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Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 9, 2012 14:30:28 GMT -5
Elsewhere we have discussed how the Texans were surprised by the early arrival of Santa Anna and quickly retreated into the Alamo. One theory is that this was something of an emergency measure or, as Stuart has put it, the Alamo serving as a lifeboat until help arrived. The Texans action suggests that either they never intended to fortify and defend Bexar itself, but only the Alamo, which suggests that they anticipated and prepared for a siege.
I came across reference to letters in Hardin's Texian Illiad from Jameson to Houston (January 18, 1836) and from Bowie to Gov. Smith (Feb. 2, 1836); both are in Jenkins Papers of the Texas Revolution. Jameson focuses entirely on the Alamo and boasts that the Texans might "whip 10 to 1 with our artillery" if the Mexicans were to attack. Bowie is even more clear about preparing for a siege, praising Neill's leadership and noting that all were "labouring night and day, laying up provisions for a siege, encouraging our men, and calling on the Government for releif" (italics added). Of course, the focus on pleading for relief forces would resonate throughout all communications from the Alamo.
Although I haven't got the actual documents here (they may be in Hansen as well), does such a strategy make sense? Had the Texans decided not to defend Bexar, as Cos had tried to do, either because they saw it as untenable or because there just weren't enough men to even prepare such a defense? If, as Bowie suggests, the plan was to hole up in a long siege, staving off the Mexicans with cannon fire, what was the anticipated end game? Did Neill or Bowie foresee a relief large enough to enable the Texans to conduct operations against the Mexicans outside the Alamo?
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Apr 9, 2012 18:04:04 GMT -5
Well, now, you've got me wondering seriously about the points you raised in context with the notion that the defenders weren't expecting to see the Mexicans for another month. What additional strengthening of the Alamo's defenses could have been accomplished with another month? Could enough been done in that time to assure a more prolonged defense under siege? How many more men might have found their way to Bexar over the course of another four weeks? Another month for Houston the whip his army into shape and maybe be in a position to move on Bexar?
You might well be onto something.
Paul
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 9, 2012 19:57:41 GMT -5
I believe that there is nothing Santa Anna would have loved more than to fight the Texian Army at San Antonio. In fact I believe that was his hope that the Alamo would bring forth that army from the colonies.
I further believe that the Fabian strategy of luring Santa Anna as far into the interior of Texas as possible, then choosing decisive ground and fighting him on Houston's terms was the correct way to go, but it had to be Santa Anna, and it had to be one roll of the dice.
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Post by Herb on Apr 10, 2012 12:44:42 GMT -5
Elsewhere we have discussed how the Texans were surprised by the early arrival of Santa Anna and quickly retreated into the Alamo. One theory is that this was something of an emergency measure or, as Stuart has put it, the Alamo serving as a lifeboat until help arrived. The Texans action suggests that either they never intended to fortify and defend Bexar itself, but only the Alamo, which suggests that they anticipated and prepared for a siege. Allen, don't forget Houston's actual instructions to Bowie were to destory the fortifications in Bexar and move the artillery into the Alamo. One of the interesting things I found was in Lindley's Traces where the Council ordered the Alamo held to the last extremity. Taken with Neill's and Bowie's letters, I believe the intent from mid January on was to hold the Alamo until relieved. While this differs with Stuart's "lifeboat" interperation I don't believe they are mutually exclusive. For the fact is by preparing for only the one option, they had no other choice but to go into the lifeboat and wait to be saved. As far as being surprised, (I know I'm getting technical) Santa Anna achieved tactical surprise by arriving February 23rd, he did not achieve strategic surprise (and had Travis been properly doing his job he might not have achieved even tactical surprise). What I mean by this, is if you review Neill's letters in Hansen, it becomes very clear that the Texains knew exactly where Sesma and the Vanguard was, and where Santa Anna and the main body was, up until about the time Neill left Travis in command. Deaf Smith, was apparently in charge of Neill's scouts watching the Vanguard Bde, and