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Post by jrboddie on Jul 25, 2010 13:59:26 GMT -5
I have been wondering about how events could have been different and conclude that once the decision was made to 'hole up' in the compound, the game was over. Perhaps you have thought about this also. Knowing all that we do today, could the Texians have done anything else that would have lead to a more favorable outcome?
Some random (and perhaps ridiculous) thoughts on the subject:
Did the Gonzales 32 ride into the Alamo assuming that Fannin was already there (as portrayed in the 2004 Alamo movie)? Do you think that it would have been possible for them to have remained outside the Mexican perimeter and practiced 'asymmetrical warfare' to harass the enemy camps and disrupt the plans for the assault that took place 5 days later--perhaps giving time for Fannin to get his act together? Or would this have been completely impractical due to lack of the cover and the size of the Mexican cavalry?
And what if Fannin had made the 90 mile trip to Bexar before March 6. I believe that he would have just added to the Texian losses--especially if his plan was to battle his way into the fort. So, do you think that it is conceivable that Fannin's relatively small force could have provided any relief at all to the garrison so late in the siege?
Other threads have discussed the lack of ability of the garrison's leadership--failure to burn the jacales and surprise at the dawn assault for example. However, if you were to replace Travis with the most brilliant military mind of the day (or any day, for that matter), could the outcome have been any different? Perhaps the final assault could have been delayed until the wall-busting Mexican cannons arrived but after that?
What kind of Texian force would have been required to achieve a successful relief of the Alamo? Is there some tactic or strategy that this force could have used other than a direct attack to change Santa Anna's plans?
I presume such scenarios have been analyzed by military scientists. What say you?
[Just trying to stimulate some new discussion outside the 'where did Davy die' question. Perhaps this will bring out some new areas of study.]
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Post by Herb on Jul 25, 2010 14:48:26 GMT -5
Before, getting into what ifs, it's important to recognize the time distance relationships.
Fannin decided on the 27th not to go to Bexar, the Gonzales Reinforcements left Gonzales on the 28th. According to Sutherland, half the Gonzales men turned south to join Seguin and the new company he was rasing and to link up with Fannin's men. The remaining half - the 32 - enterred the Alamo on March 1st, to the best of their knowledge, they were the vanguard of a far larger reinforcement to come.
Had Fannin continued to the Alamo and linked up sith Seguin and the other forces he would have approached with roughly 500 men. IF he arrived on the 1st or 2d, he would have initially faced Sesma with about 290 cavalry and 270 infantry, 560 total.
Santa Anna still had around Bexar another 720 infantry and would be reinforced on the 3rd with roughly 900 more men.
Only if Fannin defeated Sesma, would he have been able to force his way into the Alamo and who knows what condition his force would be in. Also, as the senior officer in the Texas Army Fannin would now be in charge until Houston showed up. Which with this large of a Texian force in the Alamo, he probably would have been forced to do with every Texian gathering at Gonzales.
But, Santa Anna's other Brigades would continue to arrive over the next week and a half. The decisive battle of the Texas Revolution would probably have been fought in San Antonio, and instead of the Texians facing an isolated detachment at San Jacinto, they would have faced the united strength of the Mexican Army and far worse odds.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 25, 2010 14:55:46 GMT -5
You present some interesting questions. I would think that these same questions were on the mind of Santa Anna and his commanders also, in light of the fact that up until 3 March that had a relatively few troops at their disposal.
Had the Gonzales 32 been outside the Mexivan perimeter, and the fact that they arrived been unknown to the Mexicans, they may well have harrassed the Mexican outpost line, but I doubt they they could have caused much damage, or altered the final outcome.
Fannin's showing up and having a decisive effect is more of a question to me of when he showed up. Had it been early say the end of February he may well have been able to defeat the Mexican force sent against him which I would think we be around three possibly four battalions in strength, keeping in mind that Santa Anna would have to guard against a possible breakout from the Alamo in his rear. May well have, does not mean he would have, but it assumes that he may have had a chance. After 2 or 3 March Fannin could have showed up with a thousand men and he would have been soundly defeated in my view.
My personal view on the garrison leadership questions is that if Alexander the Great, assisted by company commanders on the order of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Julius Caesar had been in command of the Alamo, not one thing as far as outcome would have changed. What is debateable is if AtG would have placed himself and his command in that situation in the first place.
