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Post by Herb on May 18, 2007 13:27:15 GMT -5
This is something, I've talked about quite often, and maybe so self evident to most serious Alamo scholars as to be irrelevant, but for me this "revelation" began changing my whole concept of the battle.
There are two serious problems with pinpointing the actual time of the battle, first none of the firsthand accounts agree to when the battle started. From the serious accounts, we're given start times from about 3 AM, until about 6 AM.
The second problem is translating their quoted times to ours. The Battle of the Alamo occurred 4 decades before the standardization of time zones, caused by railroads and transcontinental travel. Prior to the creation of time zones, people normally used sun time and almanacs to determine their local time. A few years ago, Rich Curilla, quoted an almanac from 1837 that stated sunrise was 6:30 AM in San Antonio.
The following Table is from the US Naval Observatory:
U.S. Naval Observatory
Astronomical Applications Department
Sun and Moon Data for One Day
The following information is provided for San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas (longitude W98.5, latitude N29.4):
Sunday
6 March 1836 Central Standard Time
SUN
Begin civil twilight 6:30 a.m.
Sunrise 6:54 a.m.
Sun transit 12:45 p.m.
Sunset 6:37 p.m.
End civil twilight 7:01 p.m.
MOON
Moonrise 9:09 p.m. on preceding day
Moon transit 3:08 a.m.
Moonset 9:00 a.m.
Moonrise 10:13 p.m.
Moonset 9:35 a.m. on following day
Phase of the Moon on 6 March: waning gibbous with 87% of the Moon's visible disk illuminated.
Full Moon on 3 March 1836 at 3:52 a.m. Central Standard Time.
As we can see, the difference between a period almanac and the time we use today is nearly 30 minutes. So virtually every reported start time for the attack must have 30 minutes added to it for it to match the time we use today.
Virtually every report of the battle, says that it ended at sunrise, or according to the table at 6:54 AM. Now there seems to be from the reliable reports to be three different times for the duration of the battle 30, 60, and 90 minutes.
So we have possible start times of 6:24, 5:54 or 5:24. But there are further clues. De La Pena writes "Light began to appear on the horizon, the beautiful dawn would soon let herself be seen behind her golden curtain; a bugle call to attention was the agreed signal and we soon heard that terrible bugle call of death,...." So when is there first light on the horizon? There is a thing called Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight or BMNT, that occurs 24 minutes before civil twilight. It is basically, the earliest time that the sun provides enough reflected light on the horizon that a person can easily see, or on March 6th, 1836, 6:06 AM.
From DLP's description and the multiple accounts of the battle lasting one hour, it seems most probable that the battle was primarily fought between 6 and 7 AM CST.
If this is true, it changes two very popular perceptions of the battle. First, except for the initial Mexican attack the battle was predominantly fought in twilight/early dawn conditions not in the dark of the night. Secondly, that Santa Anna was some kind of incompetent boob. Attacking at, or right before BMNT, before the advent of Night Vision Device, was one of the preferred methods of conducting an assault. The time of the attack allowed the attackers to have some darkness to help cover their move, but the increasing light once they closed with the enemy would allow them to better identify and kill their targets. This is especially true when attacking a fortified position where the defenders are sky-lighted on walls and firing down into shadows.
On a sidenote, for those lucky enough to experince a "Dawn Ceremony" at the Alamo on the anniversaries of its fall, probably within ten minutes of when the speaker begins talking - that Mexican Bugle sounded "Attention" 170+ years ago. As the Ceremony concludes, 170+ years ago, Soldatos were probably storming rooms and clearing pockets of resistance, and as you wander off to breakfast the last desperate fights with Sesma's cavalry, and the bayonetting of Walker in front of S. Dickinson were occuring.
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Post by stuart on May 18, 2007 15:42:54 GMT -5
Another point to bear in mind is that watches were not synchronised, and as a further complication I believe that the "Mexican time" used by Santa Anna's army will also have differed from local time; which brings us back to relying upon observed sunsrise rather than dodgy watches.
Just by way of another example I have as you know studied the battle of Culloden in some detail and found the same uncertainty as to timings there. Recorded time for the start of the battle ranges from "a little after 12" all the way to half past two. There are three accounts which put it at the median point of 1 o'clock, which would be very promising if it wasn't for the fact that one of them was written by a staff officer much given to flamboyant gestures (James Wolfe) and the other two writers were both in earshot of him if, as seems likely, he called out the time by his watch.
Rather more astonishing was the sinking of the Royal George in 1784. I don't have the book handy, but essentially one bright clear day she suddenly rolled over and sank in the midde of Portsmouth harbour. Visibility was good, she was surrounded by half the Royal Navy and as it was peacetime there was nothing but the tragedy itself to distract or confuse the witnesses. However, when the guy who wrote the book checked the all the surrounding ships logs he found that these very professional seamen, accustomed to recording events minute by minute produced a time range for this sudden event in excess of 6 hours!!
