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Post by stuart on Oct 24, 2007 17:24:40 GMT -5
As the question of numbers is important I thought it was worth offering this analysis to replace Herb’s missing figures. They are of course open to debate.
Santa Anna’s orders for the assault on the Alamo organised his forces as follows:
The first column, commanded by Cos was to comprise the Aldama Battalion (340) and three fusilier companies of the San Luis (275 – whole battalion)
The second column under Duque was to comprise the Toluca (320) and three more companies of San Luis
The third column under Romero was to have the Matamoros (275) and Jimenez (275) battalions
The fourth column under Morales was to just comprise three cazadore companies from Matamoros, Jimenez and San Luis
The reserve was to comprise all of the grenadier companies and the Zapadores battalion (185).
That much is straightforward enough. When it gets down to numbers a bit of uncertainty creeps in. The figures in brackets after each battalion are the numbers recorded by Filisola as taking part. However these need to be adjusted downwards because all of the battalions had their grenadier companies taken away, and three of them also detached their cazadore companies.
At first sight an easy way of carrying out that adjustment would be to divide the numbers evenly between the eight companies in each battalion and then take away one or two eighths as the case may be. The trouble with that is that regiments didn’t work that way. Assuming that the Mexican Army was following the same practice as everyone else they will have been doing their level best to keep the preference companies up to strength at the expense of the fusilier companies.
Just to give one very typical example, in 1794 the Royal Scots were serving on Jamaica when they were required to first send their two flank companies to San Domingo, and then the remaining eight companies were to follow as soon as enough shipping was available. The battalion was way below its establishment at this point, but the two flank companies accounted for fully half its number!
In theory there should have been 120 to a company in a Mexican battalion; which was clearly unrealistic, but if we suppose that they tried to maintain half that number in the preference companies we then find the numbers stacking up like this:
First Column
Aldama: 340 less 60 grenadiers = 280
San Luis: 275 less 120 grenadiers and cazadores = 155 in 6 coys, say 75 with Cos
Total for Cos: 355
Second Column
Toluca: 320 less 60 grenadiers = 260
San Luis: 275 less 120 grenadiers and cazadores = 155 in 6 coys, say 75 with Duque
Total for Duque: 335
Third Column
Matamoros: 275 less 120 grenadiers and cazadores = 155
Jimenez: 275 less 120 grenadiers and cazadores = 155
Total for Romero: 310
Fourth Column
3 cazadore companies @ 60 men apiece = 180 under Morales
Reserve
5 grenadier companies @ 60 men apiece = 300
Zapadores: 185
Total : 485
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Post by Herb on Oct 25, 2007 9:18:55 GMT -5
You've refreshed my memory, I'll see if I can reconstruct what I did and post it for comparison.
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Post by bobdurham on Oct 26, 2007 4:02:31 GMT -5
This is interesting! I've never thought of it this way, always assumed that the numbers given were the totals in the attacking force, not the totals before taking away the Granadero and Cazadore companies. This changes the complexion of things quite a bit. Giving the fourth column 180 men rather than the 100 normally ascribed to it, would mean that they were a major attacking column and definitely not just a diversionary attack. Have to revise my thinking quite a bit.
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Post by dimbo33 on Jan 13, 2008 23:03:59 GMT -5
I agree that we do not know how evenly the eight companies of the different battalions were divided. We can take clues from some of the information available. We have the Morelos Btn. strength report from Oct. of 1835. At that time the 1st company had 32 men; 2nd Co. 23; 3rd 24; 4th 26; 5th 32; 6th 36; Granaderos 30 and Cazadores 43. This does show a slight increase in the number of preferential troops per company but not by a significant margin. 176 fusileros and 73 preferential.
The list of officers from March 1836 in San Antonio only gives the names of the officers but does not seem to show more officers in the preferential units.
Also I think that one needs to take into account the number of sick that were not in the assault. De la Pena also notes that there were a significant number of deserters on the way north. He estimated that of the 6,500 Mexican soldiers that entered Texas, 500 were lost to illness and desertions by the time hostilities broke out. This is just over 7.5%. It is tempting to use that number for each unit but it is likely the Permanent units would have had fewer deserters than the Activos.
