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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 13, 2010 15:48:33 GMT -5
Note: This thread consists of posts that were originally in the "Alamo Attackers" thread, and, as they were off-topic, they have been moved here. The discussion originated with alamonorth's query about the Mexicans' possible use of a forlorn hope on 6 March 1836 and morphed into a discussion of the preparedness of the Texans at the Alamo and the competence of their commander, and has further morphed into a discussion of the Texans' prosecution of other battles in the revolution. This thread will remain focused on the Texans' military prosecution of the siege and assault of the Alamo and other engagements in the Texas Revolution.Since there has been much recent discussion of Napoleonic tactics during the Alamo battle, did the Mexican army have a tradition of a " forlorn hope" unit that had the job of carrying the scaling ladders or was it just bad luck to get this job ? Given the paucity of scaling ladders (28 in total) sent against the Alamo, would they give them to just anybody to get the job done. It's of no little significance that Joe's testimony noted that some Mexican troops had already reached the walls before the garrison even knew an attack was being launched. De la Pena is famous for telling us how nearly all the scaling ladders had disappeared in the mob at the north wall, but he is only stating things as they developed in his immediate vicinity. Sanchez-Navarro speaks that "we" carried "ladders, beams, bars, pickaxes etc." as Cos led his column to the attack; no mention specifically of an advance "forlorn hope" unit in any account of March 6, however.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 13, 2010 16:22:43 GMT -5
Remember, too, that the escalade was ostensibly a surprise attack. The defenders had no reason to believe that the siege wouldn't continue until a breach had been opened. At that point, a forlorn hope would have been in order.
Jim
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Post by Tom Nuckols on Dec 14, 2010 1:41:04 GMT -5
[/quote]It's of no little significance that Joe's testimony noted that some Mexican troops had already reached the walls before the garrison even knew an attack was being launched. [/quote]
One of the few things going for the Alamo defenders was artillery. Jameson bragged they'd beat ten to one with their artillery. Sure...assuming the Mexicans attacked during daylight and the Texians were already in position atop the walls to sweep the field with grapeshot as the Mexicans advanced. But it didn't work out that way. SA's best move was to keep the Texians awake with bombs and bands for days, then let them sleep. The sleep let SA sneak troops close enough to the walls to negate the artillery advantage. Maybe there were some premature shouts of "viva" that cost the Toluca batallion heavily, but by and large, SA's strategy of a sneak surprise worked well to negate the only advantage the Texians had.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Dec 14, 2010 9:52:52 GMT -5
Santa Anna's strategy did work and it helped that he had a really green commander opposing him. However, as Wolfpack showed some time back, it does not appear that the Mexicans kept up a nighttime bombardment. Nonetheless, the damage done by each days shelling kept the defenders busy into each night repairing and shoring up the weakening walls that were taking a pounding. I can't think of any real damage done by Alamo cannon outside of the Toluca Battalion. Romero might have taken some from the church roof or the gun in the cattle pen area, but he shifted away from that, just as Morales avoided the cannon in the tambor.
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 14, 2010 15:54:51 GMT -5
Often overlooked, too, is the advantage the Mexican soldiers had once they were WITHIN the Alamo walls. Their bayonets, swords, and machetes---aka "cold steel"---wreaked havoc on slow-loading, rifle-armed Texians. After Santa Anna's men took over the outer perimeter, it was just a dirty mopping-up operation.
