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Post by bobdurham on Jun 3, 2009 16:49:06 GMT -5
The strength returns for the Zapadore, Toluca and Aldama infantry battalions are a valuable addition to Alamo knowledge -- I want to thank Mark Lemon for sharing these with the Alamo Society. And the centerfold map is outstanding. A lot of the info gleaned from the artifact find at the History Shop was discussed on this forum but the map makes it a lot clearer, at least to me. From the map, its obvious that the area covered by the dig would have been in a direct line of fire from the artillery mounted on the northeast position in the cattle pen. It also makes plain the fact that the overflowed area of the acequia did not extend as far north as I previously thought. I've always had problems with the path of Romero's column -- this interpretation seems to follow the known facts better than any other I've seen -- an excellent depiction of the attack on the compound.
I also was impressed with the Morales' column's attack path. It makes a lot of sense to have them attack straight down the road that led to the Alamo front gate. Seeing the layout of the houses and roads helps a lot in visualizing how the attacking columns would probably have maneuvered to get into position.
I question the path shown on the map for Duque's column though. It seems that they would have attacked a little more toward the east, directly against Fortin de Teran and the center of the wall, so as not to interfere with the attack path of Cos' column. Mark -- do you have any reason, that I'm not aware of, for placing it the way you did?
Thanks,
Bob
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Post by marklemon on Jun 3, 2009 20:42:01 GMT -5
Bob,
It appears that Duque's column did in fact interfere with Cos' column, or vice versa, and this is documented by Sanchez-Navarro. The path of Duque's column is taken from both Sanchez Navarro's 1836 plan of the Alamo (Center for American History, UT Austin) showing the direction of attack of Cos' column, as well as Sanchez-Navarro's narrative. In his plan, he shows Cos' path, as well as indicating by a dotted line backed by an arrow, the approximate path (I believe) of Duque's column. In the text of his map key, under item "G," he states: "Through said point (Fortin de Teran) and through the line which runs toward the center of the other battery (Fortin de Condelle), Colonel Duque attacked and entered the fort...."
Now, in his item "H," of the same key, he states: "...and being annoyed by the firing of the Toluca Battalion (Duque's column), he (Cos) ordered an oblique movement to the right..."
Also, in Filisola's account, he states that many men in the northern columns were hit from behind by their own men.
Putting all this together, we can see that Cos maneuvered in front of Duque's column, and were being fired upon (from the rear) by them, which resulted in Cos ordering his column to oblique to the right.
The broad arrow path I drew for Duque's column may perhaps be shifted a tiny bit to the east, but based on its description by Sanchez-Navarro, as well as the other supporting data, I feel it's pretty close to being on the mark.
Mark
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Post by bobdurham on Jun 4, 2009 7:56:55 GMT -5
Mark,
Reading the same accounts, I never reached the same conclusions about the routes of the two columns but I have to say that your analysis makes a lot more sense to me than my own. I always thought of the friendly fire from Duque's column as coming from the rear ranks of Duque's column when the two columns were milling around at the foot of the wall but, now that I think about it, the path shown for Cos' column by Sanchez Navarro clearly shows that he started his maneuver towards the west wall before reaching the north wall. Thanks a lot for your further insight.
