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Post by Joy Manuel on Jul 6, 2011 15:04:38 GMT -5
Please if I might ask with out sounding stupid, why was it that they defended the Alamo and not used San Jose one of the largest missions to defend?
What made the Alamo more important than say San Jose?
I was at San Jose the other day as I live here and to me with its high walls etc, it seems that the defenders would have had a better chance of defending it more so than the Alamo. Although with out the man power it most likey didn't matter.
I have always been a history buff as my relative Asa Brigham, signer of the Texas Declaration of Independence, first treasurer of the Republic of Texas, also the Mayor of Austin back in 1842. However it has always been a wonder to me that they used the Alamo and not one of the other Missions.
Just something I needed to ask.
Thank you
Joy
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Post by Rich Curilla on Jul 6, 2011 18:11:36 GMT -5
Joy,
Don't feel awkward asking this question. It is quite a strident one.
I would say that the issue wasn't between the Alamo and San Jose, but rather the Alamo and Mission Concepcion. Part of the problem with the Alamo is that it was such a big place. Mission Concepcion was walled at that time and was more compact. San Jose, by contrast, was sprawled all over creation -- very difficult to defend. Remember that the structures you see now other than the church, convento ruins and the granary were rebuilt from the ground up in the early 20th. century. There was little or no difference between the Alamo and San Jose's outer walls as far as strength was concerned
But the major issue was that the Alamo had already been fortified the year before by Mexican General Cos -- cannon emplacements established, walls strengthened, outworks added...... It was the only mission thus prepared. And by the time Major Jameson (the Alamo garrison engineer) finished tweaking these fortifications, it was the most defensible of all the missions.
And, alas, with the surprise of Santa Anna's army arriving nearly a month earlier than the Texian commanders ever imagined possible, there would not have been time to do more than move from Bexar into the Alamo.
Hope this helps a bit.
Rich Curilla
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Post by Kevin Young on Jul 7, 2011 8:31:39 GMT -5
The Texians did try and use San Jose as a military base: in 1840-41.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 7, 2011 8:46:55 GMT -5
Joy: I am in agreement with all that Rich has laid out here.
In addition, I believe that it is important to say that the defense by Texian forces of any of the other missions would not impede Santa Anna from establishing a base in San Antonio from which to conduct future operations. Only the Alamo could do that by virtue of location.
I think Conception would have been the easiest to defend with a small garrision. I believe San Jose would have been much harder, and that belief was reinforced this past year during my visit there. The Alamo was much to large for the garrision that occupied it, but also remember that they expected reinforcements too. Therefore, considering this expectation the Alamo was the proper choice in both size and location.
I am one among few here I suspect that think the holding of the Alamo was a bad military decision. The events that transpired, the ecpectation of early reinforcements coupled with the early, and very unexpected arrival of Santa Anna conspired together to create a situation that Stuart often refers to as the Alamo being a lifeboat, a refuge of last resport. I believe this to be true.
I further believe it to be possible that the Texians could have made life throughly miserable for Santa Anna by other means, such as by ambush and raids. Small forces can hurt large forces very badly, and all out of proportion to their strength. During the war in Spain and Portugal, these small bands made life a living hell for Napoleon's Army, delaying movements for weeks and even months at a time. Keeping Santa Anna off balance could have very easily accomplished the same sort of delay that the confrontation at the Alamo did. All this supposes though that the Texians would have cleared the decks for action so to speak, by 1 February, and not be locked in by preconcieved notions as they were.
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Post by Kevin Young on Jul 7, 2011 9:07:18 GMT -5
...and the Alamo not only commands the town, but the Camino Real, as well as the roads to Gonzales and Goliad...
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 7, 2011 10:31:57 GMT -5
They were counting on significant reinforcements, misguidedly I believe, that would have been adequate to defend the Alamo. I like Chuck's ideas re: "cut, slash and run," which could have worked, prolonged the war and really cost Santa Anna. That would have required intelligent, unified leadership in Texas, which did not exist at the time. The place was a virtual madhouse.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 7, 2011 11:22:37 GMT -5
Allen: If you are assuming that such a plan as I laid out was one brought about by central direction, then I would say yes it would be quite impossible, given the political situation that existed. Indeed it was a madhouse.