Relief force: Again when? Prior to reinforcement a well supplied force of a thousand could probably have done the job. After 3 March you are talking at least three or four times that number.
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Post by jrboddie on Jul 25, 2010 15:00:12 GMT -5
So after defeating Sesma, the only course of action would be to fight your way into the fort and wait for further relief? I keep thinking that the big mistake was being in the fort to begin with. Fannin inside would delay the inevitable for only a few days. Although it would probably have resulted in a much higher Mexican casualty rate.
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Post by Herb on Jul 27, 2010 14:28:04 GMT -5
So after defeating Sesma, the only course of action would be to fight your way into the fort and wait for further relief? I keep thinking that the big mistake was being in the fort to begin with. Fannin inside would delay the inevitable for only a few days. Although it would probably have resulted in a much higher Mexican casualty rate. No, not at all, there are numerous courses of action potentially possible. But, to me, there are too many variables, beyond that point. The formost being what condition is Fannin's force after fighting through Sesma? How many killed, and more importantly how many wounded? Does the wounded swamp the Texian ability to care for them and pins them even more in place? etc. etc. |
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Jul 30, 2010 4:15:40 GMT -5
Hindsight always is 20/20. I tend to agree that the end result would ultimately have been the same; just the numbers on both sides would have been different.
Santa Anna certainly was concerned about the possibility that the garrison would be reinforced by Fannin, and took action to cut any relief from Goliad off. Even in Fannin's half-hearted start from Goliad, he left men behind, so he wouldn't have arrived with every man in his command. An encounter with Sesma would have been ugly and most certainly would not have netted the Alamo with 500 more troops.
I tend to think that all Fannin's men would have done was postpone the final assault, perhaps. If command of the Garrison shifted to Fannin, would Fannin, at some point, have simply surrender the Alamo in the face of an enemy force that would continue to grow over the coming days and weeks? We will never know.
Paul
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Post by Kevin Young on Jul 30, 2010 8:29:51 GMT -5
So after defeating Sesma, the only course of action would be to fight your way into the fort and wait for further relief? I keep thinking that the big mistake was being in the fort to begin with. Fannin inside would delay the inevitable for only a few days. Although it would probably have resulted in a much higher Mexican casualty rate. No, not at all, there are numerous courses of action potentially possible. But, to me, there are too many variables, beyond that point. The formost being what condition is Fannin's force after fighting through Sesma? How many killed, and more importantly how many wounded? Does the wounded swamp the Texian ability to care for them and pins them even more in place? etc. etc. Would the battle of the Coleto simply became the battle of the Cibolo or at best case, the battle of Espada? |
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Post by Herb on Jul 30, 2010 9:56:37 GMT -5
There's a thing called "branches and sequels" in military planning, where a staff basically makes assumptions about the outcome of an operation then plans for subsequent operations (branches and sequels) based on those assumptions. This is a critical part of the planning process, but it should be obvious is a huge process requiring a great deal of work and just as important - imangination.
Fundamentally, when you "what if" a historical situation, you're doing the same process, but partially based on history.
In this case the fundamental assumption, is that Fannin did not turn back but proceeded to the Alamo, when he learned of Johnson's defeat at San Patrico. This leads to two possibilities, Sesma intercepts Fannin, or he fails. Looking at the sequels to only one branch (Sesma intercepts Fannin) you have three probable branches, Sesma stops Fannin and forces his retreat, Fannin defeats Sesma and continues to advance on Bexar, or the battle results in some sort of stalemate between the two.
For each of those branches you have to look at the probable branches and sequels for that particular branch - and so on. Like I said a lot of work and imagination and more importantly time is required. Obviously some assumptions, have to be given greater weight in the planning process.
Sesma and Fannin's forces were to close in size to obviously weigh any particular outcome. But, only one outcome would have significantly changed history - a Fannin victory. And while the possibilities of what would happen if that happened are endless, I think there are only two realistic possibilities: a larger battle around Bexar as the Texians further push their limited resources into the Bexar area, or a fighting withdrawl to Gonzales unifying the Texian forces there.
In either case the Texian forces would have faced a far stronger, fresher, and united Mexican force than at San Jacinto. While nothing is sure, I strongly feel that that outcome would not have been a Texian victory.
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