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Post by stvn2964 on Dec 28, 2009 19:37:47 GMT -5
Good Evening,
Question concerning Santa Anna's advance to San Antonio de Bexar.
According to the Osprey Series (089), "when Santa Anna arrived at Guerrero on February 13, 1836, he learned that his army was strung out for more than 300 miles. Units under General Joaquin Ramirez y Sesma were already across the river and bound for Bexar along El Camino Real."
Is there a definitive record of when did General Sesma troops crossed the Rio Grande and begin their advance?
Regards,
Steven
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 28, 2009 20:49:49 GMT -5
Steven:
Sequin's scouts reported that Santa Anna's vanguard brigade (1400-1500 men) crossed the Rio Grande on February 13th. Santa Anna personally crossed on the 16th, Urrea on the 17th (thanks to Wolfpack for saving me the trouble of looking all this up!).
Jim
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Post by stvn2964 on Dec 28, 2009 21:41:19 GMT -5
Jim,
Thank you very much for your answer to the question that I posed.
A follow-up question....
With General Sesma's troops crossing the Rio Grande on February 13th, is there a definitive account of his soldiers advance on San Antonio?
It is my understanding that Santa Anna caught up with General Sesma's troops before they arrived in San Antonio de Bexar. Was this at the Medina River?
Regards,
Steven
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Post by Herb on Dec 29, 2009 11:37:28 GMT -5
For such an obvious question, it's surprisingly difficult to find detailed answers.
Walter Lord, provided a map and caption (page 69, 1987 edition) with the following information:
Santa Anna issued orders for the army to consolidate at San Luis Potosi (after the Zacateas Campaign). Santa Anna left Mexico City for San Luis Potosi. on Nov 28, 1835. Here he organized the army for its future operations. and subsequently marched to Saltillo, reaching that point on January 7, 1836. At Saltillo, Santa Anna spent three weeks training his army. General Filisola was dispatched to Monclova to organize supplies for the soon to arrive army.
I'm not sure when he reached there but Sesma's Brigade was already operating on the Rio Grande (out of Laredo). he was subsequently ordered to move to the vic of Del Rio - I haven't been able to find when he began his move.
On February 1st, Santa Anna held a grand review at Saltillo and began the move to Monclova. The order of march was Urrea, Gaona, Tolosa, and Andrade. Urrea, however, was dispatched to Monterey and subsequently reached the Rio Grande at Meir before moving to Matamoros (see Winder's Sacrificed at the Alamo); (At this point Almonte's diary provides the most detailed infromation - see Jack Jackson's Almonte's Texas). Almonte had received orders to join the column on January 7th and probably because of his detailed knowledge of Texas was subsequntly appointed as an aide-de-camp to Santa Anna.
Almonte arrived at Monclova on Feb 4th. At Monclova, Santa Anna linked up with Cos's defeated troops and integrated them into his command. Almonte departed Monclova on Feb 8th for the Rio Grande, reaching the river on the 12th. Sesma was already there and was ordered to cross the river the next day.
Almonte and Santa Anna crossed on the 16th, and reached the Nueces on the 17th. From the Nueces until they arrived in San Antonio, Santa Anna and Almonte travelled with the San Luis Potosi Infantry Battalion (part of Sesma's Brigade) until they reached San Antonio.
On the 19th, they linked up with Sesma's Cavalry at the Rio Frio where the Mexican Army built a new bridge to cross the river.
On the 22d Santa Anna reached the Rio Medina where he dispatched Sesma and a small party of Dragoons toward Bexar.
On the 23rd Sesma reached the Alazan Heights overlooking Bexar at 7:00 AM (approx 7:30 AM current CST) and Santa Anna and the main body of the Vanguard BDE reached that point at 12:30 PM (1:00 PM CST).
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Post by stvn2964 on Dec 29, 2009 19:40:53 GMT -5
Wolfpack,
Good Evening & Thank You for your detailed answer. It fills in the blanks on some questions that I have wondered about.
