|
Post by stuart on Nov 26, 2008 8:58:53 GMT -5
Having finally been prompted by the pursuit of a poet to look at the cover of this one on the Amazon page, I thought it might be worth reviving this thread as it looks to have the potential to be more interesting than I first thought.
So far as the breakouts go, although the very notion may be unfamiliar to many outside our circle, I very much doubt we’ll learn anything new about the events of March 6. There’s no hint of any new accounts to add to those of Sesma, Loranca and Santa Anna himself.
What I do find intriguing is the full title:
EXODUS FROM THE ALAMO: The Anatomy of the Last Stand Myth
We’re familiar with the Davy Crockett legend and the outrage aroused by the very suggestion he was captured and executed and may not after all have died game as depicted by Walt Disney. This one has exactly the same potential to run and run and we have already seen at least one attempt to depict Sesma as a liar because the story he tells runs counter to the “Last Stand Myth”.
The title suggests that the author will be looking beyond the actual breakouts to examine how that myth became established and has been sustained, and it makes me wonder just how much the Texas government really knew about what happened. They certainly knew that everybody had been killed, but the scenario that they died fighting to the last in the ruins was obviously going to make better propaganda than the truth. Did the myth arise naturally, or was it carefully cultivated. An awful lot of Mexicans knew what really happened…
|
|
|
Post by lorinfriesen on Nov 26, 2008 10:22:30 GMT -5
...this the probable result of The Last Men Standing scenario and... lets not talk to any more gringos now lest we end up the same. Happy Thanksgiving Yanks, even across the pond Stuart.
|
|
|
Post by majorevans08 on Nov 30, 2008 19:19:11 GMT -5
Hello. New member "Major Evans" here--Alamo fan since 1995 and again 1986... I have not read Exodus but would like to. I'm guessing the exodus was largely over the palisade or the low walls of the church fortin? Cut down by cavalry mostly?
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Nov 30, 2008 19:59:11 GMT -5
|
|
|
Post by stuart on Dec 9, 2008 9:27:31 GMT -5
I started off writing this for the “Why the Alamo” thread, but think it sits better here.
While I don’t want to strike a sour note I think the “decision” to stay put was something more straightforward than simple heroism.
RangerRod certainly makes a good point about honor and that is certainly reflected in Travis’ surviving correspondence where he declares, in effect, that no matter what else happens they, the defenders, can be relied upon to do their duty for the honor of Texas.
It would also have been dishonourable to deliberately abandon their wounded, quite apart from any personal reluctance to do so.
Both issues, obviously enough, would have inhibited any planned brerakout, but I feel there is another and probably more important factor and that comes back to my earlier contention that the Alamo was a lifeboat rather than a fortress. The Texians were actually based in Bexar and their hurried occupation of the nearby Alamo on the morning of 23 February was very much an unplanned piling into the only available lifeboat, simply because with no horses there was nowhere for them to run.
Once inside, or aboard if you will, there was the celebrated exchange of correspondence, with the Mexicans summoning the Texians to surrender and they enquiring as to what terms were being offered. We shouldn’t read too much into this; the Texians weren’t actually offering to surrender there and then. It was all part of the rules – the siege could not legally begin under the then accepted rules of war until there had been that formal exchange. (It wasn’t unknown in fact for fortress commanders to formally protest that the shooting had begun before anyone came knocking – a protest almost invariably followed by apologies and a formal summons)
Nevertheless, having taken the decision to fort up in the Alamo rather than bug out there and then the Texians were committed to staying put. Their last real chance of a mass breakout was the day before the Mexicans arrived; thereafter their chances literally diminished by the day. The problem was a brutally practical one. They had no horses, or at least not enough to mount more than a few individuals. Any breakout might, with the benefit of darkness and surprise, get them clear of the siege lines, but once the sun came up they would face days of struggling across the prairie at best continually harassed by the Mexicans – and ultimately blocked, surrounded and forced to surrender just as surely as Fannin. Safety was simply too far away. The only way a mass breakout might have worked was if another substantial Texian force was waiting for them outside. To be honest the actual events of March 6 illustrate this perfectly. We now know that the garrison did spontaneously attempt a mass breakout only to be intercepted and, barring the possibility that two or three got away, completely wiped out.
Now that brings us back to the question of why, until that moment, they stood and fought at the Alamo. They did so in the first instance because they had nowhere else to go, but once in the Alamo they had no alternative but to stay there and they sustained themselves by turning it into a question of honor; that they at least were fighting for Texas and would not give up – until the very end when having done all that honor demanded and seeing no hope of doing more, then and only then did they look to their own physical salvation.
|
|
|
Post by jrboddie on Dec 9, 2008 9:54:23 GMT -5
I like this analysis. The Texans were surprised that the Mexicans arrived so soon and were unprepared to make an orderly retreat to any place other than the Alamo.