The only way I can see this idea of petite guerre working is if the local commander in San Antonio, or for that matter in Goliad, shunned all convention, and made the decision on his own hook. It is easy for me to sit here as not only a retired soldier, but also a student of warfare and say these things, things which I believe to be the correct course of action. It is quite another if you happen to be Travis. To the sometime soldier, all those guns, and walls, and such would give the illusion of great strength, never thinking that those same guns and walls if utilized for defense would rob them of the thing it would be most vital to retain in this situation - iniatitive.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Jul 7, 2011 14:42:43 GMT -5
Regarding the possible use of another mission, even Santa Anna consider that the Texians might do this. His early orders to Sesma (I think) included directives as to how to operate if he found the Texians ensconced in any of the missions along the road into Bexar. Then, upon his arrival with the army on February 23, he sent a column of soldados to Mission Concepcion assuming that the enemy might be there as well. Notice that he never even considered that possibility for San Jose.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 7, 2011 15:50:16 GMT -5
Rich: Sending someone down to Conception was a prudent thing to do under the circumstances. Kevin is right though. If you have to defend one of them the Alamo is the place to defend because of the road junction.
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Post by Joy Manuel on Jul 7, 2011 16:22:48 GMT -5
Thank you, Rich, Kevin, Chuck, & Allen,
I really like hearing points of view and discussions on the Alamo.
I also saw where they had redone the granary and the face of the church at San Jose as I was there also at that time. They did a good job on it. I do believe that the granary is the oldest building in S.A. is it not?
Sometimes I wish that they had finished the Alamo with the 2 bell towers, however then the Alamo would be way to much the same in appearance as Concepcion and San Jose, at lease the Alamo has a distinct look that sets it apart from the others. I'll be heading down town in a week or two to see it again. Every time I go there I see something I missed.
I didn't know that The Texians did try and use San Jose as a military base: in 1840-41, I'll have to look that up and read on it.
As far as the setting of the Alamo, Kevin, I guess it was in a good location for the Camino Real, as well as the roads to Gonzales and Goliad. Then even now all major hwys go threw S.A.
Chuck, now that you mentioned ambushes and raids, Makes me wonder as to why they didn't do that unless even at the time they still didn't have the man power, however it would take very few men to make life miserable for Santa Anna, even on a much smaller scale, "cut, slash and run," like Allen put it, I can picture that!
(By the way Chuck Thank you for serving our country)
I would like to say more but I have an appointment I need to get to, perhaps tomorrow.
Joy
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 7, 2011 19:24:14 GMT -5
Joy: This is the way that the little guy takes on the big guy, that while it is not decisive in itself, sets the stage for the decisive battle
It is I who should thank every citizen in these here United States for the privledge.
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Post by Hiram on Jul 7, 2011 23:53:45 GMT -5
Lots of good points being made here. Certainly in retrospect, one can come to the conclusion that defending the Alamo was a poor military decision. What other conclusion can be drawn when an entire garrison is wiped out? Once the decision was reached to raise arms against the Mexican Army, three different strategies were proposed:
1) Fall back, buy time, and enlist the aid of thousands of American volunteers (Houston)
2) Take the offensive and enlist the aid of Federalists in the interior of Mexico (Tampico & Matamoros expeditions; Mexia, Grant, Johnson)
3) Establish a frontier line of defense (Bexar & Goliad; Austin, Henry Smith)
Houston firmly believed that success would come only with the aid of thousands of American volunteers crossing into Texas. That of course, never transpired.
Both the Tampico and Matamoros expeditions were unmitigated disasters and did nothing to improve the chances of success for Texas.
Austin and his supporters believed that eliminating Bexar as a Mexican base of operations was the key to victory, and if they did not attempt to take Bexar, the war itself was pointless.
I have yet to come across any contemporary accounts of a proposed strategy in which the rebels would conduct a series of small operations to harass and wear down the Mexican Army. By process of elimination, this small war is the only option left for us to ponder, and since it was never put into action, it is hard for us to measure the potential effectiveness of such a strategy.
Returning to the subject of the Alamo and its relation to Bexar, it's important to note that 87 veterans of the Siege of Bexar later died as members of the Alamo garrison. In other words, 46 per cent of the garrison had firsthand knowledge and experience in terms of what it took to defeat the Mexican Army and they proved by their actions that they believed Bexar was the key to Texas.
The Alamo as lifeboat has it's share of proponents on this forum, but in my opinion, the lifeboat analogy is a bit unsound. First point I would make is that if the Alamo is in some sense a lifeboat, it is the most heavily armed lifeboat in the history of warfare. So if we are to use a vessel as a metaphor for the Alamo, let's call it a gunboat. More to the point, if the Bexar garrison was interested solely in self-preservation, they would have simply scattered once the Mexican Army was detected. Why bother with the Alamo when they had ample time to evacuate the town in three different directions?