It would seem that the Texians missed several opportunities to slow the advance of Santa Anna to San Antonio de Bexar at the river crossings that the Mexican Army had to make. I understand that Santa Anna moved much quicker than anyone thought he would, but I have a hard time understanding why Travis (and Bowie) were so completely surprised. Why did they not have scouts out to prevent such?
Of course, I am looking at this from a 21st century perspective, with 20 years of military experience.
Regards,
Steven
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 29, 2009 22:30:07 GMT -5
Steven, no doubt you and Wolfpack could carry on an interesting discussion on this subject given both of your backgrounds. Please feel free to do so right here!  jim |
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Post by Herb on Dec 29, 2009 22:30:20 GMT -5
You're welcome and welcome to the forum also.
There are some real interesting disconnects. I think perhaps much of the difficulty was the Texian command situation. Fannin and Travis neither one arrived at their posts until Feb 2 and 3rd, and thus didn't even have two weeks before Santa Anna's forces crossed the Rio Grande. And of course Travis wasn't even in true command at Bexar until Neill left and Bowie fell sick.
Travis' cavalry coomand, of course had been raised to do just such a mission, but except for when Traivs lost the election to Bowie (when Travis took the cavalry out to the Medina). They never left Bexar.
The Texians did have good intelligence on Santa Anna's movements, but for some reason they seemed to go with their preconceived notion that Santa Anna wouldn't arrive for at least another week or two. Part of the problem may have been that Santa Anna chose to travel the Camino Real and came upon Bexar from the west. They may have been expecting (hoping?) an advance from Laredo (from the South), and that Grant and Johnson forces operating in that rough area would make intial contact and provide early warning.
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Post by stuart on Dec 30, 2009 6:15:40 GMT -5
Politics was indeed a major problem. As I've pointed out before the warning which Travis received was carried by Blas Herrera. He is often identified as a cousin of Seguin and therefore assumed to be one of Seguin's men. In actual fact he belonged to Placido Benavides' company, which was part of James Grant's Federal Volunteer Army and at the time Benavides and Grant were across the Rio Grande trying to raise the Federalist uprising in which Travis and the other "Americans" were trying to avoid any involvement at all. So far as Travis was concerned therefore the report was regarded as extremely suspect and to borrow Houston's later comment about Travis' own cry for help "an electioneering scheme" by Grant
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Post by Allen Wiener on Dec 30, 2009 9:34:26 GMT -5
Stuart, could you summarize again for us the key points from your book that pertain here? As I recall, Grant was operating as a British agent, whose major objective was to encourage broad revolution throughouth northern Mexico, and to ultimately create a new nation comprising those areas. He (and Britain) wanted to prevent Texas independence, future annexation of Texas to the United States (and/or spread of U.S. influence and territory). Travis, Houston and most of the Texan leadership had, by this point, given up on the idea of reconciliation with the Mexican government or remaining part of Mexico. Since Travis, Bowie, et al, were comitted to complete independence from Mexico by this point, they would have seen Grant and his expedition as a problem, not as potential help (only one of several examples of the infighting going on among the Texan leadership). Travis and Bowie seem to have distrusted the intelligence they received regarding Santa Anna's movements because they distrusted the source. However, did they seek intelligence of their own?
A few more questions come to mind here, although I know they've been raised before. Even if the Texans in Bexar did not expect Santa Anna's forces to arrive for several more weeks, that still did not leave a lot of time to prepare. They were already down to only 150 or so men, with no clear indication that any reinforcement was in the works. No one was even sure who was in charge in Texas at that point. So, exactly what was the plan in Bexar at that point? What did they expect to do when the Mexicans did arrive? It's been noted here in other threads that the Texans really were taken by surprise when the Mexicans arrived and rushed to the Alamo as a kind of lifeboat. But, then what? Hope for reenforcements from somewhere?
Let me add my own welcome Steven; thanks for kicking off a good discussion. By the way, if you have not read Stuart's book, The Secret War For Texas, I highly recommend it. It includes much that is new to the Alamo story and presents it in a new light.
