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Post by stuart on Sept 2, 2007 15:18:33 GMT -5
A couple of interesting points were raised on the “Crockett’s sojourn…” thread which had absolutely nothing to do with Mina or Bastrop.
The first, just to get it out of the way concerns the use of Baker rifles and Gary is quite right. We know from British documentation that comparatively few were shipped over and while they were certainly issued to men in the cazadore companies, not every cazadore got one. Contemporary British tactical doctrine used rifles in two ways. There were first of all the designated Rifle Regiments, but in addition each ordinary infantry battalion had some. These men did not necessarily belong to the light companies (cazadore companies), although King’s German Legion units mustered all of them within it. They were variously designated as flankers or marksmen and were integral to the battalion – supposedly they could not be detached as the light company often was, although it did happen.
Given the numbers of rifles involved I’d expect something similar was being done in Santa Anna’s permanente battalions. The cazadore companies were primarily armed with the same India Pattern muskets issued to the fusilier companies, but there were also a number of individuals, perhaps even a squad, armed with Bakers.
The questions about how (if at all) the Alamo walls were defended arising out of Mark’s reconstructions is far less straightforward and a whole lot more interesting. Ultimately we need to get away from the idea of the Alamo as a fortress and start looking at it simply as a refuge, where the Bexar garrison were sitting tight and hoping that someone would come and rescue them.
There was certainly a limit to the number of men who could usefully be posted on the walls and I think this is underlined by the construction of that little battery just inside the main gate, which to my mind indicates first that the lunette wasn’t being manned and secondly that the Texians were indeed anticipating that the perimeter wasn’t going to hold. And of course it didn’t. Morales got in at the south, the defense of the north wall collapsed and a substantial part of the garrison burst out because I very much doubt that they had ever had any confidence of holding the place against a real attack.
This in turn of course impacts on the question of the Mexican casualties, or rather puts us well on the road to accepting how low they really were.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Sept 3, 2007 8:10:58 GMT -5
Stuart, This is another, I suspect accurate, look at what was really going on in the Alamo. However, it also makes me wonder what they really had in mind when they decided to hole up there. Why all those carefully-placed canon if they didn't think they could repel an attack? Jameson sounded like he believed they could hold off a large army indefinitely. How much did they just not know what they were doing?
I agree with Mark -- I even took a picture last December from a spot where the northwest corner would have been, looking back toward the south and the church. I tried to imagine some 200 humans spread out over this area, tried to visualize the two-story barrack, wondered how many were sick or injured, how exhausted they may have been, and then imagined thousands of far-better-trained soldiers storming the place in the dark.
Add to this bleak picture this new thought on how many defenders could be practically placed inside the place in relatively safe firing positions. Gary may be right in saying that they would have been at a higher elevation, thus at something of an advantage initially, but where would they stand, or lie? And, of course, how useful were rifles once the Mexicans made it to the base of the walls?
I think these questions go to the heart of what the leaders thought they'd accomplish by remaining in the Alamo and how much they decided to stay there only because they thought they'd be reenforced and thus able to make a meaningful stand against the Mexicans before they could advance through the country. I also keep thinking of Stuart's point about Houston not being interested in defending Bexar at all or even including it in any Texas republic. There are times when the Texas Revolution really looks like the proverbial Chinese fire drill.
AW
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Post by Herb on Sept 3, 2007 11:04:21 GMT -5
If you can read topographic maps, here's a good link: www.topozone.com/map.asp?z=14&n=3255276.00004211&e=549875&datum=nad83Even though it's downtown Bexar, today, the elevations remain pretty constant. Gary's statement is very true for the West Wall, but, the difference in elevations doesn't have too great an impact on the other three sides. Tactically speaking the limitations the terrain had on the attackers are pretty obvious. Besides attacking uphill, the West also has limited maneuver space, ie except for the NW corner there is insufficient space to mass/assemble an attacking force of any size. On the East, the aqucea, the ponds, and the orchard all place limits on Maneuver and probably limited the places you could attack to the NE and SE (church) corners - as the church was the strongest building in the whole compound, a commander might choose to rule out the SE corner. The South has limited room to mass and maneuver columns of infantry due to the restrictions caused by the built up areas (jacales, etc.) but it provides an opportunity for cover and concealment by light infantry using a more open order. The North provides plenty of space to first assemble attacking columns and then the maneuver space necessary for them to carry out an assault. Cavalry, by it's very nature, requires even more maneuver space than comparable bodies of infantry. This isn't hindsight, but simply evaluating the military fundamentals of terrain. The only difference between today and then is the evolution of tactics and technology - thus we tend to use more restrictive terrain today ie the Southern and Western approaches, because they offer obstructions (cover and concealment) versus 1836 when such obstructions hindered the maneuver of large bodies of men.