Another number that I struggle with is the ones left in camp according to Santa Anna's orders. Filisola's version of the attack orders from the 5th of March included the following: "The recruits who are not well-trained will remain in their quarters". I have never seen any number of the recruits that were left out of the attack.
By the way, if any of you are interested, there is an original copy of the attack orders at the San Jacinto Museum. They did not know what they had until a few years back when I recognized Amador's signature and looked closely at the document that was on display. Since then they have taken it off display so you would have to go to the library.
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Post by stuart on Jan 14, 2008 4:04:42 GMT -5
Thanks Greg, that's both interesting and useful, but the question is still slightly more complicated. In the first place as I read Filisola the numbers quoted are those actually present and taking part in the assault on March 6 and therefore don't include the sick and other details left behind in the camps. (I have an interesting parallel for this in two sets of returns for the British Army at Culloden; one giving the regimental totals and another, markedly lower one (the Morning State) enumerating those actually standing in the ranks when the battle began.
That bit's straightforward; where it becomes less so is in the breakdown by company. What you have there is the administrative numbers. On active service properly run units kept the companies “levelled” with as near as possible the same numbers in each, in order to manoeuvre properly – at a very basic level imagine forming a hollow square with the companies on one side only mustering half the numbers as the companies on the other. A colleague and I once tracked down a guy who served in the 71st Highlanders at Waterloo and asked for letters to be forwarded to him in a particular company, yet the rolls clearly showed him listed under a quite different one and this turned out to be because he’d been posted across during the campaign as part of the “levelling”. The flank or preference companies operated in the same way except that it their case it was a matter of beefing them up before going into action rather than levelling them since they needed to be stronger than the fusilier companies for operations like Morales’
Now I said in my initial post my estimate was only a guesstimate, but DLP at least credits him with more than 100 men which at the very least implies at least 35-36 men per company, which would be 50% more than the fusiliero ones, especially if they were being milked to make up Morales’ numbers
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Post by Herb on Jan 14, 2008 12:39:24 GMT -5
Another number that I struggle with is the ones left in camp according to Santa Anna's orders. Filisola's version of the attack orders from the 5th of March included the following: "The recruits who are not well-trained will remain in their quarters". I have never seen any number of the recruits that were left out of the attack. I take the strength report numbers as those present (normally that is what is reported to higher HQs and what Filisola probably had) - not the actual numbers that participated in the attacks. The number of raw recruits and sick left per company in camp is of course unknown, but I would calculate that to be roughly 10% or 2 or 3 per company. Another point is that each company would probably have left baggage guards in camp. Now if there were sick or untrained men in the company - that is where the guards would come from. If not the company probably would have detailed one or two men. We're talking small numbers here, but even still the cumulative effect is somewhat significant. The differences between assigned strength, those present, and those present for duty, ie participating in the attack, would have shown significant drop offs from one category to the next. I expect that the disparity in numbers between companies quoted for the Morelos Battalion (a permanent battalion, and before any significant action) was typical. |
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Post by dimbo33 on Jan 14, 2008 20:35:51 GMT -5
Stuart, Did you mean to say de la Pena in your first paragraph of your last post? I do not recall seeing any specific numbers from Filisola but if he did, do you have the source.
I agree with you that the numbers that de la Pena gave for the four columns actually fit better with the larger preferential companies that you have proposed. I think this is certainly a possibility. However when you look at the fourth column de la Pena says they were over one hundred. That only tells us that the three cazadores units averaged over 33 men per unit.
I realize that if one uses de la Pena's numbers for the other columns and take out less men for the preferential companies there would appear to be too many men left for the other columns. However, that could be explained by the number of men that were sick, had deserted or were too inexperienced to participate in the attack.
Obviously we have had to take several leaps of faith to get to this point. One of the ones that is somewhat of a problem for me is using de la Pena's numbers. Is it likely that there would have been an accounting of the actual number of troops that participated in each column? Would de la Pena's numbers be more of a general estimate?