The decision to fall back into the Alamo was made not as a means of survival, it was a decision made based on the importance of maintaining some sense of "control" over the area. Yes, the town of Bexar was taken by the Army of Operations, but occupying the Alamo would allow the garrison to hold out until reinforcements arrived. The defenders were not looking to be "rescued," they were looking towards the reacquisition of Bexar.
Ultimately, the implosion of the rebel government in January 1836 effectively ended all possible hope of a unified defense and irreparably damaged any real chance of being reinforced by hundreds of volunteers. It was this failure that led to the tragedy of March 6. It's difficult dealing with hypothetical scenarios, but I think that a unified government would have resulted in a more unified plan of action on the part of the insurgents in Texas, and that unified plan would have prevented the disasters of the Alamo and of Goliad, and for that matter, Tampico and Matamoros.
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Post by stuart on Jul 8, 2011 0:55:59 GMT -5
I'm sticking with the lifeboat. Green Jameson had delusions of grandeur and an accumulation of artillery old and new that nobody knew what else to do with - Grant took the only mobile guns with him.
The problem which ultimately doomed the Texians wasn't lack of men or ammunition or guns or other supplies, but horses. They were short of horses to start with and most of those they had were being pastured out of town. Thus they had to throw themselves into the Alamo simply because they didn't have enough horses to get everybody away in time.
Now this also impacts on the famous slash and burn guerilla business. We're not talking about the mountains of Galicia here but the plains of Texas and you can't run a guerilla campaign there without horses to mount your raiders.
Then again if you did the scenario would be an interesting one and not necessarily to the Texians' advantage. The Presidiales and the Centralista volunteers such as De La Garza's rancheros were a pretty tough bunch with a lot of Indian fighting experience and Richard Widmark's slashers might have found it wasn't as easy as they thought...
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 8, 2011 9:04:09 GMT -5
Hiram: No I do not think there was any proposed strategy to wage a guerilla war. It would certainly not be found proposed by anyone in the Texian government, if you want to call it government. I would by necessity have been a local decision. In addition the decision would have to be made very early and started to be implemented at the latest by 1 February. Looking at this thing with the advantage of hindsight I conclude that
1. No one was thinking this way and the notion never really crossed their minds. They were keyed on reinforcements arriving, and a general battle in the area of San Antonio.
2. While mobility is essential to a guerilla campaign, an early decision to go this way could probably given them the time required to make themselves mobile. No these are not the mountains of Galacia, but there are also places present in that country that could serve as a base of operations.
3. I still go back to the illusion of strength that the Alamo gives. Travis and the others would be very reluctant to let the Alamo guns fall into the Mexican hands even in a damaged condition.
Like I stated before all these things are easy to say in hindsight. It is much harder to make these decisions in the present, especially not knowing what impact these decisions might have on any overall plan, which was rather illusary in itself. I don't think any such moves were in the cards, for the reasons stated by Hiram, Stuart and Allen, but still it makes one wonder what might have been.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Jul 8, 2011 15:28:49 GMT -5
Like I stated before all these things are easy to say in hindsight. It is much harder to make these decisions in the present, especially not knowing what impact these decisions might have on any overall plan, which was rather illusary in itself. That said, I find it to be a simple matter of "what do we do if." After Cos left, the Texians had quite a fort -- stretching from Cos' fortifications on the Plaza de las Islas and San Fernando Parish to those in the Alamo. As Neill and Jameson were faced with new decisions based on having so few men by early January, a new plan had to be conceived. This was to tighten the defensive front by moving all the Bexar armament into the Alamo alone. "We have 104 men and two distinct fortresses to garrison, and about 24 pieces of artillery." That is Neill stating the problem he is faced with, not our 20/20 hindsite or even the political issues he would have known about. On January 14, he wrote, "Fourteen days has expired since I commenced informing my superior officers of my Situation, and not Even an item of news have I received from any quarter..." On January 18th., Jameson reported, "We have too few to garrison both places, and will bring all our forces to the Alamo tomorrow as well as the cannons." Thus, the commander and his staff were dealing with only one question, "What is best under the circumstances." When Bowie arrived, he saw their inability to take 24 cannons with them if they left due to lack of draft animals -- or, for that matter, removing them to some other mission. Plus, as a Bexareno himself, he related to the problem of the locals, and then this became part of the plan as well. "The Citizens of Bejar have behaved well. Col. Neill & Myself have come to the solemn resolution that we will rather die in these ditches than give it up to the enemy. These citizens deserve our protection and the public safety demands our lives rather than to evacuate this post to the enemy." Commanders choosing to stay and hold, not simply getting caught and running for the "lifeboat." And by then, the overriding reason was Independence. |
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