Their options were very limited from the day of the arrival of the army.
|
|
|
Post by marklemon on Dec 9, 2008 10:36:36 GMT -5
Stuart, I'll play Devil's Advocate here, and ask, based on the conclusions reached in your post above, how does this "spur of the moment, nowhere else to go, or nothing else to do" scenario square with Bowie's "We would rather die in these ditches than give them up to the enemy" letter, well before the Mexicans arrived? Mark
|
|
|
Post by elcolorado on Dec 9, 2008 11:09:59 GMT -5
I agree with much of what Stuart has said. The Texans were caught flat-footed and had no where else to go. Trying to out run the Mexicans was out of the question. And as we've discussed before, the Alamo was indeed a lifeboat - it's occupants waiting for rescue. Honor would have factored into the defenders decision to stay...but there were other reasons.
The Bexar-Texans had big plans for the Alamo. They viewed it as vital or "key" to the defense of Texas. A view that was shared by Smith, Robinson, and the Counsel. Unlike Houston, the government was not willing to abandon San Antonio. A trickle of men and supplies were sent to Bexar with the intention of keeping it out of the hands of the enemy. With this in mind, the defenders were duty bound as well as honor bound to stay and hold the Alamo until reinforced, relieved, or rescued.
Travis and company naturally believed that Texas would rally to their aid - at least initially. By over-riding Houston and sending men south to San Antonio, the Texas government validated the views of Travis, Bowie, Neill, and their collective resolve to fortify the Alamo. With both governors and the Counsel supporting them, it's understandable why the garrison was so adamant about staying.
The forts cannon was probably another factor in the decision to remain in the Alamo. The garrison couldn't haul them off and they felt leaving them behind was out of the question. I don't think disabling the guns was a consideration either.
And as Stuart correctly points out, the defenders were not going to abandon their sick and wounded - especially Bowie.
As for as the "exodus," I feel it was a number of factors that triggered it. No doubt all of the Texans experienced the moment or question of "fight or flight." Most decided to fight to the bitter end, some fought until the instinct for self-preservation kicked in, and a few may have called it "quits" once the Mexicans got inside the compound. As Stuart said, once honor was satisfied - the defenders holding out as long as possible - then bugging-out in the hopes of saving your life and living to fight another day was regarded as acceptable.
I don't believe the "exodus" was planned or coordinated - it just happened. It was a quick and natural response to a life-threatening situation - not a lot of time to think...but enough to react.
Glenn
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Dec 9, 2008 13:09:18 GMT -5
I don't believe the "exodus" was planned or coordinated - it just happened. It was a quick and natural response to a life-threatening situation - not a lot of time to think...but enough to react. Glenn Glenn, I'll disagree with this, they had 13 days to think about what they would do as individuals, as companies, and as a garrison as a whole, once the Mexicans broke into the compound. Now what decisons, were made, is debatable, but there was plenty of time to think about "what if" and while there may not have been a garrison contingency plan there were certainly some individual ones! I do not think the wounded, a mere handful before March 6th, were much of a factor in any of the decision making. Rather, as Stuart points out (and you amplify) the decisons that led to the Alamo were all made long before February 23rd. When Santa Anna arrived on the 23rd, the Texians had already lost their freedom to maneuver, they had no other recourse, but to fall back into the Alamo and wait for help to arrive (which is what they planned all along). While less to do with the breakouts, if we are serious in asking "why the Alamo" we have to look at what brought these men to San Antonio to fight in the first place (and to me where the traditional "myths" are actually close to reality) than what happened when the Mexican's arrived. The decison on the 23rd was simply to resist or to surrender.
|
|
|
Post by stuart on Dec 9, 2008 14:36:00 GMT -5
Stuart, I'll play Devil's Advocate here, and ask, based on the conclusions reached in your post above, how does this "spur of the moment, nowhere else to go, or nothing else to do" scenario square with Bowie's "We would rather die in these ditches than give them up to the enemy" letter, well before the Mexicans arrived? Mark The Devil here is in the context. That was the February 2 letter written just after Bowie arrived, when he and Neill agreed (or he was persuaded by Neill) of the importance of holding Bexar - not the Alamo but the town. They complain of the fact that before Grant left he demolished parts of the defences - presumably the barricades across the streets which were no doubt greatly inconveniencing the ordinary Bexarenos. They ask for more supplies, for more money and more men; to defend Bexar. They and Travis were still waiting in vain for those reinforcements, for the defence strores originally ordered by Johnson back in December, and above all the money, when Santa Anna came up, forcing them to abandon Bexar and fort up in the Alamo. As for "dying in the ditches"; well they had to sound determined, otherwise there was no chance of getting what they asked for. In the end it comes down to Wolfpack's point. Once Santa Anna turned up like the Devil at prayers all the decisions except the last one were taken for them. What's critical is not the decision to hold out in the Alamo, because that was no decision at all, but the decision to hang on in at Bexar in the first place. As I said on another thread its justifiably easy to be critical of many, perhaps even most of those coming to Texas at this time; but the filibusters all went off with Grant. Those who stayed in Bexar, or went to Bexar in the first weeks of February were going there because they had taken a conscious decision to believe in Texas.
|
|
|
Post by elcolorado on Dec 9, 2008 14:47:47 GMT -5
No argument here, Herb. I'm sure each individual defender pondered their fate during the long days and nights of the siege. Some may have concluded for themselves to go over the wall if or when the Mexicans penetrated the plaza.