You obviously have much more of a background in military history than I (none at all) and you bring up excellent points in which the British army responded in this manner. Do you have any evidence that the Mexican army would have responded likewise? My general impression of the Mexican army is that they were very quick to break up battalions/regiments but I am still unsure about breaking up the companies. From some of the strength reports (Lipantitlan, the Mexican army on the Colorado on May 9 and especially the Mexican army in Victoria on May 14th it seems to me that it was their practice to do so.
On the other hand, probably from my background as an avocational archaeologist, I love proof of these things. I hope that some day we will have some of the answers from the Mexican Military Archives. In the meantime it is fun to consider the possibilities.
Also, so as not to confuse anyone. The numbers that I gave in my first post, for the Morelos Btn., were from Oct. 1835, before the Texans stormed Bejar and the Morelos returned to Mexico. They did come back to Texas but did not participate in the action of March 6th. In fact they were so decimated by the siege in 1835 and the two trips into Texas, they did not participate in any action during the 36 campaign. Gregg
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Post by stuart on Jan 15, 2008 2:03:13 GMT -5
Gregg, the source of the numbers is a good question which some of those with access to a copy of Filisola may be able to answer better. I took the figures from a table in Nofi's book(p135), citing Filisola. The figures differ from those obtained via Andrade in the version in Hansen, but are preceded by a column headed "engaged", which I read literally as being those taking part in the attack and not including the rear parties left out of battle.
As to the "levelling" of companies, I should clarify that this was just a temporary thing. The men in question still belonged to their parent companies and would return to them at every opportunity. It was just a practical measure in order for the battalion to be able to execute close order drill movements smoothly and easily. as I said, imagine trying to form a square with companies of different sizes - so, yes, although my expertise lies with the British Army this was a universal problem and I'd strongly suspect a universal solution
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Post by Herb on Jan 15, 2008 11:28:59 GMT -5
I'm not sure if Nofi's source is Filisola or Nofi's work based on Filisola.
It looks like, to me, that Nofi took the strength report and simply subtracted the musicians and rounded down (with the exception of the Zapadores).
However, there appears to be a serious disconnect, between Nofi's numbers for some of the battalions. The San Luis Potosi for example is reported to have numbered over 440 men (minus musician)after the battle. Add in their causalities on March 6th, and this battalion apparently numbered close to 500 men.
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Post by Jake on Jan 15, 2008 12:03:31 GMT -5
An unnoticed aspect of Sanchez-Navarro's information about the attack on March 6 is his listing of what forces attacked where, which affects what numbers we assign to the attack on a given point.
The Santa Anna order of March 5 listed the four columns of attack and the reserves.
1. General Martín Perfecto de Cos would command the first column, with General Juan V. Amador, of Santa Anna’s general staff located with the reserves at the northeastern battery as his second and the permanent Aldama battalion and three companies of the San Luis battalion as his troops.
2. The second column would be under the command of Colonel Francisco Duque, with General Manuel Fernández Castrillón as his second, also on the general staff with the reserves, and his troops the active battalion of Toluca and the other three companies of the San Luis battalion.
3. Column three would be commanded by Colonel José María Romero, seconded by Colonel Mariano Salas, and made up of the permanent battalions of Matamoros and Jiménez.
4. The fourth column would be lead by Colonel Juan Morales, seconded by Colonel José Miñón, and would consist of the cazador companies of the permanent battalions of Matamoros and Jiménez, and the active company of San Luis. The reserve would consist of the Zapadores battalion and the five grenadier companies from the other five battalions.
5. Nominally the reserves were under the command of General Santa Anna, but they would be assembled by Colonel Agustín Amat, who would “lead them also to wherever shall be indicated.”