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Post by Herb on Jun 4, 2009 12:33:41 GMT -5
Bob, It appears that Duque's column did in fact interfere with Cos' column, or vice versa, and this is documented by Sanchez-Navarro. The path of Duque's column is taken from both Sanchez Navarro's 1836 plan of the Alamo (Center for American History, UT Austin) showing the direction of attack of Cos' column, as well as Sanchez-Navarro's narrative. In his plan, he shows Cos' path, as well as indicating by a dotted line backed by an arrow, the approximate path (I believe) of Duque's column. In the text of his map key, under item "G," he states: "Through said point (Fortin de Teran) and through the line which runs toward the center of the other battery (Fortin de Condelle), Colonel Duque attacked and entered the fort...." Now, in his item "H," of the same key, he states: "...and being annoyed by the firing of the Toluca Battalion (Duque's column), he (Cos) ordered an oblique movement to the right..." Also, in Filisola's account, he states that many men in the northern columns were hit from behind by their own men. Putting all this together, we can see that Cos maneuvered in front of Duque's column, and were being fired upon (from the rear) by them, which resulted in Cos ordering his column to oblique to the right. The broad arrow path I drew for Duque's column may perhaps be shifted a tiny bit to the east, but based on its description by Sanchez-Navarro, as well as the other supporting data, I feel it's pretty close to being on the mark. Mark Mark, I haven't seen your article/map yet. But, to clarify it, after reading your explanation and rereading S-N in Hansen, it appears that the arrow and dotted line you speak of was Duque's right flank while the center of Fortin Teran was his left - initially - is that correct? I don't know if that's what you're saying but if that's the case, before Cos executed his right oblique it looks like the flanks of the two columns were almost intermixed and does explain a lot. It makes a lot of sense, and as Bob says, it's something I had missed before (it's a shame that the best published translation of the document - Hansen has the worse reproduction of the plat - and the "good" reproductions only have summaries of the words). Perhaps , there was a notable visible feature on the Alamo Wall at that point (where the arrow crosses the wall), that Santa Anna pointed out to the two commanders to guide them as their boundary and they ended up crowding the line and each other. I don't see the logic on Morales, yet, I guess I'll just have to continue to wait on the "snail" express!  |
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Post by garyzaboly on Jun 4, 2009 14:02:17 GMT -5
An early, fairly well reproduced image of the Navarro "battle map" appeared in REPUBLIC OF TEXAS, by the American West Magazine and the Texas State Historical Association, in 1968 (p.73). That was the first time I ever saw it anyway. Unfortunately it was printed without Navarro's key, aside from a few token references.
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Post by Herb on Jun 9, 2009 11:13:39 GMT -5
Finally received my issue on Saturday.
One apparent error (unless Mark's found contradictory evidence elsewhere) according to Santa Anna's attack order (see Hanson and/or Blood of Noble Men) specified that the reserve consisted of all five Grenadier Companies from the attacking battalions - not three - and the Zapadore Bn.
Other then the proposed route for Morales, and the more specific route of Duque, it pretty well represents the debates that have taken place on this site over the last couple of years.
The Duque find is interesting and simply points out that we do indeed "know" more than we realize. It's just took somebody, this time Mark, rereading the same passage for probably the hundreth time, to realize what was really being said. Nice catch, Mark.
I personally don't see Mark's proposed route for Morales - unless he indeed did make an initial attack on the main gate and was repulsed and shifted to cover and then attacked the SW (there is some possible evidence that this may have happened). If, however, the attack was all the time aimed at the SW corner, given the composition of this force as light infantry, I would be surprised if they wouldn't have used a more covered and concealed approach from the start. To me it's very much a debatable point - and probably rests on where you believe Morale's planned on gaining entry into the Alamo.
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Post by marklemon on Jun 9, 2009 18:27:14 GMT -5
Herb,
I wanted to correct the route of Morales, but didn't have time before I had to drive to San Antonio. I was going to show Morales' formation using the jacales and houses along the western edge of Pueblo del Alamo for cover as they made their approach...so you are correct in pointing that error out.
Mark
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Post by Herb on Jun 9, 2009 19:34:22 GMT -5
Herb, I wanted to correct the route of Morales, but didn't have time before I had to drive to San Antonio. I was going to show Morales' formation using the jacales and houses along the western edge of Pueblo del Alamo for cover as they made their approach...so you are correct in pointing that error out. Mark Well, I didn't quite mean it that way, I thought maybe you were putting a different spin on the Main Gate or SW corner argument! I'm really looking forward, to when Tom gets done translating the documents you were able to pick up. It's kind of incredible what's hiding in people's attics. |
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Post by marklemon on Jun 10, 2009 0:26:03 GMT -5
Herb,
A thorough review of the existing documents (that we know of) says nothing about an attack on the palisade, or on the lunette, but they do state that Morales used the buildings as a screen, and went on to take the SW corner....so I fail to see why they would then advance straight down the middle of the road from the pueblo towards the lunette, and then oblique to their left to get to the houses near the corner...I drew it this way to be honest not being focused on the action at the south (as the article was mainly regarding the East column), and after I had drawn this approach route, I realized it made little sense, but didn't have time to change it.....
