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Post by cantador4u on Oct 9, 2009 21:39:02 GMT -5
I've seen discussions on this forum wondering why Santa Anna wasted so much time at Bexar. One thought is that he could have left a small contingent of troops to keep the Alamo defenders bottled up while the Napoleon of the West could have continue marching and attacking the Texas rebels. General Urrea didn't need to rest his troops for two weeks before kicking Texian rebel butt. why would Santa Anna?
The typical response is that SA wanted to recover Mexican as well as family pride by recapturing the town that defeated Gen Cos forcing him to surrender to a rag-tag mob of foreign pirates. This makes sense, but not necessarily military sense.
It occurred to me that MAYBE, just maybe, SA had a plan that would let him not only recapture pride, but maybe defeat the enemy at the same time.
With his vastly superior numbers SA could have been stormed and taken the Alamo a lot sooner than he did. So what was he waiting for? Siege canons? A twenty to one troop advantage?
No. My new and amazing theory is that SA was using the defenders of the Alamo as bait to lure the Texan army to him, thus fighting at the place that he chose rather than his foe. In doing so his troops would be rested while the would-be rescuers of the Alamo would have had to make a fast march and fight tired. It's not likely that the Texans could scrounge together enough men to quickly and effectively come to the aid of the Alamo. It's more likely that smaller groups would arrive which the Mexican army, and especially the cavalry could easily defeat then wait for the next bunch of troops to show up.
What proof can I put forth for this theory?
With thousands of troops at SA's disposal I don't understand how so many messengers could get out of the Alamo without being caught. They might have been allowed to get out to put more pressure on the rest of Texas to send help.
There was at least one time that troops were sent out to intercept Texan reinforcements before they got to Bexar. This shows that SA expected aid to come to the Alamo.
Granted, the larger siege cannon didn't show up, but when did the Mexican army ever seriously challenge the Alamo? It was more like a cat with a mouse. SA was playing with them. Lob a cannon ball over the walls once in a while, see how close you can get before they start shooting at your troops, play mind games with the foreigners by enticing the Tejanos to leave the fort, yada, yada, yada.
SA was frustrated that this theoretical plan wasn't working as well as he hoped it would. He received reports of the victories and glory that Urrea was winning yet was forced to be patient and wait for Houston or someone to take his bait and show up for a battle.
I guess that's all the corroborating evidence I can think of. Pretty weak case, huh? But why extend your own supply lines and march your troops all over creation when you such a juicy prize to lure your enemy to YOU, extending THEIR supply lines and fatiguing THEIR troops.
The only problem is that the Texan army didn't take the bait. Other than the Immortal 32, no one else showed up to reinforce the Alamo defenders. Yes, Fannin got a couple hundred yards before the reality sunk in about what sort of snake pit he and his 300+ men were going to be stepping in. They would have been gobbled up. I believe they were marching on foot and the four cannon they were bringing were being pulled by oxen, just the thing for rapid tactical mobility. The Mexican Cavalry lances would have been dripping with blood and the Mexican army in possession of another 4 cannons if the Texians had gone ahead with the plan.
When it became evident to SA that his trap wasn't working and that the defenders might even surrender he decided that the siege cannon weren't necessary and simply stormed and captured the Alamo, something he could have done a lot earlier if he had wanted.
There is no documentation that this was ever stated as his plan, but then again SA never felt compelled to explain or justify what he did or planned to do and I'm not aware of any documentation explaining SA's actions at Bexar. If you don't share your plans with anyone no one will know when they don't work out and your success to failure ratio remains high.
The Napoleon of the West was trying to entice the Texas army to their "Waterloo", but ended up falling into his own trap (sort of).
That's my theory and I'm welcome to it.
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Post by stuart on Oct 10, 2009 6:35:52 GMT -5
The traditional summing up over here, is "That's my story/theory and I'm sticking to it..."
We have actually discussed this before on other threads, although I'm a touch too lazy to did them out.
The old "waiting for the artillery" argument doesn't stack up simply because he went in without waiting for the guns, and as we know every Mexican officer in creation afterwards complained about it.
So why suddenly go when he did, rather than wait for the guns and at the same give the Texians more time to come to him as you suggest?
Part of the answer is the arrival of reinforcements, but the real answer in my view is that he was marking time waiting for news from Urrea. This was a really sticky area for Santa Anna: Urrea was a Federalist and his orders were to hunt down Grant, who was trying to use American filibusters to trigger a Federalist revolt. This of course is why Santa Anna didn't dare to give Urrea any decent troops; because there was always a danger that Urrea would join Grant rather than fighting him - had Grant got to Matamoros quickly enough this could well have happened, but in the event Urrea stuck with the winning side and it was the news that he had routed Johnson's detachment and was in pursuit of Grant that triggered the assault on the Alamo because after all that time wasted, Santa Anna now knew his rear was secure and he could commit to battle without the danger of a Federalist uprising behind him.