Lindley argued that this order was subject to change, and had no necessary relationship to what happened on March 6. In fact he was quick to toss it out when it got in the way of a new theory he proposed based on his misreading of Sesma’s report: “... the commanders of the first, second and fourth columns were changed sometime after the March 5 order was written...” Although I think Lindley’s suggested changes are mistaken, Sanchez-Navarro did list things differently:
1. Sánchez says that the first column under Cos consisted of 200 cazadores and musketeers of the Aldama battalion and 100 musketeers of the San Luis.
2. Duque commanded the second column (in which Peña served as his aide), made up of the Toluca battalion. Differing from the Santa Anna order of March 5, the other companies of the San Lucas Battalion were not in the second column. Sánchez adds that Duque was wounded near the northeast corner, and General Castrillón and the Zapadores from the reserve joined the Toluca battalion and continued the effort to climb the wall; at this point there were about 500 men in the column, counting the Zapadores.
3. General Romero’s third column consisted of the Matamoros and Jiménez battalions, as the Santa Anna order said.
4. The fourth column, under Morales, attacked the south wall. Sánchez says that Morales’s men were the remaining 300 men of the active battalion of San Luis (who originally were to have been on the north wall with Duque) rather than the originally-planned cazadores of the Matamoros, Jiménez, and San Luis battalions. This means that the cazadores of the Matamoros and Jiménez battalions presumably remained with their battalions and attacked the east side in the third column.
5. The reserves, said Sánchez, were in the northeastern battery, and consisted of the Zapadores and grenadiers of the other battalions, just as Santa Anna’s order of March 5 says.
The problem with Sanchez's statements about who actually went where is that I think it's Sesma who mentions some components of companies at the southwest corner that matches the Santa Anna order and does not match the Sanchez list. I'll find that (I think it's in Hansen) if someone else doesn't first, and give you the statement tonight.
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Post by Herb on Jan 15, 2008 15:28:54 GMT -5
Jake,
I don't think I've ever seen that troop breakdown before! If true it would change a lot of notions about the battle.
There are two contradictions that come to mind. One is DLP, whose account seems to support the original order and the other is the San Luis Potosi Battalion Journal, which according to Hansen (page 442) the troop breakdown mirrors Santa Anna's order.
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Post by Jake on Jan 15, 2008 16:06:11 GMT -5
Wolf: yeah, I thought I had a great thing when I worked out what Sanchez was saying, but then I began to find these little references in circumstances that I couldn't really dismiss that suggested that the original Santa Anna order was actually followed -- so I've come to believe that Sanchez got it wrong... but why did he get it wrong? What happened that caused him to think the distribution he describes was what was going on?
And thanks for that ref. to the Battalion journal -- I had missed that one.
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Post by stuart on Jan 15, 2008 16:09:11 GMT -5
Herb, have at look at Hansen 408 : the breakdown quoted by Jake is in Sanchez plan key, which inter alia refers to the main gate as being "taken by Colonel Don Juan Morales assisted by… Don Jose Minon, and his battalion, the reserve militia of San Luis Potosi"
There are two ways to interpret this, either (a) there was a reshuffle post publication of Santa Anna's original orders (about 2pm) and the San Luis battalion was assigned to beef up Morales' attack - I'd still be inclined to leave him his original three companies plus some back-up. This would both explain Filisola's reference (Hansen 392) to “Colonels Jose Vicente Minon and Juan Morales with their columns” and give them enough men to take the gate as well as the SW gun position as I've been arguing elsewhere. The discrepancies on the other hand with the accounts of DLP and others could be explained by their relying on the original orders.
However, (b) comforting though this is to me, I do in all honesty have to wonder if in fact it is Sanchez who is in error because the wording of the order appears a little misleading to me:
"The fourth column...composed of the light companies of the Battalions of Matamoros and Jimenes, and of the Active Battalion of San Luis". Now its clear from the earlier parts of the order that this refers to the three light companies taken from Matamoros, Jimenes and San Luis, but it would be very easy to carelessly misread it as two light companies and the San Luis Battalion.
