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Post by stuart on Mar 26, 2008 1:45:34 GMT -5
Just developing a suggestion I made on the Morales thread...
Joe’s testimony is important as the only known American eyewitness of the fighting, but problematic in so far as we only have summaries of it as written up by third parties.
In the earliest version (Hansen 70) it is stated that “the enemy were undiscovered until they were close to the walls, and before the sentinels had aroused the garrison, the enemy had gained possession of a part of the ramparts”
The other versions seemingly based on the same interview make no mention of the Mexicans getting on to the walls before the garrison although there are consistent references to the failure of the three pickets outside the wall to give any warning.
Apart from that initial and at first sight puzzling reference Joe’s account is also consistent with the known Mexican ones describing how they got close to the walls before being detected then had a vicious (but brief) struggle to get over them.
Following the recent and quite logical suggestion that the Charli house outside the south-west angle may have been occupied by a picket, that statement no longer appears an aberration but actually explains a lot.
Leaving aside the question of whether Morales and his men got in by the south-west angle or by the gate or both, I’ve argued in the past that the rapid collapse of the defence of the north wall was precipitated by Morales seizure of the gate area, as evidenced by DLP’s account of finding his men already in the southern part of the plaza when the main assault carried the north wall.
That reference by Joe, I suggest, is further confirmation of this. The Mexicans clearly had not yet “gained possession” of a part of the north wall when he, Travis and the others rushed there, but the statement would make considerable sense if he and the other defenders suddenly realised that quite inexplicably – quite conceivably without a fight – Morales and his men, having “run in upon and bayoneted” the picket, had “gained possession” not of a part of the north ramparts but the southern ones.
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Post by bobdurham on Mar 26, 2008 8:11:48 GMT -5
Hi Stuart,
I like your scenario. The Mexican accounts of the attack on the North Wall don't really give an impression of a great surprise. In fact, the Texians seem to have held their own for quite a while; so well, in fact, that Santa Anna ordered in the reserves to push the attack along.
Once the Mexicans got control of the Charli house, there would have been no way to hold the tambour -- the guns were facing the wrong way. I think any artillerymen manning those guns would have retreated into the Low Barracks, locking the gates behind them.
In a previous post somewhere, Wolfpack said that he's revised his thinking somewhat on the manning of the artillery pieces; that they would have been fully manned as the primary defense of the fort, with relatively few men being assigned as riflemen. After seeing Mark's book, I agree with him; the artillery platforms would not have had enough room for both artillerymen and riflemen. The artillerymen on the Southwest gun position would probably not have been able to depress the gun enough to get off a shot at Morales' men. Switching in mindset from being artillerymen to infantrymen would have given Morales' men ample time to mount their scaling ladders and scramble up onto the gun platform.
MY "switching in mindset" statement, btw, comes from reading a lot of Civil War literature. Artillerymen during the Civil War were armed with pistols but accounts of their defending their guns very seldom tell of them using them (their pistols, that is). They almost always resorted to using their rammers, etc. in a hand-to-hand defense. The Texians probably had rifles stacked nearby (loaded?) but I think they most likely either tried dislodging the soldados with the weapons they had to hand or else saw there was no chance and retreated to the barracks.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 26, 2008 10:20:00 GMT -5
This fits in with what I was saying elsewhere about Santa Anna's overall plan. The objective of taking the gate is clear; among other things, it eliminated the gate as a possible venue of escape, thus (again) forcing the Texans to the east. With the massive attack at the north, most Texans would have to rush their, leaving few men at the south. I wonder if there was much of a fight down there at all. Then, once the Texans at the north realized there were already Mexicans entering the fort at the south, there may have been something of a panic, or at least a shift from defending the north to retreating into the long barracks and elsewhere (I wonder if Travis even had much of a contingency plan, despite the ditches in the long barracks).
Also, your thoughts about the cannon crew resorting to using ramrods for weapons fits in with a quick and easy entry by Morales's men. There may not have been many Texans at that end of the fort in any case. I wonder if Morales' attack was timed at all to follw the Mexicans at the north reaching that wall and engaging the Texans there; then surprising them at the south with another attack; kind of a one-two punch.
I wonder about the degree of resistence at the north wall. It may have been the only place where the Texans got off at least one round from the cannon, as the Teluca Battalion got raked. I can't think of other reports of the Texans using their cannon, or at least making any major hits with it. By the time the Mexicans reached the wall, how much could riflemen do? I don't know where any firing loopholes existed and there was no real ability to fire downward from the top of the wall at the massed troops below without full exposure and probably certain death (which is what happened to Travis). I'm sure the defenders did the best they could, but the situation already seems to have been hopeless.
AW
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Post by Jim Boylston on Mar 26, 2008 10:26:06 GMT -5
This new sceanrio is intriguing, but before we move it too far along, a question:
Is there any advantage to stationing pickets in the Charli house rather than in the low barracks? I seem to recall a low barracks room being labeled "guard house" or something of that nature.