Smith left his station about the same time as Neill. Travis apparently didn't replace Smith, a grevious failure. As it was, the Texians were fully aware that the Mexicans were only about a one week march from San Antonio, but for some unknown reason, once the Texians removed their "eyes" (Smith) from the enemy, Travis assumed that it would take two - three weeks for them to cover this one week march. By not replacing Smith, or by posting picketts out on the Medina Travis allowed Santa Anna to gain tactical surprise. Allen, the strategy of holing up in the Alamo and the Texas Army rallying to it's relief, was probably the one thing everybody (except MAYBE Houston) agreed on. In fact if you reread Moore's Eighteen Minutes you'll find that some of the first units raised to relieve the Alamo actually began organizing BEFORE Santa Anna arrived ie they were already preparing for the anticipated campaign. But, I'll agree with Chuck that, had that happened it would have played into Santa Anna's hands. For even if the Vanguard Brigade was defeated there was another whole army behind them. Only a decisive defeat with Santa Anna a prisoner, ie San Jacinto, could possibly end the war in a Texas victory. As far as defending Bexar if Cos couldn't defend the Alamo and Bexar with a 1000 men how could Neil defend both with only 100 (or Travis 200). Houston's orders to Bowie to destroy the fortifications in Bexar and move everything into the Alamo was definitly the better course of action. |
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Post by Rich Curilla on Apr 10, 2012 16:00:01 GMT -5
I further believe that the Fabian strategy of luring Santa Anna as far into the interior of Texas as possible, then choosing decisive ground and fighting him on Houston's terms was the correct way to go, but it had to be Santa Anna, and it had to be one roll of the dice. Here! Here! I agree! There is a move I learned in a college fencing class that I have always related to Houston's retreat. After all, he was into the classics and may have known this. Most combatants fence with an advance tactic, stepping forward one step at a time toward their opponent, backing him down. The tactic I learned was to step backwards, causing your opponent to step toward you. Back up, back up, back up -- and then DON'T back up. Once the rhythm is achieved, it is likely that your opponent will continue stepping forward -- and thus right onto your foil. You never have to lunge. Psychologically, when you are pushing your opponent, you are causing him to be on his guard and defensive. When you allow your opponent to push you, he gains confidence and gets careless. |
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 10, 2012 16:54:50 GMT -5
Rich: When your adversary withdraws across the width of your front, giving you little or no resistance, the motive is seldom one of benevolence.
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Post by Hollowhorn on Apr 10, 2012 17:24:42 GMT -5
What additional strengthening of the Alamo's defenses could have been accomplished with another month? Could enough been done in that time to assure a more prolonged defense under siege? On Jan 6th, in a letter to the Council, Neil was calling for "200 men at all times & I think 300 until the repairs & improvements of the fortification is completed"He further states that: "The men have not even money to pay for their washing. The Hospital is also in want of stores, & even the necessary provisions for well men was not left the wounded by Grant & Johnson. Send us money in haste. The men have been here many of them more than three months, and some of them have not had a dollar during that time"He goes on to say: “I further add that owing to our having no correspondence with the interior, that we know not what day, or hour, and enemy of 1000 in number may be down upon us, and as we have no supplies of provisions within the fortress we could be starved out in 4 days by anything like a close siege”On the Jan 14th, in a letter to Houston, Neil states that he has “no rifle powder” & also “there are at Laredo now 3,000 men under the command of Genl. Ramirez and as it appears from a letter received here last night , 1,000 of them are destined for this place” Further stating that he is in a “torpid, defenceless situation here” He goes on to say that he cannot get “Horses enough to since Johnston & Grant left, to send out a patrol or spy company” On Jan 18th Jameson writes to Houston regarding “Fortress Alamo”: “The men here will not labour and I cannot ask it of them until they are better clad and fed” Possibly from the same letter: “All we want now is provisions and munitions to stand a siege against an innumerable force tho’ we are weak beyond imagination, not being more than 100 strong since Johnson & Grant left, and there