On balance I suspect this may be closer to the truth, but don't let this get in the way of a good discussion
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Post by Herb on Jan 15, 2008 17:38:12 GMT -5
Looking at Sanchez-Navarro's plat (using Nelson) at the start position it looks like he is showing a column of three lines each line being made up of two companies for a total of six line companies. Matching his notations - if you figure that the San Luis was broken up to cross level the Aldama. However, when the column is closing the West Wall, it looks like he's showing each line being made up of three companies for a total of nine line companies. Matching Santa Anna's order. Sanchez-Navarro is also stating that the total numbers for the San Luis in the attack was around 400 which does come closer to the strength report than Nofi's 275.  The trump to me would be the San Luis Journal. You would think that the battalion journal would get it right on how they were deployed. Sadly, Hansen just gives a summary of that portion of the journal. I'd sure like to see what exactly the journal said. |
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Post by Jake on Jan 15, 2008 18:13:29 GMT -5
To help out here, following is the Spanish and my translation of the portions of the indexes of the two Sanchez maps that give his idea of who attacked where: The lettered designations are from the Ayudantia map of ca. 1836-1839, while the numbered designations are from the “Aguayo” Map of 1840. B. Puerta principal: la tomó el dia del asalto el Señor Coronel D[o]n Juan Morales, acompañado del de igual clase D[o]n José Miñon, con su Batallon el activo de S n Luis Potosí.
B. Main gateway. Colonel Juan Morales took it on the day of the assault, accompanied by José Miñón of the same rank, with the active battalion of San Luis Potosí.
1. Puerta principal fuí tomada en el dia del asalto por los Señores Coroneles D[o]n Juan Morales y D[o]n José Miñon con cerca de 300 hombres del Batallón activo de Sn Luis Potosi.
1. Main gate that was taken on the day of the assault by the Colonels Juan Morales and José Miñón with about 300 men of the Active Battalion of San Luis Potosí.
H. Por este punto, llamado fortin de condelle ... intento el asalto el Señor General D[o]n Martin Perfecto de Cos con la 1.ra columna de ataque compuesta de cazadores y fucileros de Aldama y de cien fucileros del activo de Sn Luis...
H. Through this point, called the “Fortín de Condelle,” ... General Martín Perfecto de Cos attempted to assault with the first column of attack, composed of the chasseurs and musketeers of the Aldama and one hundred musketeers of the active batallion of San Luis...
18. Bateria llamada de Condelles por este punto asalto el S[eño]r General Cos con 200 hombres de Aldama y 100 de Sn Luis...
18. Battery called “de Condelles;” at this point General Cos attacked with 200 men of the Aldama and 100 of San Luis...
F. Barracas para la tropa, y corral, para caballos, por el cual asaltó y entró con los Batallones Matamoros y Ximenez el Señor Coronel del 1.ro D[o]n Jose Maria Romero.
F. Barracks for the troops, and corral for the horses, through which attacked and entered, with the Matamoros and Ximénez battalions, Colonel José María Romero of the first [named].
25. Por los puntos señalados con estos numeros atacaron y entraron al fuerte los SS[eñores] Coroneles Duque y Romero mandados por el S[eñor] Co[ronel] Amador con cerca de 500 hombres de Zapadores y Toluca, Duque fué herido de metrallas antes de entrar.
25. At the points indicated by this number, the Colonels Duque and Romero, under the command of Colonel Amador, with about 500 men of the Zapadores and Toluca, attacked and entered the fort; Duque was wounded by grape-shot before entering.
G. ... Por el dicho punto y por la linea que corre acia el medio de la otra bateria asalto el S[eño]r Coronel Duque con su Batallon de Toluca, y por habersido herido continuo el Asalto el S[eñor] G[ene]ral Castrillon y entro al fuerte con Toluca y Zapadores.
G. ... At the said point and on the line that ran toward the middle of the other battery [on the northwest corner] attacked Colonel Duque with his Battalion of Toluca, and because he was wounded, General Castrillón continued the assault and entered the fort with the Toluca and Zapadores.
That statement under G about "la linea," that may actually be a military jargon phrase that would translate as "the wall" -- but I couldn't be sure, so I left it in its more or less literal form as "the line." |
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