A station in the low barracks would provide easy egress from the lunette, while still providing cover.
The close proximity of the Charli house to the fort would seemingly provide no real advantage over the low barrack as a picket station and would be a much harder position to defend in the event of an attack.
I realize it's outside the walls, but not really by much.
Am I missing something?
Jim
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Post by stuart on Mar 26, 2008 10:42:37 GMT -5
Joe explicitly states there were three pickets outside the walls and on reflection the Charli house seems an obvious place for them to be based. There were no doubt other sentries on the main wall (whether asleep or not), but the point is that if the outer picket was asleep or at least silenced before they could give warning then Morales was able to get close enough to carry the SW corner and the gate in one quick gallant rush before whatever defenders were left down that end could do anything to stop them.
Then once he was in, as I've been arguing from way back, the realisation the Mexicans were behind them caused the north wall defence to collapse and probably precipitated the breakout attempt to the east, leaving the long barracks to be defended by those who didn't make it out before Sesma's lancers closed in.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Mar 26, 2008 12:13:22 GMT -5
We may be talking at cross purposes. I thought of the 3 pickets that joe mentions as more outbound, I guess, with the Charli house being where they might have been stationed when off duty.
Are you suggesting that the Charli house was, in fact, their duty posting?
I'd always imagined the picket duty position as something further outlying.
Jim
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Post by Herb on Mar 26, 2008 12:19:46 GMT -5
We may be talking at cross purposes. I thought of the 3 pickets that Joe mentions as more outbound, I guess, with the Charli house being where they might have been stationed when off duty. Are you suggesting that the Charli house was, in fact, their duty posting? I'd always imagined the picket duty position as something further outlying. Jim The Charli House makes sense, but I seem to recall a comment (Joe?) that the pickets were located beyond a 100 yards from the walls. I'll look for it in a little bit. BTW, you're right about the Guard House in the Low Barracks, but this would probably have been used by the officer of the day, sergeant of the guard, etc. for the guards inside/on the walls. |
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Post by stuart on Mar 26, 2008 12:46:48 GMT -5
One of the versions of Joe's narrative does indeed mention that they were 100 yards out, but I'd qualify that with the observation that they may well have been intended to be 100 yards out but that doesn't mean that they actually were.
Getting down the nitty gritty reality of this business scattering three men singly around a perimeter at night, especially 100 yards out is just asking for trouble. Ideally they should be paired so that they can keep each other alert and unspooked and of course they should be visited regularly. You can't do that with just three men. What I'd expect if there were just the three is that they were based at the Charli house and were expected to patrol around the circuit. Whether they actually did that or just hunkered down in the house is a different matter entirely, but I suspect that asleep or not that's exactly where they were when Morales and his merry men turned up like the Devil at prayers, disposed of them and then got in over the Alamo walls before anybody realised what was happening, far less tried to stop them
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Post by elcolorado on Mar 27, 2008 10:37:13 GMT -5
I have to agree with Jim. There is no advantage of stationing pickets in the Charli house...it's simply too close. I can see the structure possibly being used as some sort of "Pickett H.Q." (if it was used at all) for sentries or pickets employed beyond the south wall. For the North and West walls, the Northern Postern would have been well suited for the entry and egress of pickets.
In truth, there is no evidence, not even circumstantial, that the Charli house was utilized for any purpose...I think we're jumping to conclusions.
I feel too much is being read into the Commercial Bulletin report ( Hansen pp 70). Even Hansen says that it is of "little value." As for the statement " the enemy had gained possession of a part of the ramparts," it may or may not be an accurate account. But if true, there in no indication that the writer, who ever he was, was speaking about the southwest corner. The reference to the penetration could easily have been anywhere along the north wall.
Glenn
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Post by stuart on Mar 27, 2008 12:07:57 GMT -5
Glenn, the point is that all of the Mexican accounts are clear that they hadn't reached, let alone mounted, far less gained a foothold on the north wall before the shooting started.
While seeing advantages to using the Charli house as a patrol base - as I said on the other thread if only to deny it to the Mexicans - its actually irrelevant whether it was held or not. What's important as has been discussed before, is that occupied or not it covered Morales' approach. From there he only had a very short bound to reach his objective - whether it was the SW angle or the gate or both, and since Joe demonstrably couldn't be talking about the Mexicans gaining a foothold on the north wall; that reference in the letter must be related to Morales' getting in across the south wall before anybody realised what was going on.
I know that for some reason you're having trouble with the notion that Morales' was mounting a real rather than a diversionary attack but all of the admittedly limited evidence we've got puts him in there and as I've been arguing for some time it was most likely the fact that he did get in which brought about the collapse of the north wall defence - something this reference by Joe also points to.
