many of them no longer exist; and if they do they are apparently widely scattered and difficult of access.
If a report written by Sesma to Santa Anna was supposed to have been subsequently put in the generalissimo's correspondence trunk and not seen again during the course of the campaign---assuming protocol here was to write an after-action report that would not be published or sent to Mexico---then how to explain Sesma's report to Santa Anna dated March 15, detailing Sesma's seizure of the town of Gonzales? Santa Anna didn't hold onto it and hide it...he sent it to Mexico City where it saw publication in the newspapers. In fact a Washington D. C. paper, two months later, translated and re-published it.
So the rule about "protocol," if strictly adhered to here, does not preclude the fact that such an after-action report could have been copied and sent south....obviously after March 11, when it was written.
Going even beyond the fair suggestion that Stuart makes about the rivalries in the Mexican army, and the individual desire for celebrity, etc.: the Mexican press, especially after the humiliation of Cos's surrender the year before, was hungry for ANY good news. Santa Anna seems to imply this hunger when he sent copies of his February 27 letter detailing the capture of Bexar, to his other commanders. He specifically stated to Filisola that he was forwarding it both "for your knowledge and for that of the troops of the Army under your immediate command."
Urrea in turn also sent copies of his report concerning his defeat of Francis Johnson's detachment not only to Santa Anna, but to General Fernandez in the south. They were not hoarding or hiding the information.
Again we come back to the March 6th battle, but I give all these other examples in order to caution that we just do not know for sure if any other Alamo battle-related report was sent south.
I'm not as convinced that such additonal Alamo-related documents "won't be found in the Mexican archives," including after-action reports, or however you might wish to term them. Even if they are "merely" letters, let's be clear about this: in this subject area ANYTHING new in terms of substantial information is considered pure gold. Cos's two accounts I mentioned earlier---that dated February 12 and that dated February 23---sit in the Archivo General de Mexico collection. How did they get there---especially considering that Cos was captured on April 21? All of these points are relevant in this argument.
I think it's a question of semantics, too: Santa Anna's 1837 Manifesto was hardly his definitive, detailed account of the Alamo battle: one is better off consulting his Attack Orders (published in Mexican newspapers) as well as his "official report," as he called it, also published in said papers. That he never did write a more detailed account, as he promised, is beside the point. The point is that it was the only battle report he did write in 1836. (And besides, his Manifesto was essentially a DEFENSE of his decisions and actions made during the Texas campaign, not a detailed account of that campaign).
So I would still say, keep an open mind on these matters: you might be surprised at what may turn up south of the border. William C. Davis spent only 3 days plowing through parts of the Mexican archives, and came up with some very choice bits. So too has Roger Borroel. As someone who has handled many an old manuscript in the search for information, I know full well how even many weeks of research can but barely scratch the surface.
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Post by garyzaboly on Aug 13, 2010 15:05:48 GMT -5
PS: by quoting Almonte's March 8th report about "official reports" being "forwarded" that day, I in no way intended to mean that Sesma's battle report was included, obviously.
My point was simply that "official reports" were being sent south as frequently as deemed necessary. We don't have precise inventories of what each courier carried. But again, considering those reports that WERE published, they came from every section of the 1836 Mexican campaign.
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Post by garyzaboly on Aug 13, 2010 15:29:12 GMT -5
PPS: the "why should we bother to look" comment was meant in an ironic, not literal, sense.
Also...and not unimportantly, since "protocol" of all European-based armies of the day was to make copies of official reports and letters, we can't simply say that because the originals, or copies, may have been captured or lost in a battle, that duplicates do not exist, or were not sent, elsewhere.
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Post by TRK on Aug 13, 2010 16:35:34 GMT -5
Also...and not unimportantly, since "protocol" of all European-based armies of the day was to make copies of official reports and letters, we can't simply say that because the originals, or copies, may have been captured or lost in a battle, that duplicates do not exist, or were not sent, elsewhere. An example is the certified copy Ramon Caro made in Bexar on 6 March 1836 of Santa Anna's attack orders of 5 March, now in the Archivo Historica, SEDENA.