could be raised in town 300 men that could besiege us at any time” On Jan 24th, Neil writes writes: “In my communications to the Executive I did not ask for pledges & resolves but for money provisions & clothing” Then: “we cannot be fed & clothed on paper pledges – my men cannot nor will not stand this (course) of things much longer” On Feb 2nd, Bowie is writing to Henry Smith: “We are still labouring night and day, laying up provisions for a siege” And that: “Capt. Neill and myself have come to the solemn resolution that we will rather die in these ditches than give it up to the enemy” On Feb 12th, Travis writes to Henry Smith: “This being the Frontier Post nearest the Rio Grande, will be the first to be attacked. We are illy prepared for their reception as we have not more than 150 men here and they are in a very disorganised state” On Feb 13th, Travis writes to Henry Smith regarding Bowie’s drunken shenanigans. On Feb 14th, John J. Baugh wrote to Henry Smith regarding Bowie’s drunken shenanigans. On Feb. 14th, Travis & Bowie write to Henry Smith: This garrison is in a very destitute situation – We have but a small supply of provisions, and are without a dollar” And: “It is useless to talk of keeping up this garrison any longer without money, as we believe that unless we receive some shortly, the men will all leave ”On Feb 16th, Jameson writes to Henry Smith, telling that him that : “ A great number of the volunteers here will leave tomorrow as the end of their second month is up” Then goes on to say: “I have some improved demonstrations to make & send you of our fortress whereby fewer men & less artillery will be required in case of a siege or an attack” On Feb 23rd. Travis writes to Andrew Ponton: “The enemy in large force is in sight – We want men & provisions – Send them to us – We have 150 men & are determined to defend the Alamo to the last” On Feb 24th. Travis writes to the People of Texas & all the Americans in the world: “When the enemy appeared in sight we had not 3 bushels of corn – We have since found in deserted houses 80 or 90 bushels & got into the walls 20 or 30 head of beeves”
Was there really a 'strategy' for defending the Alamo? The men were poorly fed & clothed & any money they had was going on booze & women. Most of them do not seem to have shown much interest in shoring up 'Fortress Alamo' until the Mexicans appeared over the horizon. Jameson was dreaming up grand plans that he had neither the men nor the supplies to deliver. Bowie & Neil were talking of 'dying in the ditches' Which was about as much as they could expect given the situation at the time. I mean, if they were 'labouring night and day' to provision the Alamo, why was Travis noting that on they day that they were forced to actually enter the Alamo, that they had not 3 bushels of corn to hand" If a siege was expected (and it was) why were they not stocking up on provisions to sustain such a siege? Was it because they thought that they had another few weeks grace in which to do so? The only hope they had of surviving such a siege was the chance that reinforcements would arrive, this is the belief that the commanders held to at any rate. What of the men though, they only knew what they were told by their leaders, leaders that they would have a certain trust in. Anyway, what else could the men do, penniless, horseless & near naked as they were? Very little I would suppose until Santa Anna took away any remaining choice that they may have had by driving them headlong into the Alamo with little more than whatever clothes they had on their backs & whatever arms they could carry (hangovers permitting) I really do not mean to be too harsh here, but the facts as written down by the participants do not leave too much leeway for the use of the word 'Strategy' |
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Post by Herb on Apr 10, 2012 17:49:02 GMT -5
Orders of the Texas Council, January 31: that the Alamo be placed "in the best possible state for defense, with assurances that every possible effort is making to strengthen, supply and provision the Garrison, and on no case to abandon or surrender the place unless in the last extremity."
jameson, January 18: "We have received 100 bushels of meal and 42 beeves which will last us for two months to come."
Bowie, Feb 2: "We are still labouring night and day, laying up provisions for a siege ...."
Travis, Feb 24: " ... We have since found in deserted houses 80 - 90 bushels and got into the walls 20 or 30 head of Beevesi
Travis, March 3: "We have provisions for twenty days ...."
If you actually calculate out the rations we know of it would have fed 200 men on full rations into April.
The US had a strategy for defending the Philippines in WWII, that it failed reflects more on the quality of the strategy not whether it existed.