Mark
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Post by elcolorado on Jun 10, 2009 11:47:54 GMT -5
Mark:
I don’t think your initial placement of Morales is really far off the target. First, we do have documentation from DPL and Navarro that suggests the gate may have been an objective for Morales’ column. Now, I don’t know if the lunette was the actual goal or not, but it’s certainly possible.
Here are some other things to remember. The success of Santa Anna’s plan depended greatly upon speed and surprise. The shortest distance (and quickest) between two points is a straight line; and with the element of speed in mind, I believe he would have positioned and instructed Morales to make a direct approach to the gate/lunette. The fact that Morales was issued just two ladders may indicate the size of the objective was small.
Not very long ago, Herb suggessted Santa Anna may have used 3 of the 4 columns to assault/capture/control the Alamo’s ingress/egress points. Cos was in position to take the “Northern Postern,” Romero was assigned the east gate, and Morales was tasked with capturing the main gate and lunette. That may have been part of the strategy, we truly don’t know at this time, but controlling the entry points does seem logical to me.
So I think one possible scenario would have Morales lined-up for a straight shot into the lunette/gate for the quick capture. And it probably would have be successful had the defenders not been alerted to the Mexicans presents. After the attack signal was finally given, Morales would have attacked as directed and moved to close-in as quickly as possible on his objective. However, with the Texans now aware of the assault, they open fire and cause Morales to veer his column away from the lunette and to the relative safety of the jacales. He quickly regroups, adapts to the situation, exhibits initiative, and forms plan “B.” Realizing that attempting to capture the gate and lunette will expose his small force to fire from both the south wall and the lunette, he seizes an opportunity to enter the Alamo via the southwest corner.
Gen. Filisola stated Morales took the southwest corner by a “daring move” which can be interpreted as an unplanned action. As with most assessments made on the movements of Morales, this is somewhat speculative...but plausible.
Glenn
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Post by bobdurham on Jun 10, 2009 15:51:14 GMT -5
Boy, a lot of things I thought I remembered reading turn out not to be right when I check it out again. Filisola, for example; I was sure he said that Morales attacked the southwest corner only after being stymied at his main objective, which most authors believe(d) was the palisade but that I thought was the lunette. However, when I re-read Filisola, I find that he didn't say anything like that. Instead, he said, ". . . to the South, Colonels Jose Vicente Minon and Juan Morales with their columns skillfully took advantage offered by some small jacales with walls of stone and mud which were next to the angle corresponding to the West [the Southwest corner gun platform]. By a daring move they seized the cannon which was placed on a platform . . ."
The daring move might indicate that it was unplanned but not necessarily. As I re-read his passage on Morales' assault, it sounds to me like the plan, from the beginning, was to use the jacales (and the Charli house) as cover, and advance directly against the Southwest corner.
Filisola also says that "The three columns that attacked on the West, North and East . . . by means of a move to the right and the left simultaneously and unorganized [my italics], both swung to the North . . ." and also, ". . . the instinct of the troops as they attacked, moving to the right and to the left on the North side and the movement made by Minon and Morales with their column on the West corner of the South side which they attacked, left without a target all the guns that the enemy had located on the other three sides." This indicates, to me, that Filisola believed that the changes in direction by Romero and Cos were done spontaneously due to the fire from the Alamo defenders (although Sanchez-Navarro's map of Cos' movements disputes this) but Morales attacked directly against the Southwest corner according to plan. Actually, it sounds to me like the troops wrapped around the wall to hit the West side of the cannon platform.
De la Pena doesn't mention Morales' attack prior to gaining entrance to the Alamo except to say ". . . Colonel Morelos with his chasseurs, having carried out instructions received, was just in front of us . . ." already inside the Alamo -- which, again, would seem to indicate that everything went according to plan.
Looks like I'm going to have to re-read all my sources!
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Post by marklemon on Jun 10, 2009 16:11:02 GMT -5
I strongly believe that Morales planned to do what he did all along. That is, use the cover and concealment of the jacales to screen his man's approach, and take the gun at the SW corner, and then the main gate from the rear.