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Post by Tom Nuckols on Dec 15, 2010 1:40:29 GMT -5
Santa Anna's strategy did work and it helped that he had a really green commander opposing him....I can't think of any real damage done by Alamo cannon outside of the Toluca Battalion. Romero might have taken some from the church roof or the gun in the cattle pen area, but he shifted away from that, just as Morales avoided the cannon in the tambor. With the benefit of 175 years of hindsight, it's tempting to be an "armchair QB" and think it couldn't have possibly turned out any other way. A direct attack from the west was impossible because of the river and topography. The city being the logical base for any invading army, the defenders must have anticipated an advance that started in the city and then went across the river on the Commerce St. bridge. Accordingly, they focused on fortifying the southern part of the complex with the 18 pounder, the lunette/abatis/stockade and associated cannon, and the cannon in the apse of the chapel. SA realized he needed to outflank those defenses and attack from the north/northeast/northwest. The key was keeping the defenders asleep until his army had crossed the Commerce St. bridge and completed the flanking maneuver. Or did some of them cross the river north of the Alamo? |
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Post by stuart on Dec 15, 2010 1:48:57 GMT -5
Often overlooked, too, is the advantage the Mexican soldiers had once they were WITHIN the Alamo walls. Their bayonets, swords, and machetes---aka "cold steel"---wreaked havoc on slow-loading, rifle-armed Texians. After Santa Anna's men took over the outer perimeter, it was just a dirty mopping-up operation. Gentlemen, I refer you to an upcoming article in the Alamo Journal... |
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 15, 2010 4:57:59 GMT -5
Often overlooked, too, is the advantage the Mexican soldiers had once they were WITHIN the Alamo walls. Their bayonets, swords, and machetes---aka "cold steel"---wreaked havoc on slow-loading, rifle-armed Texians. After Santa Anna's men took over the outer perimeter, it was just a dirty mopping-up operation. Gentlemen, I refer you to an upcoming article in the Alamo Journal... ....and my upcoming book.....  |
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 15, 2010 5:02:46 GMT -5
Santa Anna's strategy did work and it helped that he had a really green commander opposing him....I can't think of any real damage done by Alamo cannon outside of the Toluca Battalion. Romero might have taken some from the church roof or the gun in the cattle pen area, but he shifted away from that, just as Morales avoided the cannon in the tambor. With the benefit of 175 years of hindsight, it's tempting to be an "armchair QB" and think it couldn't have possibly turned out any other way. A direct attack from the west was impossible because of the river and topography. The city being the logical base for any invading army, the defenders must have anticipated an advance that started in the city and then went across the river on the Commerce St. bridge. Accordingly, they focused on fortifying the southern part of the complex with the 18 pounder, the lunette/abatis/stockade and associated cannon, and the cannon in the apse of the chapel. SA realized he needed to outflank those defenses and attack from the north/northeast/northwest. The key was keeping the defenders asleep until his army had crossed the Commerce St. bridge and completed the flanking maneuver. Or did some of them cross the river north of the Alamo? Santa Anna was very familiar with the Alamo defense works, not only thanks to some Bexarenos who joined his lines during the siege, but also because General Cos's engineers had built most of those works in '35. Biggest mistake the Texian garrison made, even according to Sanchez-Navarro: not emplacing cannon in the two-story long barracks, which would have made it a fairly formidable "citadel." |
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Post by Herb on Dec 15, 2010 11:04:55 GMT -5
With the benefit of 175 years of hindsight, it's tempting to be an "armchair QB" and think it couldn't have possibly turned out any other way. A direct attack from the west was impossible because of the river and topography. The city being the logical base for any invading army, the defenders must have anticipated an advance that started in the city and then went across the river on the Commerce St. bridge. Accordingly, they focused on fortifying the southern part of the complex with the 18 pounder, the lunette/abatis/stockade and associated cannon, and the cannon in the apse of the chapel. SA realized he needed to outflank those defenses and attack from the north/northeast/northwest. The key was keeping the defenders asleep until his army had crossed the Commerce St. bridge and completed the flanking maneuver. Or did some of them cross the river north of the Alamo? There were 8 "battalions" that participated in the attack, the Aldama, Toluca, Matamoros, Jimenez, San Luis Potosi, Zapadores, and the provisional battalions of grenadiers, and cazadores. We know the Jimenez, Matamoros, and the San Luis (and the cavalry) occupied fortified camps on the Alamo side of the river. In addition, assuming the Mexicans were following "normal" procedures (and there is no reason not to) it would seem probable that the Toluca Battalion, and possibly the Zapadores were encamped near the north artillery battery as supports. Thus, only the Aldama Battalion, grenadiers and cazadores had to cross the river to move into attack positions. It seems probable to me that the Aldama and grenadiers probably crossesd the river somewhere north of the Alamo, and only the cazaodres crossed the river at the bridge. While popular mythology, has insisted that Santa Anna halted his 24 hour a day bombardment the night of the 5th, to lull the defenders to sleep, tactically it would have done just the opposite. Whenever the enemy radically changes his behavior it always alerts the other side. Besides, historically, we know from Almonte's journal that there was no bombardment at night. Instead, Santa Anna followed very fundamental tactical prinicipals, and did nothing out of the ordinary to alert the defenders that an attack was coming. |
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Post by Chuck T on Dec 15, 2010 11:05:05 GMT -5
Gary: I am not sure that Sanchez Navarro's statement made a whole lot of sense to me. If he was strictly speaking about a rifleman on rifleman contest the statement has some validity. Otherwise such a move on the part of the Texians would have been a complete disaster.