I simply contend that it is unlikely (though possible) the garrison, or even groups, had formulated a plan to egress from the Alamo. Even if the wounded weren't a consideration the women and children would have been. It would have been viewed as shameful or dishonorable to abandon them.
No doubt many in the garrison were as disappointed and frustrated as Travis was in regard to the meager aid they had received. No Houston, no Fannin, and with the exception of the 32 from Gonzales, no help from the colonies. They may have felt anger toward their countrymen and a few may have even felt betrayed...like they were being written-off - sacrificed. And if that is the case, it's easy to understand why some elected to escape the battle and take their chances outside the walls.
The "Exodus" reminds me of a formation of domino's. Knock one over and a chain reaction occurs. Or even bird hunting. Cause just one in the group to break and the rest are likely to follow. I realize that sounds simplistic but the breakouts may have occurred as easily as that.
Glenn
|
|
|
Post by majorevans08 on Dec 9, 2008 19:08:23 GMT -5
Has anyone theorized that escapees wanted to attack some Mexican batteries, foolhardy as that may sound?
Also, how was "last stand" said in Spanish: could it mean/imply last indoor stand as opposed to other (open air)?
--Evan-s
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Dec 9, 2008 19:14:34 GMT -5
I think you guys are getting right to the bone of this. That they chose to stay there because, for whatever reason, they saw Bexar as too important to abandon is a key point. However, I wonder what sort of contingencies they had in mind when they decided to hold Bexar at all cost, and at the same time chose to wait for reinforcements, which they knew were crucial to holding the town. Apparently, they were already trying to shore up the Alamo or had some plan to use it. What role did they see the Alamo playing in a defence of Bexar (assuming enough troops had arrived, say the number who took Bexar the previous autumn)? Cos used it as a base of some sort and ended up forting up there himself once the Texians took the town. Did Travis, et al, see it playing a similar role as a supply depot, corrals for livestock, barracks, etc.?
Also, I have to agree with Wolfpack here -- whether there was any concerted plan to stage breakouts, once the Mexicans entered the fort, there must have been some individual/small group plans of that kind. I'm looking forward to reading "Exodus from the Alamo," but from discussions here it seems that at least one, and possibly as many as three small groups left the fort -- as groups. That suggests something more planned than a random breakout by individuals who simply saw the Mexicans coming over the wall and ran for it, or felt they'd rather take their chances outside.
AW
|
|
|
Post by elcolorado on Dec 9, 2008 22:40:09 GMT -5
I find it very difficult to believe the breakouts were anything more then spontaneous reactions by surprised and overwhelmed men. But thats not to say a couple of tiny groups (two here or three there) didn't secretly make an escape pact with each other.
The breakout points certainly weren't planned. With the possible exception of the north wall, the defenders had know idea where Santa Anna was going to attack. The defenders egressed where they did simply because they were the paths (or points) of least resistance - windows of opportunity.
Additionally, no survivor or messenger has ever mentioned anything about a breakout strategy. The only contingency plan the garrison had that I'm aware of was the plan to fall back into the fortified long barracks or other structures and fight from there. That tells me there was a commitment to stay and fight it out.
And are we sure that three separate groups broke out? Is it possible the defenders who went over the wall simply gathered together (safety in numbers) at different points and the Mexicans just assumed they were three organized groups?
I think the only individual who truly had a contingency or breakout plan was Santa Anna.
I know we've discussed this topic at length on the "Breakout" thread, but I'm not sure we truly resolved the issue. I'm glad Stuart revived it. It's worth a closer look.
Glenn
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Dec 9, 2008 23:15:51 GMT -5
Allen,
We know from all the studies done since WWII, that the hardest thing to get a man to do in combat is to voluntarily leave cover (ie a protected position).
For so many men, to exit the Alamo, means one of two things happened, and imo probably both. Some men or a leader had made a what if plan for when everything went to hell to try and reach Gonzales. But, the vast majority were simply forced out by what was a fairly simple, but effective plan by Santa Anna to squeeze the garrison into the SE corner and out into the open into a Kill Zone that he created for his cavalry.
If we look at it logically, men who are cutoff and surrounded and where surrender isn't a true option are apt to determine to try and sell their lives at a steep price (think of Wake Island in WWII for instance) however if an escape route is perceived to exist - even if doesn't in reality - many men will choose trying to escape. For an attacker, obviously, it is far easier to destroy a fleeing enemy, than a defending one. Thus, even though it may not sound so, it is often preferable not to completely surround an enemy position, but to maneuver in such a way to lure the enemy to move out of his prepared defenses and then destroy him in the open.
|
|