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Post by Herb on Oct 10, 2009 11:21:23 GMT -5
I think, Santa Anna, indeed hoped to fight the decisive battle of the war in the vicinity of Bexar and very much hoped for the Texian Army to march on Bexar (a Bexar he hoped to have already conquered).
And I agree for the most part with Stuart, that he did not want to assault the Alamo until he knew what was happening in the South of Texas or until he had the strength to both assault the Alamo and fight a reinforcing Texian Army at the same time.
But, let's not forget that Santa Anna wanted Sesma to capture Bexar and the Texian garrison in a surprise dawn attack on Feb 23rd. When Sesma failed to cross the Medina and rapidly march on Bexar, Santa Anna had no choice but to wait for reinforcement. Here's some data I posted in a similar topic on Wade's site:
"First let's look at what the Texians actually faced:
On February 23d, Santa Anna arrived in Bexar with General Sesma's Vanguard Brigade of 1350 men (the Vanguard Brigade consisted primarily of the Dolores Cavalry Regiment, the Jimmenez and the San Luis Potosi Infantry Battalions) it only included about 720 total infantry, but almost half of that was considered by Santa Anna has untrained and would not participate in the attack on the Alamo. While inexperienced men would have been a liability in a limited visibility attack, defending against Fannin's 300 men would have been a totally different question.
On Mar 3d, General Cos arrived with the advance elements of the 1st Brigade or 895 men, almost all trained infantry, giving Santa Anna the manpower he needed if he was to attack the Alamo. Out of this new total of 2250 men in Bexar, about 1400 - 1500 infantry would participate in the assault on the Alamo with 290 Cavalry in support.
On Mar 8th, General Gaona arrived with the remainder of his 1st Brigade or 825 men.
On Mar 10th, General Andrade arrived with the Cavalry Brigade of 430 men.
On Mar 16th, the final unit arrived General Tolosa's 2d Brigade of 1720 men."
I'd highlight a couple of things while it would appear that Santa Anna had sufficent numbers to attack 150 men anytime before Cos arrived this just isn't true. Most people have heard the old saw that for an attack to suceed the attacker needs to have a three to one superiority in numbers (at the point of attack). However, when attacking a defending fortified enemy the minimum ratio is generally considerd to be 6:1 and preferred to be 10:1.
Then when you consider that the Vanguard Brigade only had about 360 trained infantry (just a little over a 2:1 ratio) and the probably higher casuality rate that a smaller assault force would have experienced than the historical battle - Santa Anna would have been in big trouble had Fannin or Houston arrived before March 3rd. A bold general might have risked it, but most generals would opt for the safer alternative of waiting for reinforcements and and the more sure thing.
Santa Anna's bold alternative, Sesma's surprise attack, had already failed. Now, he waited for the sure thing.
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Post by stuart on Oct 10, 2009 13:27:13 GMT -5
There is another way of looking at this...
So far as the Mexican government was concerned Bexar was the old departmental capitol; true Texas had recently been split into three; (Bexar, Brazos and Nacodoches) in order to better accomodate the influx of settlers but Bexar was still the old capitol. The recovery of Bexar - not the capture of the Alamo - was Santa Anna's primary objective.
And that's exactly what he achieved right at the outset. Now yes some of the rebels and their filibustering friends had taken refuge in the Alamo just outside of Bexar, but they were a threat to no-one there and could be dealt with at leisure - once a number of other things had happened:
1. once the army had a chance to rest up and reccuperate from its forced march, and
2. once the rest of the troops had closed up and the army was actually ready to undertake serious military operations
3. once confirmation was received that there was no danger of a Federalist uprising in the rear, and lastly
4. once it was established there was a sufficient concentration of Texian troops who could be brought to battle - and where they were
Remember that other than the recovery of Bexar, which he had achieved, Santa Anna had no clear objectives in Texas other than the defeat of the rebels and until he knew where he could find them there wasn't much point in busting a gut to capture a broken down little mission station that was militarily valueless and then wanteringly aimlessly around the prairie in the hope of finding the rebel government and what passed for its army
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Post by cantador4u on Oct 10, 2009 21:48:56 GMT -5
Quote: "... 3. once confirmation was received that there was no danger of a Federalist uprising in the rear,...
I was unaware about Santa Anna's need to watch for a Federalist uprising in the rear (kinda like hemorrhoids, huh?) but it makes sense in a Mexican sort of way.