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Post by Hollowhorn on Apr 10, 2012 17:59:21 GMT -5
Jameson, January 18: "We have received 100 bushels of meal and 42 beeves which will last us for two months to come." Which they had obviously used up by Feb 23rd? Why then: "When the enemy appeared in sight we had not 3 bushels of corn"? My point exactly. Which they gathered up during the skedaddle towards 'Fortress Alamo'? |
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Post by Herb on Apr 10, 2012 18:52:58 GMT -5
Somewhere on here is a discussion of what a "ration" is. While beef and meal don't make up a total ration, and if they were totally dependent on it disease such as scurvy would eventually appear, they were the largest components of the daily ration. While we don't know for sure, (we know Travis exaggerated in other letters) it is very improbable that Jameson's two months of rations were used up in one. And what,of the rations Bowie said he was laying up?
No doubt there were shortages of select items of the daily ration, but the 72 head of beef should have lasted long past the fall of the Alamo.
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Post by Hollowhorn on Apr 10, 2012 19:22:42 GMT -5
So, how do we explain Travis when he states:
“When the enemy appeared in sight we had not 3 bushels of corn – We have since found in deserted houses 80 or 90 bushels & got into the walls 20 or 30 head of beeves”
Now, did I not read somewhere that those beeves were gathered on the run, rather than a herd that had been cultivated for the nourishment of the Alamo garrison?
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Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 10, 2012 19:54:32 GMT -5
Not able to consult sources just now, but I seem to recall a propensity on Travis's part in some of his messages. I think he's responsible for some of the confusion over how many men there actually were in the Alamo. It would not surprise me if Travis dramatized things a bit by claiming so few rations, only to miraculously come upon plenty as the siege began. What I'm reading here suggests that Bowie and Neill did not fret over rations, but rather the desperate need for more troops to enable the Alamo to hold out.
Herb's argument is sound in that there didn't seem to be many alternatives for a force of 100-200 men other than holing up in the Alamo in the strong belief that reinforcements were already being organized and would be on their way to the Alamo. I started this thread asking what the strategy was, and that's what it seems to have been. LIke that British commander on the Orn River Bridge on D-Day: "Hold until relieved." Of course the two incidents are not really comparable, but the Alamo commanders somehow clung to the blief that they'd be relieved. My problem is that I don't see the thinking behind such a belief. Neill seems to be saying that the situation is on the brink of dissolving; already Grant and Johnson have reduced the size of the force and provisions. I don't know how much Neil, Bowie, or Travis understood the near-total dysfunction of the provisional government, but if they were aware of it, it could well have persuaded them that it was time to abandon Bexar and regroup somewhere else; live to fight another day. But, I think Bowie is clear as to why Bexar is considered the "key to Texas" since he saw it as the place to prevent Santa Anna from sweeping unopposed to the bulk of settlements in the colonies in the east.
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Post by Herb on Apr 10, 2012 21:54:40 GMT -5
Exactly, we know Travis for whatever reason was wrong, when he said 140 defenders, that for some reason he deliberately distorted the number of Tejano defenders, etc. That his information on rations doesn't match Jameson's and Bowie's letters is not proof positive of an impoverished state, indeed as in most issues, it raises the question of what is the truth?
Clearly, things were not good after Grant and Johnson left, but by Jan 18th at least according to Jameson things were improving.
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Post by stuart on Apr 11, 2012 1:05:28 GMT -5
Just a quick observation on the rations business, where I'd tend to agree with Herb. The Texians seem to have had a pretty good idea of the notion of a balanced diet or at least didn't regard flour and beef as sufficient. Arriving at Goliad after having supposedly stripped the Alamo of provisions as well as men, Grant threatened to fight Dimmit unless he turned over flour, coffee and sugar, while a little later under Fannin the garrison there was complaining about an unrelieved diet of fresh-killed beef.
Although Travis complained (and no doubt exaggerated) about how little he had in the way of beef and flour, when he ought even by his own accounting to have had sufficient, its likely that they perceived they had insufficient supplies because they were genuinely short of coffee, sugar and other foodstuffs.
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Post by Herb on Apr 11, 2012 10:29:31 GMT -5
That's what I was fumbling around trying to say. Thanks for the clarification.
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