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 18, 2007 16:29:20 GMT -5
Another account published in El Mosquito Mexicano in April of 1839 (Hansen, p. 486) states:
"...we stationed ourselves at three in the morning on the north side at about three hundred paces from the enemy fortress."
"We remained prone on the ground until five thirty (the morning felt very cold) when the call to march sounded..."
Also interesting, in view of our previous discussions on the artillery fire from the defenders, is this:
"Though the distance was short, in crossing it we suffered two cannon volleys of grapeshot that felled more than forty men."
This lends more support to the idea that there wasn't all that much in the way of cannon fire coming from the ALamo that morning.
Jim
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Post by Herb on May 18, 2007 16:39:22 GMT -5
Add the 30 minute time correction I mentioned and it's right on 6 AM.  The three hundred paces is interesting, I've overlooked that in the past. The thing that sticks in my mind is that another account specifies a musket shot, although three hundred paces makes more sense to me. At a simple march rate, we're still only talking roughly three minutes to the wall. |
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 18, 2007 16:50:33 GMT -5
I wonder too, if contributing to the confusion is the 3AM positioning of the troops with a later assault.
Another account that mentions 330AM is Lorranca, who is problematic anyway.
Lorranca though, also mentions that the assault was "...so sudden that the fort had only time to discharge four of the 18 cannon which it had."
Jim
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Post by Herb on May 18, 2007 17:09:30 GMT -5
There's a lot of things wrong with Lorranca, but they're more details (the wrong names of battalions) then actual major facts - at least up until he enters the fort. Unlike Hansen, I tend to agree with Davis that it's an authentic account. Most of the errors, are those that a man of his position, Second Sergeant, could be expected to make. At least until he talks about seeing Travis and Bowie's bodies in the Low Barracks, but even then he got Bowie right.
The four cannon shots are a case in point, as a cavalry sergeant, stationed outside the Alamo and for the most part not experiencing the fire, to be able to count the number of cannon rounds fired is not improbable.
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Post by stuart on May 18, 2007 23:07:50 GMT -5
And again we have exactly the same parallels with Culloden where the preparatory artillery bombardment became established as lasting for 20-30 minutes and inflicting crippling losses (sound familiar?)
In fact it actually appears that only 2 or 3 rounds were fired before the infantry battle began.
Just as at Culloden we have had a mythology built up here which presumes a prolonged struggle, a desperate defence of the north wall inflicting massive losses on the attackers, when in fact it was very rapid. What I'm finding interesting is just how rapid the collapse really was.
We're now looking at just a few minutes, and its also clear from de la Pena's account that Morales was already inside the Alamo when the north wall was taken.
In overall terms I think we're looking at a far more fluid battle than anybody has ever realised, with the Mexicans getting into the main compound in minutes and then perhaps as many as half of the garrison trying to break out at the same time, before a prolonged and messy mopping up of those trapped in the buildings
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Post by Herb on May 19, 2007 10:53:02 GMT -5
... we have had a mythology built up here which presumes a prolonged struggle, a desperate defense of the north wall inflicting massive losses on the attackers, when in fact it was very rapid. What I'm finding interesting is just how rapid the collapse really was. We're now looking at just a few minutes, and its also clear from de la Pena's account that Morales was already inside the Alamo when the north wall was taken. In overall terms I think we're looking at a far more fluid battle than anybody has ever realized, with the Mexicans getting into the main compound in minutes and then perhaps as many as half of the garrison trying to break out at the same time, before a prolonged and messy mopping up of those trapped in the buildings As I stated when I began this topic, the realization that the start of the attack was much later than the popular image, was a revelation for me. The picture became much more complete, for me, with the arguments about Sesma, and finally really comprehending his words "The enemy ... displaced from its first line of fortifications just as Your Excellency predicted ...." IE the battle basically occurred just as Santa Anna had planned it. The final piece for me was the publication of Hansen. For the first time I readily had multiple sources for Joe's testimony. Looking at them side by side, almost magically, a totally different battle than popular myth appeared. These three pieces together, for me, shows a deliberate, well planned attack, executed almost entirely as planned, that caught the defenders by surprise, and dictated the defenders' final actions. |
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 19, 2007 10:56:28 GMT -5
I don't think you're far off, Stuart.
I also think that the key man here, despite the relatively little we have in the way of documentation, is Morales.
The prevailing idea that Morales first attacked the palisade, was repulsed by heavy fire and moved to the southwest corner, seems to have originated with Walter Lord. If anyone can offer an earlier citation for this scenario I'd welcome it, but Lord is the earliest I can find. This scenario has been repeated until it's become "common knowledge", but I don't think there is a basis for the belief in any primary source.