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Post by Herb on Sept 3, 2007 11:26:09 GMT -5
There is a very big misconception of black powder era military tactics. That being the use of the bayonet. Americans have never, even historically, grasped the bayonet as anything but a weapon of last resort. But, the ultimate goal of Napoleonic offensive infantry tactics is to deliver a bayonet charge.
Stuart is far more knowledgeable than me about period bayonet drill, and can give a much better detailed answer, but Santa Anna's first goal is to get his infantry into the walls where they can overwhelm the defenders with trained bayonet drill. An untrained man no matter what his size or strength, is no match for a trained man with a bayonet, then given that , that one man is probably facing half a dozen men with bayonets ... it's simply not a pretty picture for the defenders.
The defenders sole hope was their artillery, they simply could not afford to allow Santa Anna's men to close the walls. Once sufficient trained infantry was underneath the artillery's' ability to fire upon them, there was but one possible outcome.
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Post by sloanrodgers on Sept 4, 2007 1:45:30 GMT -5
Americans have never, even historically, grasped the bayonet as anything but a weapon of last resort. But, the ultimate goal of Napoleonic offensive infantry tactics is to deliver a bayonet charge. Isn't it ironic that the Alamo had more bayonets in storage than any other issued weapon? If only they'd had the manpower to use every belly-sticker on the invading infantry.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Sept 4, 2007 12:09:41 GMT -5
Americans have never, even historically, grasped the bayonet as anything but a weapon of last resort. But, the ultimate goal of Napoleonic offensive infantry tactics is to deliver a bayonet charge. Isn't it ironic that the Alamo had more bayonets in storage than any other issued weapon? If only they'd had the manpower to use every belly-sticker on the invading infantry. And, perhaps, the kind of guns the bayonet mounted on? Wasn't that an issue for the defenders?
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Post by sloanrodgers on Sept 4, 2007 12:15:29 GMT -5
There were 368 muskets in the Alamo Store. Colorado Smith's store, not the DRT's Gift Shop. ;D
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Post by highplainsman on Sept 5, 2007 10:31:15 GMT -5
Just a few quick points! Professionals in large numbers versus amatuers in small numbers. The garrison worn down by lack of sleep and labor to shore up the north wall. According to reports of the Mexican officers the initial attacks on the north, east and Northwest failed and became a jumbled mess crowded beneath the north wall. This situation lasted for ten or fifteen minutes. Possible most of the defenders hurried to what seemed the point of danger leaving other areas lightly or undefended. Mexican officers managed to extricate at least some of there units and swung back to the East and West and overcame any defenders that remained at those posts. Meanwhile the southwest corner had been overcome undoubtbley because all attention had been drawn to the north. Two to one casualties (if indeed thats what they were) to me at least does not seem light. Some of the Mexican officer didn't think so either!
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Post by Herb on Sept 5, 2007 10:53:33 GMT -5
I've posted elsewhere, not sure what topic, but one of the facts that gets overlooked in the arguments about numbers, it wasn't just how many soldatos fell, but who they were. The attacking battalions were Santa Anna's best infantry, what casualties were suffered were to the "flower" of his army.
Some people want to portray the attacking Mexican Army as a bunch of untrained non Spanish speaking Indians. This does the defenders a gross injustice, they took on the best the Mexicans had to offer. Their defeat to a better trained, superior in numbers enemy, was far nobler than the losing to a half trained rabble that some promote.
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Post by Herb on Sept 5, 2007 11:04:18 GMT -5
Stuart mentioned in the opening post about the Alamo being a refuge not a fortress. It's a point I hope he'll expand upon (hint, hint). One of the highlights, for me last March was walking around Goliad with Stuart. It was very obvious that despite some bastions and loopholes, that Goliad was a refuge and not a fortress, despite all that we have heard about Fort Defiance. In fact, to me it looked like the Alamo was in considerably better shape, given its artillery, than Fort Defiance. Stuart ?
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Post by highplainsman on Sept 5, 2007 11:45:24 GMT -5
By frontier standards, if not by military, the Alamo with its cannon and the attempts by the defenders to make it more defendable would qualify it to be a fort. Frontier forts or maybe better stockades were places to hole up and defend as best settlers were able until the attacking force would lose interest and go away. Since the Texians lacked the numbers to meet Santa Anna in the field they had the option to withdraw before he arrived or hole up. From their correspodence we know that they knew he was comming so as per Neil and Bowies letter and later Travis' we know that they had made their choice before the arrival of the Mexican army. Their hope that a large number of their fellow Texians would rally to them was their undoing. What they did do was hold Santa Anna in place long enough for the Texians to declare independance and give the Republic its Battle Cry.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Sept 5, 2007 16:07:41 GMT -5
This is an interesting question. I have typically thought of frontier forts as being designed to fend off Indian attacks, but they were used for other purposes throughout the French & Indian War, the Revolution, and afterward. Of course, they were built to be forts and little else, whereas the Alamo was a ruined mission complex, not originally designed to be a military facility. However, it was modified by Cos and then the Texans to serve that purpose, but only so much modification could be achieved with that sort of structure.