Any cannons mounted under roof on the first floor of the long barracks would have had very limited traverse, and it would not have been hard for Mexican soldiers within the plaza to avoid their fire. Cannon mounted on the second floor would have suffered from the same problem, and there is no assurance that the floor of the second story would have held up to the recoil of a cannon firing. Were they mounted on the roof they would be easy pickings for Mexican light infantry, particularly if they were armed with the Baker Rifle or some similar weapon.
All other factors aside, should the Texians have planned for and utilized a citidel defense as a fall back or even pre-planned action, the tactical solution for Santa Anna was readilly at hand. Deploy the cavalry screen as mounted skirmishers along the east side of the compound at about three hundred yards. Mass your artillery, if necessary every piece you have, along the east side as well., and shoot until the caisions and limbers run dry. The Texians would have made the artillery's fire solutions quite simple and the result would have been a charnel. house of bodies.
The citadel approach to defence, in this particular instance, is much the same problem that British infantry had to cope with in the Napolionic Wars. Against cavalry, form square. Against infantry, form line. If French artillery ever caught British infantry in a square, the bloodletting was monumental due to the compact nature of the target. The citadel idea therefore seems to me like a British square with walls that would in the end offer very little protection from the concentrated artillery that could be brought to bear. Today we would call this a target rich environment, and for good reason
The best defense against artillery is dispersion and the reverse slope, preferably both. Also there is no one size fits all situation when you are dealing with a combined arms attack. What may be a perfect defense against dismounted infantry may be a disaster when you suddenly find your self dealing with cavalry or artillery. Therefore the biggest problem on the battlefied is to find that correct solution in a timely manner while not being so entrenched in your plans and dispositions to be unable to honor a new and possibly even more dangerous threat. Therefore it is a combination of arms which are the masters of the battlefield, and the army that is best in orchestrating these combined arms usually has the title winner at the end of the day.
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Post by stuart on Dec 15, 2010 14:08:46 GMT -5
Yes but I think here that S-N is making the same error that most historians have done in treating the Alamo as a deliberately prepared fortress, when in reality Jameson had some grandiose ideas that were never followed through because he couldn't persuade the garrison to stay out of the cantinas long enough to do some serious work, and ot was only when Santa Anna rolled in to Bexar like the Devil at prayers that they all piled into the Alamo simply because all the horses were out at grass and without them they had no way of outrunning the Mexicans.
In short it wasn't a question of making mistakes when they fortified the place; it was down to them not fortifying it at all other than to perhaps bodge repairs of some of the damage from the previous siege.
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 15, 2010 15:21:43 GMT -5
Considering the Alamo fort's original purpose, viz., as a compound to keep out Apache raiders, any military improvement to the perimeter would have only been helpful to the defenders.
It should be remembered that the Alamo garrison were not all sluggards; even before Santa Anna arrived there is an occasional praise found in the letters written there for those who did put their back into it. A number of the defenses we now associate with the Alamo fortifications---such as the interior parapet defending the main gate---were Jameson's additions.
