Possibility of Breakout

Chuck, I think you've probably have placed limits that automatically make the answer no, given that there were still wounded men in the hospital from December, that were part of the garrison.

There were opportunities that a large part of the garrison might have made it out, but even those evaporated when Santa Anna's reinforcements arrived on March 3rd.

But, before March 3rd, there was no real reason for the garrison to withdrawl. They fully expected Texas to rally to them, and just as importantly they were executing what they thought the government expected of them.

I've come to think of the "siege" of the Alamo as a race for reinforcements, one which Santa Anna won on the 3rd. I think the tone of Travis's letters reflect that.

Herb and George:

You have to go to my original post of this morning which is still up to find the motivation for my question, and by extension my views on the subject. Herb, I think you touched on the mindset that was one of the factors for not retreating or breaking out. A time of Scott and Byron.

George. I think leaving on the 23rd was the long shot. A week or even two or three days head start and they would have reached Gonzales I believe. All this is assuming that they had the transportation necessary to accomplish this. It also assumes that they were smart and not greedy by not trying to take all or any of the artillery with them. A three day head start with at least some mounted to act as rear guard and I think it is doable. Also keep in mind that a prudent Travis would probably have sent gallopers to Gonzales to warn and mobilize the "mounted" ranging company. There were less than 400 Mexican troopers in the vanguard. Forty or fifty mounted Texians could have made life a little difficult for an all cavalry pursuit force. Additionally, everyone assumes that cavalry has the automatic mobility advantage over light infantry unencumbered by a lot of baggage. Short term - yes. Long term -just ain't so. So once the wounded, sick, and non-combatants were well on their way with escort., you may still have fifty or sixty dismounts that could cause the pursuit force a lot of damage if cleverly employed.

Paul, I know Houston claimed in in 1850s Congressional Speech that he ordered the Alamo blown up, but there is just no evidence of it, nor more importantly he did not have the authority to issue such an order. He did however, request that the government order the abandonment of San Antonio/the Alamo.

Instead, the Military Committee of the government made the following statement, that LTC James Neill be ordered to place the Alamo "in the best possible state of defense, with assurances that every possible effort is making to strengthen and provision the Garrison, and in no case to abandon or surrender the place unless in the last extremity. (emphais added).

Abandoning the Alamo before March 3rd, was not an option, and after that date it was an impossibility.

But you're very right it would have been an almost impossible operation if the wounded and noncombatants would have accomplished the troops. The only possibility would have been to have left them to the mercy of the Mexican Army (as Cos had left his severly wounded with the Texians after he surrendered). Remember this was before the Texians knew of the Alamo and Goliad.

I'll disagree with Chuck, about the mobility of the Mexican Cavalry.
He's right, leg infantry, as a greater mobility operationally (that is on a campaign rather than a battle) than horse cavalry. But, any withdrawl, imo, would have been a tactical operation (ie a battle) and horse cavalry would have had the short term mobility advantage necessary to make a withdrawal problematic.

For a withdrawal to have been sucessful, would have required the defenders move from defendable point to defendable point ie from a copse of woods, to a creek crossing, etc. They absolutely could not afford to get caught in the open as Fannin did at Coleto.

I posted this question to get the views of others who have much more knowledge than I on this particular part of the puzzle. I find that we are all in general agreement.

I think a retreat could have been conducted, most probably toward Gonzales, given a few days head start. In the absence of specific orders I don't think Travis would have gone anywhere near Fannin. Somewhere around the 18th or 19th of February would have been sufficient.

My start date and time of 1200 hours on 23 February would have been a real longshot, and probably have meant that the wounded and non-combatants would have to be left behind. Could it have been done - possibly. Was this course of action unthinkable given the times - assuredly.

I do have lingering questions though:

I assume that the transportation assepts were quite poor for the defenders. Does anyone know how poor.

Given that transportation assets were very poor, I am still appalled by the lack of security in the form of outposts on the two major avenues of approach to San Antonio. Lack of even minimal security took any option but defense away from Travis and his men.

I think Santa Anna was of the view that he would have to fight at San Antonio from the outset, thus he chose the indirect approach rather than the Loredo Road. This begs the question as to why the Texians felt they needed to hold San Antonio as a rally point for the rest of Texas.

Herb, I believe rightly suggested that the Alamo was really a race for reinforcements. I posted on the Book Club thread about a recent book on Dien Bien Phu, which was exactly the same situation, an ill conceived defensive position, at the end of a very long supply line, where Giap actually welcomed French Union reinforcements, knowing full well that none of the reinfocements that arrived would alter the outcome.

The key here is reinforcement alone were not enough. More mouths to feed are more of a burden on the long term viability of the garrison. The only thing that would have saved the garrison were reinforcements in large numbers with a sustainable logistical tail. Nowhere in Texas did that exist to my knowledge, nor did it exist at San Jacinto. San Jacinto was a lot of clever mixed with a little dab of dumb luck.

It should, I believe, been quite apparent that the Alamo could not be held long before the battle began. The defenders were completly unprepared in terms of numbers and logistics to do so. Travis , in his 23 February letter, says as much when he mentions the corn and beeves being gathered together as they retreated from the city into the Alamo.

I think a strong case can also be made that were the city and the Alamo not defended Santa Anna would have still had to pause in SA for a number of days to consolidate his force and allow them some rest before moving further into Texas. He may have had to stay as long as the 5 or 6th of March. He moved into Texas with a fairly strong vanguard, and the main body well in the rear, He had no reason to believe he would be engaged before reaching San Antonio, so that course of action was an acceptable risk. Had he gone further into Texas with just his vanguard force he would have risked defeat in detail, as he probably had little or no intelligence of what the Texians had possibly waiting for him in the interior.

As always I welcome your thoughts on these matters.

Chuck,

I've been doing some idle musing, and I've been wondering if what the Napoleon of the West was really trying to do was imitate the real Napoleon's Campaign of 1805?

Think of the parallels, Fannin and his troops in the role of Mack and the Austrian Army and Goliad as Ulm. Urrea and his troops as Murat and his, and San Antonio as the pivot point aka Ansbach/Nurenberg. But for the delay imposed by the Alamo and its defenders, Santa Anna could have rapidly swept up Fannin and destroyed the Texian Army as Napoleon did to Mack, then rapidly move into and secure the Texas Colonies (Vienna) before Texas could raise a new army or reinforcements from the US (the Russian Army) could reach decisive points.

Chuck, Allen,

I think if you look up Neil's correspondence in The Alamo Reader you'll see that Neil was remarkably well informed about Mexican operations. His Intelligence Section, must have been working overtime. He very clearly knew numbers, locations, and routes of march.

I've been doing a lot of research into what was going on in Jan/Feb 1836 these past few months and it seems to me, that Neil's departure had a much more significant impact than has been credited in most histories. One of the conclusions, I've reached is that while Neil was maintaining focus on his internal duties as a garrison commander, he was also very much focussed on the advance of the Mexican Army. When he departed the Travis/Bowie conflict/politics took center stage, and the garrison lost sight of the big picture.

Don't forget that even given this, Travis was expecting the Mexican Army in San Antonio, by March.

I touched on the supply issue in the article I wrote in the March issue of the AJ. When you take Bowie's letter of Feb 2d, Jameson's letter of Jan 18, and Travis' letter of Feb 23rd, there was probably sufficent food in the Alamo to last until the end of March without going on short rations. Now it might have been mostly beef and corn everyday, but there was plenty. Good gunpowder might have been a different story.