From all reports, Morales had the clear objective of capturing the main gate, which he apparently did rapidly and effectively with about 100 men under his command. Whether the "bold move" he is credited with was first capturing the gate area and then flanking the SW corner (as Stuart has suggested), or whether that boldness was exhibited by his taking the SW cannon position and commanding the high ground so as to dominate and subdue the main gate (as I believe) hardly matters (though we'd all like to have a definitive report in our hands...maybe someday); Morales took the south end of the fort quickly, and it was no mere feignt to take attention away from the north wall assault.
In capturing the south end, Morales, with the fewest troops at his disposal, took the low barracks, the chapel area, the south end of the west wall, and reportedly began the assault on the long barracks as well.
If Bowie was quartered in the low barracks, Morales' men would have probably been responsible for his death. If Crockett was stationed at the palisade (unlikely, in my opinion), these same troops would likely have killed him. In the chapel they would probably have encountered Dickinson and Bonham. When you consider that Morales was also at Coleto and contributed to Fannin's defeat, he's personally responsible for the fall of quite a few principal players in the Alamo saga.
As Stuart mentioned, DLP is clear that Morales was already in the compound when the north wall was over-run. If Santa Anna had a "secret weapon" in his plan to take the Alamo, Morales is a prime candidate for the position.
Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 19, 2007 11:19:53 GMT -5
The more I'm reading this discussion the more I get the almost shocking image of a fairly lightning-quick strike that took the defenders by surprise, with the Mexicans inside the fort very, very quickly. Morales may well have been the first in; not only did he have the fewest troops among the Mexican units, but that part of the fort must have had very few defenders since the major threat was on the north, to where they must have rushed, and the fact they were all asleep anyway to start with. Almonte seems to indicate no more than a half-hour before the Texans began to bolt, so it must have been pretty much all over by then, except for the mopping up in the Long Barracks, with Sesma's cavalry finishing off the bolters.
I wonder if the bolting was also planned as a contingency if the Mexicans entered the fort, rather than (or maybe in addition to) a plan for escape by night.
AW
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Post by Herb on May 19, 2007 11:26:47 GMT -5
I wonder if the bolting was also planned as a contingency if the Mexicans entered the fort, rather than (or maybe in addition to) a plan for escape by night. AW I think it's a definite possibility. Sesma talks about the one group breaking out as marching and organized that certainly implies that it was still under effective command and control. While it's certainly possible on the spur of the moment that one or two company commanders, sized up the situation, determined it was hopless and ordered his/their company(s) out; it makes more sense that it was something he had already considered for when/if the battle went bad. |
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 19, 2007 11:55:16 GMT -5
I think a lot of these actions occured simultaneously. We tend to think of this battle in a linear fashion, this happened, then this happened, when in fact a lot of the action dovetailed or overlapped.
Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 19, 2007 12:49:35 GMT -5
That's exactly how I'm seeing it. Morales may have already been in the fort, a losing struggle taking place on the north wall, with Travis dead, many Texians rushing from the barracks, only to quickly retreat back there, and 60 or more defenders quickly bolting ---- all around the same time or within minutes. It's like a state of confusion, really, for the Texians. They very quickly found themselves out of options. The only time that may have been bought for them once the attack started was whatever canon fire they got off, which seems to have only inflicted serious damage to the Toluca battalion.
AW
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Post by Herb on May 19, 2007 13:29:59 GMT -5
Rereading Filisola, and the posts Jim has made that included comments about artillery fire, it really does seem that the "pause" at the North Wall was more to the happenstance of Duque's wounding and the temporary loss of leadership in his column than a devastating defensive effort.
It would seem probable, that Duque and his staff were probably brought down by the same cannon burst that produced such causalities in the Toluca Battalion.
Once Amador, restored command and control, and led the soldatos unto the North Wall, what resistance that was made from the perimeter collapsed.
I wonder, if the wounding of Duque, and the resulting pause caused by the loss of leadership, isn't the real reason Morales gained control of the SW corner prior to the fall of the North Wall.
Not minimizing Morales' efforts - just reinforcing that all of this was happening simultaneously.
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Post by stuart on May 19, 2007 14:20:54 GMT -5
I'm inclined to agree, with the caveat that I have this lurking suspicion Travis may actually have contributed more to the defence than anyone has recognised. Joe clearly states not only that the Texians were taken by surprise but that some of the Mexicans were actually up on the walls when he and Travis reached the north wall.
Makes me wonder if the sequence of events which Wolf suggests came about because the assaulting column was hit by that artillery round while it was stalled as a direct result of Travis clearing the ladder with his shotgun?
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