As for Sanchez-Navarro, let's not jump to conclusions about what he said. He simply wrote about the two-story long barracks: "If the enemy had made a second line of defense of this, it would have been very difficult to drive them out or to take it from them."
While they DID fortify it with interior trenches and hide-and-earth parapets, it's obvious that Sanchez-Navarro is referring to something else, including artillery. How disposed, and just where, is an open question.
Navarro had not only taken part in the assault, but had made two detailed, keyed plans of the fort. At this remove we may not agree with him on all points, but in my mind he speaks volumes and merits more attention than he has gotten.
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 15, 2010 16:59:42 GMT -5
Chieftain:
It's one thing to position gunners en barbette and have them picked off one by one, another to safeguard them with proper ramparts and embrasures. So there's no way to know how far a sensibly-erected gun position at the long barracks might have succeeded.
At least one account of the battle tells us that, after the Mexicans were inside the walls, an Alamo gun positioned on a "high place" did the most damage to them. So another, intelligently placed interior artillery position would have had, presumably, an equally telling effect.
As for the strength of the floors in the barracks, who can say? If anything, Sanchez-Navarro might indeed have been referring to the fact that the Texians hadn't even attempted to erect a Fortin de Cos-like terreplain there---something strong and sturdy enough to hold more than one gun.
At any rate, food for thought.
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Post by Chuck T on Dec 15, 2010 18:45:09 GMT -5
Gary: I assume you have been through the doors leading into the long barracks. Only the smallest of guns could have been positioned inside its wall on the first floor without major work widening access.. At ground level, saying that they found a way to do this without leaving a gaping hole in the wall requiring backfill, any such gun would have been of limited value. The elevation was correct to maul any Mexican solder in the plaza. That however is not the issue. The cone of fire would be quite limited to a few number of degrees, bacause of a limited ability to traverse the piece inside of the building.
If the first floor was tough in gaining access, the second floor would have presented even more of an engineering challenge. In addition a gun so placed would not only have the disadvantage of limited traverse, but in addition it would have been easier to get under the guns, because the gun's ability to depress would be also limited by the structure.
Mounting a gun on the roof adequately protected by some sort of surrounding fortification, would have been much easier, and probably within the garrisions ability by lifting it into place. It does not solve the problem of the limited ability to depress. In addition the more fortification you put up surrounding the gun the more you limit the ability to traverse.
None of the above negates the fact that had such work been done, and had a target presented itself, the effect of the fire would have been quite brutal, at least for one shot. It is obvious by the narative you cited that this happened during the assault on at least one occasion.
Guns within fortifications that are designed from the outset solve these things by making sure the the fortification gives the gun the maximum ability to traverse. You see this in a lot of the older coast defense fortifications along the east coast.
On the Mexican side, the emplacement and field fortifications they erected around these emplacements had this problem also. You show one such emplacement on page 138 of Alan Huffines book. You will note how narrow the embrasure you drew is. The more narrow the embrasure the more limited the traverse. This did not matter in this instance though in that the Mexicans knew where there target was and the Alamo was not going to move. Not so with infantry seeking cover and concealment as they conduct their assault.
Field Artillery is at its best when it is mobile. It is conceivable from a field emplacement to be able to traverse 360 degrees, but not without a lot of hard work. The more you fortify the gun position in a field environment the more you limit this ability.
Your answer above has not addressed the fact that had such a citadel existed it would still mean that the target area for Santa Anna's guns would have been much smaller, and that their ability to concentrate fire into a relatively small part of the compound, had he chosen to mass his guns, would have blown the place away in relatively short order. When faced with artillery fire the illusion of cover is not enough. In fact in my view there is never enough cover.
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Since there has been much recent discussion of Napoleonic tactics during the Alamo battle, did the Mexican army have a tradition of a " forlorn hope" unit that had the job of carrying the scaling ladders or was it just bad luck to get this job ? Given the paucity of scaling ladders (28 in total) sent against the Alamo, would they give them to just anybody to get the job done.