I wonder what, exactly, Cos thought its purpose was when he occupied it, but carried out most of the Bexar battle fighting in the town itself, not the fort. Once his forces were defeated in town he surrendered the fort, indicating that he did not see it as defendable for very long, despite the fact that he had a far larger force than the Texians had later on.
I am (at least for the next few hours, anyway) inclinded to believe that the Texians did know they were taking something of a gamble in holing up there. They clearly believed that they would be relieved, but I think they were already concerned about that once they saw the Mexican army occupy Bexar. I'm not too clear on the first day's communications with the Mexicans, but it sounded like Travis and perhaps Bowie were at least contemplating a surrender, if decent terms could be agreed on (they weren't). After that, it was pretty much a waiting game to see if adequate reinforcements would arrive or the Mexicans would storm the place first.
We've discussed elsewhere this idea of the defenders simply holding out in a refuge, as Stuart calls it, in the hope of getting help. I have wondered where they expected the help to come from. Other than Fannin's force, there really don't seem to have been any sizeable, organized forces in Texas at the time. There seems to have been a rather disorganized scramble to find whatever men were to be had for a relief force, without much success.
The fact that the government (such as it was) spent most of its time squabbling, rather than organizing, didn't help. Various factions wanted to defend Bexar, while others found Grant's Matamoros expedition more appealing (at one time or another, all of the Texan leaders, including Houston, appeared to support this effort, which did not indicate any interest or sense of urgency in relieving the Alamo). Stuart's book illuminates this aspect of the revolution, as well as Houston's lack of interest in Bexar at all.
To return to the main topic here, when the Mexican assault finally came, the Texians were stuck there and forced to make the best they could of their improvised fort, which was not the most ideal structure to defend, and in any case would have required far more men for the job.
AW
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Post by tmdreb on Sept 5, 2007 23:01:04 GMT -5
The question of the number of Baker Rifles in Santa Anna's army will be debated for years to come, I'm sure. Personally, I'm wondering how many (if any at all) were captured in Zacatecas in 1835. I don't have the source in front of me, but wasn't this state supposed to have an on paper force of 12,000 men? I also believe that this force was armed and equipped at the expense of the state and not the federal government, and any arms purchases would not be included in the numbers we've seen for shipments to the Mexican government. I wish I knew more about this subject, or even at least how to research it.
As for bayonets, the problem for the defenders is that their effective use demands training and discipline, which was rare in the Texian forces throughout the conflict.
Stuart, that's great information regarding the British use of rifles, and how it might translate to the Mexican Army. One of Gary Zaboly's theories is that the cazadores not armed with rifles possibly carried carbines. This could make sense if the cazadore companies of several battalions were operating together for extended periods of time and needed ammunition resupply. On a related note, I'm wondering if the Mexicans bothered with issuing both sizes of ball for the Baker Rifle as the British did.
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Post by stuart on Sept 6, 2007 0:53:27 GMT -5
On a related note, I'm wondering if the Mexicans bothered with issuing both sizes of ball for the Baker Rifle as the British did. That shouldn't have come into it in theory, because although we experimented with full musket-bored Bakers very early on the production ones were carbine bore. There is an outside chance, given the low numbers involved that we did unload the comparatively few musket-bored weapons on to the Mexicans but as I've not come across a Mexican one I don't know. I'd very much doubt there'd be a mixture. Another variant (in carbine bore) which may have surfaced on the other hand, given that they were late production (1815 onwards) was the 3rd Pattern Baker, built to take a normal socket bayonet in place of the sword bayonet. Far less likely but not impossible were a few Baker cavalry rifles, these had a pistol-grip styled neck, but if there were any I'd expect them to be carried by cavalrymen.
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Post by stuart on Sept 6, 2007 0:55:18 GMT -5
Stuart mentioned in the opening post about the Alamo being a refuge not a fortress. It's a point I hope he'll expand upon (hint, hint). One of the highlights, for me last March was walking around Goliad with Stuart. It was very obvious that despite some bastions and loopholes, that Goliad was a refuge and not a fortress, despite all that we have heard about Fort Defiance. In fact, to me it looked like the Alamo was in considerably better shape, given its artillery, than Fort Defiance. Stuart ? I can expand... take a little while to work up properly, but in general I'd say our observations of Goliad would also hold true for the Alamo, with bells on.
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