Allen
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Post by stvn2964 on Dec 30, 2009 14:57:27 GMT -5
Let me add my own welcome Steven; thanks for kicking off a good discussion. By the way, if you have not read Stuart's book, The Secret War For Texas, I highly recommend it. It includes much that is new to the Alamo story and presents it in a new light. Allen, Good Afternoon & Thank You for the tip concerning Stuart's book; it sounds fascinating. I ordered a copy today. Regards, Steven |
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Post by stvn2964 on Dec 30, 2009 15:11:01 GMT -5
Politics was indeed a major problem. As I've pointed out before the warning which Travis received was carried by Blas Herrera. He is often identified as a cousin of Seguin and therefore assumed to be one of Seguin's men. In actual fact he belonged to Placido Benavides' company, which was part of James Grant's Federal Volunteer Army and at the time Benavides and Grant were across the Rio Grande trying to raise the Federalist uprising in which Travis and the other "Americans" were trying to avoid any involvement at all. Stuart, Good Afternoon. I have seen references to Blas Herrera as being part of Seguin's unit and always assumed that such was true. As part of Benavides' company, instead, the question that immediately comes to mind concerns motivation for carrying the warning to San Antonio de Bexar. Did Blas Herrera take it upon himself to carry the news concerning Santa Anna's advance or was he sent as a messenger by Benavides and/or Grant? I look forward to reading your book. Regards, Steven |
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Post by stuart on Dec 30, 2009 15:42:57 GMT -5
Herrera was sent by Benavides, which is why he was regarded with suspicion.
Allen has actually summed things up pretty well. Grant was a British agent, albeit a slightly disconnected one, who was working to block American expansion around the gulf coast and west to the Pacific. By 1835 he was also a prominent Federalist leader in Mexico (he was never a Texian) and heavily involved in planning and leading a Federalist uprising in the northern states, including Texas, aimed at creating a breakaway Republic of Rio Grande. This is what the Matamoros expedition was really about. Initially the Texians were keen to support it because a Mexican civil war would distract Santa Anna from trying to retake Texas.
However once Grant actually got the expedition under way - stripping men and supplies from Bexar - the Texian secessionists, including of course Houston and Travis, feared Texas being sucked into a Mexican civil war that didn't fit in with their aspirations to join the United States - hence the distrust and then hatred of Grant
By February Grant and the Federalistas, including Benavides and a Colonel Gonzales, were down on the Rio Grande and sending back word of Santa Anna's advance.
Travis' problem, as he complained, was a lack of horses to mount proper reconnaisances of his own, yet he clearly distrusted the intelligence he was getting from the Federalistas.
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Post by Herb on Jan 12, 2010 23:10:07 GMT -5
Wolfpack, Good Evening & Thank You for your detailed answer. It fills in the blanks on some questions that I have wondered about. It would seem that the Texians missed several opportunities to slow the advance of Santa Anna to San Antonio de Bexar at the river crossings that the Mexican Army had to make. I understand that Santa Anna moved much quicker than anyone thought he would, but I have a hard time understanding why Travis (and Bowie) were so completely surprised. Why did they not have scouts out to prevent such? Of course, I am looking at this from a 21st century perspective, with 20 years of military experience. Regards, Steven I've been working on a seperate project, covering part of the same time period, and I've noticed the Texians especially Bowie were pretty conscientious about sending out patrols to verify the intelligence they were receiving from Mexico. But that the patrols pretty much always turned up empty. I expect what was happening was, while the Texians especially Bowie were pretty intimately familiar with the area from Monclovia north, they weren't adjusting for the difference in time that it would take an army marching largely by foot, to cover the same distance, that a small civilian party travelling by horse could cover. A man travelling horseback could easily travel 50-60 miles a day, while an infantry battalion conducting a sustained march would probably only cover about 12 miles a day. Striking camp after breakfast marching at a rate of about 3 mph until noon break, then marching again until midafternoon and stopping to set up camp, so everything was done before dark. From looking at the letters it looks like that is what happened with the mounted Texian patrols looking for the Mexican army much further along the route of march then what it really was. |
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