The column commanders reconnoitered the avenues of approach with Santa Anna the day before the assault. At this time, Morales, if he was any sort of a light infantry commander, would have immediately seen the wisdom in doing this. The set up was ideal for light infantry, who did not move in block formations, but in open order, often with arms at the "trail," darting from cover to cover. Morales could have closely observed the defenses at the SW corner with his "spyglass," and seen the wisdom of disabling that huge gun before taking the gate. If he had taken the gate before taking the gun, his men would have been badly mauled by it as they entered the compound from the lunette. So Morales should have seen this as his best option, and may have formulated the afternoon prior to the attack, the plan to use the houses as cover. He would have been able to position his men in complete concealment, back a hundred yards or so from the Alamo, maybe closer, and when the attack began, the men could cover the remaining few yards in a very short time.Two ladders would have been all that it took to gain an advantage at the corner gun position. Once this position was taken, it was in effect an open door for Morales' men to enter by, and then take the gate from the rear. By the way, this may have been the cause of a possible breakout from the lunette, as the defenders within, being trapped and cut off from the rest of the Alamo, had nowhere else to go but out. .
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Post by Herb on Jun 11, 2009 9:55:00 GMT -5
While this has been heavily debated in the past, and Mark and Bob give excellent reasons why Morales attacked the SW corner first, I'd reinforce it with two more points.
1. Even though the Main Gate was the objective, that does not prescribe that Morales had to make a frontal attack on the lunette to accomplish his mission. In fact, there are two very good reasons in the composition of the force why this was not so. First, is the fact that this body was made up as Mark says of Light Infantry, men who are generally chosen for their physical and mental quickness, and trained to fight in open order - had a force been chosen to storm the lunette and main gate by brute force - the chosen force should have come from the grenadier battalion and not the cazadore battalion.
Secondly is the two ladders. For some reason everybody forgets the ditch around the lunette, a frontal attack on the lunette REQUIRES the attackers to jump down in the ditch and then scale the earthen wall of the lunette now above them. Once the lunette is seized the attackers have merely secured an outerwork- nothing else. They still have to either breakthrough the gate or scale the Low Barracks - all the while under fire. The ladders if not destroyed in taking the lunette, must then be recovered for the second effort, two is clearly insufficient for an approach this way.
2. A frontal attack on the main gate exposes the enemy to cannon fire from multiple gun and numerous angles (to include the two cannon backing up the entrance). While using the jacales and Charli House as an avenue of approach prevents a single cannon from being able to engage (by the time the attackers leave the cover of the Charli House they are already under the 18 pounder). Once the SW corner falls, given the way the defenses are constructed, there is virtually nothing the defenders can do to keep Morales from seizing the Main Gate/Low Barracks. In fact it looks like the possible cannon position in the Gap at the Low Wall maybe the only location that the defenders can bring effective fire on Morales once he's secured the SW corner.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 11, 2009 10:11:29 GMT -5
Herb,
One question (which may have no answer) - The Mexicans may not have known about the gun emplacement on the Plaza just inside the main gate, and aimed at the main gate. They might have come as a surprise to Morales and, in addition to the gun at the low wall, fired on the Mexicans. I don't think de la Pena mentions anything about that and I don't recall any other account mentioning Morales coming under such fire once inside the fort. In fact, IIRC, DLP only mentions Morales coming under friendly fire as forces from the north entered the fort and moved south. Whadja think?
AW
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Post by Herb on Jun 11, 2009 10:45:52 GMT -5
Allen, I think, the Mexicans had a very good idea of the layout of the interior of the fort - even with the Texian improvements. There just seems to have been too much traffic between the Alamoand the town especially early in the siege. I also wonder how much of the interior would have been visible from high ground with a spyglass - ie the Powder House or maybe even the San Fernando Bell Tower?
While depending on how, the two gun battery was consturcted, ie with embrasures or without, would probably determine how easily and more importantly how quickly it could fire on the 18 pounder, it's probably irrelevant, by the time Texians in the SW corner were down or out of the field of fire, the men at this battery would already have been under small arms fire from the Mexicans in the SW corner.
I think the Low Wall gap is the only place where a defence on a breakthrough in the SW corner would have any chance of doing any damage at all - contrast that to the two gun battery that could have devastated anything coming through the Main Gate. It may have been the last futile gesture of defiance, but the casulaites it could have produced - canister in a confined space could have decimated Morales' men.
You're right, there is no evidence of any of this being done - just DLP's remarks of friendly fire - but the facts that these defenses were there and what they could have done, imo, influenced Santa Anna's plan, and led to the adoption of attacking the Main Gate through first gaining entry through the SW corner.
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