Quote: ...Santa Anna had no clear objectives in Texas other than the defeat of the rebels and until he knew where he could find them there wasn't much point in busting a gut to capture a broken down little mission station that was militarily valueless and then wandering aimlessly around the prairie in the hope of finding the rebel government and what passed for its army... "
No clear military objective? Sounds like a lousy way to run a war, but perhaps that was the way things were done at that time. Hundreds of thousands of pesos to outfit an army, the lives of thousands of soldiers, give up your position as President of the nation, and no clear objective?
And it why was it OK for Urrea to wander around hoping to find an enemy to attack, but Santa Anna couldn't? Once he secured Bexar he could have marched on to Goliad and secure that. He captured Bexar without a single casualty. His troops certainly didn't need 13 days to recover from their march.
Quote: The traditional summing up over here, is "That's my story/theory and I'm sticking to it..."
I guess that's all "water over the bridge" at this point. I know I was mangling the phrase. Not many people catch it when I do it. I was trying to convey the message that it was just a theory put forth for consideration (and likely destruction) and that my feelings would not be hurt if/when all the flaws in it it were pointed out.
I need to find out more about Grant. Who he was and why he was so important to Urrea's activities.
Paul Meske
Sun Prairie, Wisconsin
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Post by Jim Boylston on Oct 10, 2009 22:38:42 GMT -5
Paul, you should pick up Stuart's book, "The Secret War for Texas," if you want to study James Grant. More info there than anywhere else.
Jim
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Post by stuart on Oct 11, 2009 14:36:57 GMT -5
And it why was it OK for Urrea to wander around hoping to find an enemy to attack, but Santa Anna couldn't? Once he secured Bexar he could have marched on to Goliad and secure that. He captured Bexar without a single casualty. His troops certainly didn't need 13 days to recover from their march. Ah well, I've always considered Urrea over-rated even before I read Filisola's (admittedly very partisan) criticism of his movements. He took far too long to pin Grant down partly through ineptitude and partly I guess through waiting to see which way to jump. As for the 13 days... read Herb's run down above. Santa Anna achieved his primary objective - the recapture of Bexar - by a forced march that left most of his army strung out all the way back to the Rio Grande. He needed to wait while they closed up before his army was combat ready. The Alamo didn't matter when he already had Bexar. He didn't need to take it. Remember it wasn't a real fortress at all, just somewhere the Texians had holed up instead of running away when he liberated Bexar; they were fine where they were and mopping them up was just a detail to be attended to before he moved on out after Houston. |
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Post by Kevin Young on Oct 11, 2009 14:56:56 GMT -5
I have always felt that once Sesma failed to cross the Medina on time and the Texans got into the Alamo, it became a matter of which commander: Santa Anna or Travis: got in enough reinforcements to make a difference. Once Santa Anna got his in, it was time to reduce the Alamo and move on; he could handle the rest of the Texans as he came on them. With Bejar secured and Goliad about to be, he pushed on.
The arrival of the larger cannon would have been nice, but I think he felt that with enough men in place, he could reduce the Alamo just as well with out waiting further.
There are some who will suggest that it was all ego: that since Arrendondo had crushed the 1813 rebellion in once battle near San Antonio, Santa Ana felt he could do the same. Or that he was trying to make up for the stain on his young career/honor with the supposed forgary episode in San Antonio in 1813. Nice thoughts, but I think it still boils down to a lost opportunity on February 22 and a need to get his army in place to take the Alamo.
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Post by cantador4u on Oct 11, 2009 16:17:42 GMT -5
Quote: Santa Anna achieved his primary objective - the recapture of Bexar - by a forced march that left most of his army strung out all the way back to the Rio Grande. He needed to wait while they closed up before his army was combat ready.
Apparently Urrea didn't have the same sort of forced march as Santa Anna which enabled him to proceed at a faster pace? Didn't he have as far to travel? Did he have fewer or different troops? I'm trying to understand what the difference was so that Urrea was able to be combat ready but Santa Anna had to wait for an army strung out between Bexar and the Rio Grande. Maybe I'm reading too much into it.