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Post by elcolorado on Mar 27, 2008 16:54:01 GMT -5
No...no trouble at all. As I stated in my last post on the Morales thread, the physical evidence (bayonet scabbards) discovered near the base of the SW corner convinced me that the attack was premeditated. Although I still feel that Morales' objective, in part, was to keep the defenders on the south wall from reinforcing the north. While at the same time, prevent any Texan from trying to escape into/or through La Villita.
You and I disagree on the cause of the north wall collapse. I believe the north wall was abandoned due to the overwhelming difference in numbers. 1400 soldados against a few dozen defenders. Everything I've read so far indicates the Mexicans were finally successful because Cos began to threaten and then attack the west wall. Followed by Romero's simultaneous attack against northeast wall (jacales) and the stock pen.
I haven't seen anything that would lead me to conclude that Morales' little force caused the collapse of the north wall. However, I'll happily adopt your position, Stuart, when I see evidence that is either factual or very convincing.
Glenn
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Post by Jim Boylston on Mar 27, 2008 17:49:52 GMT -5
I don't think either position really negates the other.
Glenn's position that the north collapsed due to the overwhelming difference in numbers doesn't preclude the fact that Morales' men may have gotten into the compound before anyone made it over the north wall.
It's difficult to say which action may have had the greater effect on the other. Was Morales able to mount the SW corner because the defenders were distracted by the commotion to the north, or did the north collapse because Morales had taken the south?
I think the amount of time that elapsed between either of these actions may have been minimal, and may have almost seemed simultaneous to the defenders. A number of the Mexican reports claim most of the action only took 30 minutes, which would indicate that anything happening on the perimeter happened pretty quickly.
I think we might be talking chickens and eggs. Which came first?
Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 27, 2008 23:11:10 GMT -5
Exactly. It sounds more to me like a combination of all these factorst that overwhelmed the Texans and may also have created some confusion among them. There was no way they could have held the north wall against that large a force for very long anyway. Whether it was Morales gaining entrance at the south, Romero breaking through the jacales on the north east, Cos at the northwest, the forces at the north wall itself scaling the wall -- all of these things ensured the Texan defeat, and a pretty fast one at that. Remeber, Morales alone was thought to have a relatively small force, but it was nearly equal to the entire Alamo garrison.
AW
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Post by bobdurham on Mar 28, 2008 9:27:29 GMT -5
I think the Charli House, outside the wall, would have been manned, at least by an outpost. It doesn't make sense to leave such an obvious weakness undefended. However, I believe, with you Allen, that there is no indication that the fall of the Southwest corner led to the North wall being abandoned. Filisola's account says "At the same time, to the South Colonels Jose Vicente Minon and Juan Morales with their columns skillfully took advantage offered by some small jacales with walls of stone and mud which were next to the angle corresponding to the West." Note, he said "At the same time!" Of course, he wasn't there. . .
Jose Enrique de la Pena, who was there, says, "In the meantime, Colonel Morales with his chasseurs, having carried out instructions received, was just in front of us at a distance of a few paces, and, rightly fearing that our fire would hurt him, he had taken refuge in the trenches he had overrun trying to inflict damage on the enemy without harming us." I guess this could be construed as meaning that Morales' soldados were already there when the troops from the North got over the walls but I think that might be reading too much into his description. Besides, there is no way to know whether de la Pena was one of the first over the wall. . . His depiction of Morales' troops doesn't occur in his narrative until after the Texians had retreated into the barracks on either side (west and east) -- no way to know whether he was reporting the happenings inside the Alamo chronologically or not though -- in all the confusion, I doubt it; probably just an account of his impressions.
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Post by elcolorado on Mar 28, 2008 18:30:50 GMT -5
I can understand the temptation to man the Charli house. It appears to be a strong outer work that would provide any would-be inhabitants with good protection. But upon a second glance, I do not see any practical benefits to be gained from positioning men inside of it.
The Texans had more ground to protect then they could handle. Adding the Charli house to their defensive responsibilities would only increase that burden. The structure is too close to the Alamo to be of much use...even as a base for pickets. The house appears to have no southern or eastern windows or loopholes for riflemen to shoot through. And unlike the lunette, entering or leaving the Charli house would leave men exposed to enemy fire. Also, anyone caught inside during a large scale attack would be effectively cut off - trapped.
There would have been even less benefit for Santa Anna. Any Mexican unit trying to enter and/or capture the building during daylight attack would be cut to pieces. A night assault could provide success initially but maintaining possession of it would prove to be nearly impossible. But why would Santa Anna want to occupy the house, anyway? The soldados would only find themselves trapped, cut-off, and unable to defend themselves. The Texans could easily roll a gun up to the lunette gate and fire away at the house.
So, from my point of view, neither side had anything to gain from posting men inside the Charli house. Travis would have been better off if he had just leveled the place.
Glenn
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