Col Neil

Bowie's reference to ditches, first or foremost, reveals a lack of military acumen, as would be expected from an untrained soldier. If Bowie had been a soldado in one of the Mexican Army infantry battalions during the assault of the Alamo, he would have been left behind as an untrained recruit - as per Santa Anna's operations order. That's not to say the man couldn't fight - we all know his skills in this arena - he certainly held his own against the Comanche, who were some of the best warriors around, and his aggressiveness at Concepcion exemplifies a professional soldier's fighting spirit. But the fact is, like Travis, he neither knew nor understood sound military tactics. He was an amateur, albeit a experienced one.

Second, the term ditches can apply to either the trenches dug by the Mexicans in the plazas of Bexar or around certain parts of the Alamo. I believe Bowie referred to the trenches in Bexar because the Texans intended to defend both Bexar and the Alamo, just as the Mexicans had done. Remember, the Texan's only experience with military professionalism and tactics, poor though they were (the tactics I mean; the battalion in Bexar fought with great determination in a fight for which no troops of that era trained, i.e., urban warfare), was the Mexican Army's defense of Bexar and the Alamo. Only God knows what would have happened if the Mexicans had been commanded by a man other than Cos - like that battalion commander in Bexar, for instance (I cant remember the battalion's name; somebody will help out here, I hope).

Neill, Travis and Bowie did not expect the main Mexican Army until late April or May of 1836, a reasonable expectation as grass for horse fodder would be plentiful by then and the weather milder, even warm. Remember, our forces during the Civil War rarely fought during the Winter with principal operations usually commencing in April and ending by November/December. Bowie et., al., expected no less from Santa Anna, whom they underestimated because of Cos, and their fellow Texans to reinforce them before then, another reasonable expectation. As we know, the arrival of the Mexican Army at Bexar after a forced march in horrible Winter conditions, including a blizzard, took the Texans by surprise. They made a bee-line for the Alamo from Bexar, having prepared it but little if at all.

Anyway, that's my $10 worth, the price for such opinions having gone up. No doubt some will disagree, but they are 5th Columnists, insurrectionists, or contrarions - or worse yet, people with different opinions. And evidence.

I'm not at all sure it should be taken literally at all, but rather metaphorically as in a last ditch stand.

Allen, I agree. I don't think James Bowie was an allegorical thinker. I think he was literal and when he wrote of "ditches," he meant trenches but didn't know the right word for it. I don't think he was trying to convey anything beyond that.

Chuck - I'm sidetracked with some research at the moment, but plan to get back to Donovan this week, so I'll let you know. Offhand I'd say that the Texians may have had plans to defend the town because the key phrase in the letter notes that Bexar must be kept out of the hands of the enemy. And Santa Anna's real objective was the town, not the Alamo, and he got that on day one. I believe the Texian plans all hinged on their belief (or hope) that large numbers of reinforcements would come to Bexar; that never happened.

I dont think there's any doubt that the Texans intended to defend both Bexar and the Alamo - with their main defenses in Bexar.

The fact that an urban area is approachable from three sides, or four sides for that matter, is irrelevant. What matters are the battle positions inside the town. The Mexican battalion defending the town had prepared excellent positions, inside Bexar around the plazas. The Texans could never have defended Bexar's perimeter, no more than 200 men could have defended the Alamo's perimeter. But perimeter defense is the last thing you want to do when defending urbanized terrain. The enemy can sit off and hammer you with artillery. But once inside the city, that artillery is rendered ineffective as the gun crews would be exposed to rifle fire.

The Texans relied almost exclusively upon the field fortifications prepared by the Mexicans as well as their concept of the operation. This was a mistake - but they didnt know it because they were not professional soldiers. They were amateurs. The only professionals they had encountered in battle were the Mexicans and so they followed their example. Unfortunately, Cos' concept of the operation was deficient on numerous levels - the worst of which was failing to concentrate his forces on a single piece of defensible terrain. By splitting his forces and dividing them by a river staked on either bank by large, hard-wood trees (For God sake, how stupid could one man be?) and then placing them in positions that provided no mutual support, Cos doomed his command before the Texans ever arrived on scene. The French Foreign Legion did the same thing at Dien Bien Phu.

The 5 day fight for Bexar, which the Texans never succeeded in clearing, would have served as an example of the ease with which one can defend barricaded buildings and streets. Given that experience, why would the Texans not defend Bexar? All those buildings in and around the plazas represented a greater obstacle to an attacking force than the Alamo. But they didn't have the men to defend it so they had to skedaddled to the Alamo.

Green Jameson may have been a trained civil engineer, but he was not a trained combat engineer and had no grasp of sound military engineering. If the copies of the plans he prepared of the Alamo defenses are accurate, he had a whimsical, school-boy approach to field fortifications. He was preparing for a dirt clod fight and not a defensive battle with cannon and rifle. You dont defend walls (or buildings) from the top, but at ground level where you get grazing fire. He had no concept of interlocking fields of fire, integration of obstacles within sectors of fire, the critical importance of enfilade fire, and the equally critical need for reducing or eliminating defilade along the walls. A combat engineer would have looked at all those vertical walls and burst into tears - and combat engineers are not known for expressing their emotions.

I am not aware of any entrenchments outside the walls of the Alamo - regardless of Sanchez Navarro. Jake Ivey has shown that the field fortifications drawn by Sanchez Navarro around the southwest corner of the plaza were never there. SN may simple have seen piles of dirt from the Mexican's acequia dig and assumed they were trenches. Regardless, external positions like that would only have been useful as cannon positions for establishing enfilading fire along the west wall - a really, really good idea. But they were not there.

As you said, he who defends everything, defends nothing. The Texans didn't know that little axiom and they violated it the moment they decided to defend all of the Alamo instead of a concentrated position within it that could be defended by 150 to 200 men. Alamo Plaza and the church's campo santo would have been wonderful kill zones in which the assaulting Mexicans could have been trapped and slaughtered. And the Texans could have prepared them both during daylight hours without having to sortie.

Davidpenrod: Interesting defense of your position, with which I largely disagree. Based upon our previous encounters, I am afraid you will have to pardon me from any further discussion, as I do not wish to debate with you point by point. I do think that some of the others may find you views interesting though and they may take up the challenge.