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Post by Herb on Aug 13, 2010 17:38:18 GMT -5
Gary, Again, we're talking apples and oranges, and Sesma's report from Gonzales matches exactly what I said in my summary several pages ago about how commanders forwarded reports. It didn't go straight to Mexico, but went through Santa Anna who simply endorsed it. Apparently, partly because he wanted it published immediately, to show how barbarous the rebellious Texians were, by burning their own towns. It is also worth pointing out, that this report is not a battle report, but more a status report/situational report. There is no reason for Santa Anna to write anything other than a simple endorsement and to send it along. And again, if Santa Anna's report of March 6th is a battle report, why are their no details (just generalities) of the battle and why does Santa Anna, say he will write a full report of the battle when he has time? I will conceed that it's possible that additional copies of the column commanders reports were made for any number of reasons, just about anything is possible, but in reality how likely is it? Are we really talking about what is historically probable or the outcome we all hope for? Tom, you're point about Caro's copy of the order is of course legit, but again it's apples and oranges. Orders for completed operations are not after action reports. If Santa Anna wanted to preserve the operational order, it (or a copy) should have gone to Mexico with the next courier - probably the same one that carried the captured flag and Travis' commision, etc. I've tried to be very specific about what catagory of documents and what specific documents in that catagory, I've been talking about. these are not normal letters or correspondence, they are not administrative reports, they are not logistic reports, they aren't status reports. These are afteraction reports explaining in detail how commanders executed their orders to accomplish the attack on March 6th. They include the Mexican initial maneuvers/actions the enemies (Texians) reactions and the Mexican counteractions etc. They describe maneuvers, they cite officers/soldiers by name that performed with courage or exceptional diligence, etc. etc. Please reread Sesma's report to see exactly the type of report that I'm talking about. Anything less is not an afteraction report and would not be handled with the procedures I've described. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE. There is also another fundamental difference, and a political impact to after action reports that seems to be consistently getting missed in this discussion. The after action reports of the subordinates besides being used by the commander to write his own report will reflect on the actions of that superior commander. Thats a key reason that commanders hold on to subordinate reports (and more importantly don't write their own until they have all their subordinate reports). We'd like to think otherwise, but the higher levels of military command are as political as anything involving elected officals.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Aug 13, 2010 20:57:19 GMT -5
I have deleted the last 6 posts from this thread.
In the past, when things have occasionally gotten heated on the forum, I've locked the thread, but I'm not locking this thread down. I see no reason to quash debate because certain members are unable to control their tempers or check their egos at the door.
THIS STOPS NOW. Keep it up and I'll delete the accounts of the offenders.
We built this forum as a sanctuary where people interested in discussing history could do so in a civil manner and not be plagued by nonsensical disruptions, threats, or boorish behavior.
The next time someone feels like posting with both guns blazing, be advised that I'm not going to let ASF devolve into a shooting gallery. I've always considered it a privilege to be in the company of this membership. It is everyone's privilege to be here...not their right.
For the life of this forum it's been my desire that members feel at home here and think of this place as "ours," but I pay the rent and, with a few fine volunteers, maintain it. Don't come into my house if you don't know how to behave.
Don't PM, email, or call to complain about how draconian this all seems. Act right.
Frankly, I never thought a post like this would appear on ASF, and I'm sorry it's necessary.
That's it.
Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on Aug 13, 2010 21:08:38 GMT -5
Let a real novice chime in with a few questions. In what ways do the more formal reports differ from other reports, several of which have been mentioned? If the official post-battle reports are submitted according to an established protocol, do they also follow (generally speaking) a format of some kind? What are we likely to see in such reports or learn from them, beyond what other evidence tells us? Naturally, ANY document is important and worth searching out, reading and evaluating, so I understand that it is not possible to give hard and fast answers to this question; I'm guessing that any officer's report will include important info, even if it doesn't do any more than confirm previously-seen sources.
How does info in these reports compare with the kind of things we see in more informal documents, such as letters or diaries? Again, there are no hard and fast rules about what kind of information you are most likely to find in any of these things, but it would seem likely that the officers involved would say more in diaries or even private correspondence (if they were sure it would STAY private) than they might say in a formal report.
I'm not sure where this gets us, but if we are going to game out what missing documents may, in fact, existed at one time and/or still exist somewhere, why not speculate on which documents are most likely to yield the most valuable information? Hence, my question about what the official reports are likely to have contained. Are they typically static, statistical exposition of facts, such as numbers of troops, troop movements and locations, battle descriptions, casualty figures, etc., or might they also include opinion or personal views about the battle?
Allen
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