- Paul Meske, Sun Prairie, Wisconsin
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Post by Herb on Oct 11, 2009 17:03:05 GMT -5
Quote: Santa Anna achieved his primary objective - the recapture of Bexar - by a forced march that left most of his army strung out all the way back to the Rio Grande. He needed to wait while they closed up before his army was combat ready.Apparently Urrea didn't have the same sort of forced march as Santa Anna which enabled him to proceed at a faster pace? Didn't he have as far to travel? Did he have fewer or different troops? I'm trying to understand what the difference was so that Urrea was able to be combat ready but Santa Anna had to wait for an army strung out between Bexar and the Rio Grande. Maybe I'm reading too much into it. - Paul Meske, Sun Prairie, Wisconsin Paul, I think you might be confusing the timing of the various operations - Santa Anna's lead elements arrived in Bexar, before Urrea truly began his operations against Fannin and Grant. Santa Anna was just as much Urrea's flank security as Urrea was Santa Anna's. And yes Urrea's forces was initially only about a 1/5th the size of Santa Anna's whole column. While Urrea destroyed Grant and Johnsons' forces between the Nueces and the Rio Grande before Santa Anna attacked the Alamo, Urrea really didn't take much action against Fannin (other than screening) until he received reinforcements from the main column (in fact battalions that participated in the assault on the Alamo). I highly recommend Stuart's book, it really ties in the timing of all these interrelated events exceedingly well. |
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 11, 2009 17:05:45 GMT -5
Stuart's book is really the best source on this, but as I recall, Urrea was sent up the coastal plains to start with and proceeded at his own pace with a much smaller unit than Santa Anna's large army. His job was to find any Texian forces that could move on Bexar, destory them if he could, and get word to Santa Anna about the Texian military condition beyond Bexar. As Stuart says, he was also concerned about other insurrection action elsewhere, which Grant was trying to foment, and which had been taking place anyway. It is kind of odd that Santa Anna trusted Urrea with this key mission, given the chance he might have thrown in with Grant or other Federalists.
Without good intel from Urrea, Santa Anna was really operating in the dark as to what else the Texians might throw at him. For an idea of how costly that can be, recall Jeb Stuart at Gettysburg and his failure to report intel to Lee promptly. Once Santa Anna knew that Urrea had eliminated most of the other Texian units, he was free to "mop up" the holdouts in the Alamo and move on. But he had reason to be concerned about possible reinforcements up to that point. Recall that he posted units along roads leading into Bexar to intercept any reinforcements and there is at least some information indicating that it's possible some of the Gonzales men were turned back by some of those forces.
I think Kevin is right about the situation on day 1. If the Texians had gotten significant reinforcements fairly quickly after the Mexicans took Bexar, there could have been a different scenario. But it was the Mexicans who were reinforced, not the Texians. Along with the news Urrea sent him, this cleared Santa Anna to attack the Alamo. Travis and Bowie must have been thinking along these lines, or why else remain in Bexar with such a tiny force? I think they expected reinforcements, and did not expect the Mexicans to arrive so soon. Once they were totally surprised on February 23, the Alamo became their "lifeboat," as Stuart says, while they hoped for those reinforcements.
Allen
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Post by stuart on Oct 12, 2009 4:35:15 GMT -5
While I don’t doubt that pride was a factor, the point is that the battle on the Medina, far from being a random event, was fought to secure Bexar. Now Santa Anna had made that forced march to once again secure Bexar, because to the authorities in Mexico City, Bexar was still the political capitol of Texas and therefore the primary objective of any expeditionary force. In those terms Santa Anna’s initial campaign was a complete success; he got the army into Texas and recovered the capitol without a fight; the rabble in the Alamo were an irrelevance, not a priority.
There was, although he probably didn’t realise it at first, a real rebel capitol at Harrisburg, but that was just a collection of wooden shacks which were abandoned and burned as soon as he got near the place. Although neither side fully recognised it, they were actually in a classic guerrilla scenario where the regular forces can capture the material objectives such as Bexar easily enough, but can’t pin down an enemy who won’t stand and fight – unless accidentally trapped.
Now as for Fannin; again you have to bear in mind the timing. From the Texian point of view - and hindsight - he was at the time commanding the largest troop concentration, but he wasn’t there when the invasion began. From the Mexican perspective he was just the rear echelon of Grant’s filibusters, and needed to be mopped up once Urrea had finally done something about the vanguard under Grant himself which was already raiding across the Rio Grande
As for Urrea he just had his own cavalry regiment, with some attachments, and a very low grade infantry unit, precisely because Santa Anna didn’t trust him with anything better and in the event he spent a lot of his time bumbling about in Tamaulipas engaged in some very half-hearted skirmishing with the Federalistas until it became obvious that Grant’s expeditionary force wasn’t going to amount to anything (thanks to Houston’s interference) and so finally threw in his lot with the Centralistas and moved north – even then, it took him a very long time to get his act together and track down Grant and his eventual arrival at Goliad and fight with Fannin was incredibly slow and inept – notwithstanding the breezy account in his “diary”.
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