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Post by jrboddie on Jul 22, 2010 14:29:50 GMT -5
Almonte refers to getting information about the situation in the compound through spies. What do we know about them? Were people coming and going between the compound and Bexar during the day? Why? Or were spies somehow sneaking in and out at night?
How about spies in the Mexican camp? Almonte says there was a cannon attack on the President's HQ. How did the garrison know its location? (I do not believe that the front of this building would be visible from the compound.)
How did intel play a role in the events leading up to the battle? Obviously the lack of intelligence about the location of the Mexican army in mid-February was a big factor in the ultimate defeat of the garrison. Or was it? Would Travis have done anything differently if they had known that the enemy would be upon them in days instead of weeks/months?
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 15:41:09 GMT -5
The term spy during that period did not necessarily mean the James Bond Cloak and Dagger variety. Not certain of course, but he could very well have meant personnel detailed to specifically watch a certain portion of the compound, in much the same way we would use an observation post or a forward observer today. It was also a period term used for what we would call a scout.
Anything, I have learned mostly the hard way, is possible.
The reason I would lean toward Almonte's use of the word spy as being an observer, is that there were certain essential elements of information required to formulate an assault plan. Things like exact location of guns, and any partiular pattern that could be detected in the garrison's activities. For instance: Did the garrison go on full alert or stand to an hour before dawn. As you can see, if that fact were observed, it would have had a dramatic effect on assault planning. A lot of intelligence can be gleaned from these efforts.
I think I agree on the Santa Anna headquarters thing. Does not seem to be in a direct line of sight. Could be a number of things. A spy as you speculate, luck, H and I fires, but most probably Santa Anna had been observed out an about on a few occasions, but retuning habitually to the same general area. It could be that having some knowledge of the town's layout they put two and two together and took a couple of shots. Often the most simple of explanations turns out to be correct. Dumb luck and educated guess are two of those simple things that we seem to discount by saying , at least to ourselves, it must be more complicated than that. A lot of battles have been won that way though.
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Post by stuart on Jul 22, 2010 15:44:13 GMT -5
Can't comment on the spies, but would make a couple of points about the pre-battle intel.
In the first place Travis was getting good intel all the way through. Whether he was making proper use of it is a different question. I've mentioned before that Blas Herrera was one of Benavides' (and hence Grant's) men, rather than Seguin's, which may have led Travis and Bowie to distrust him.
Conversely, as has been pointed out, the garrison does seem to have maintained some sort of outpost on the Medina.
Intriguingly the Morphis interview of Dickinson (Hansen:45) includes this little gem:
"...Santa Anna, having captured the pickets sent out by Col Travis to guard the post from surprise, charged into San Antonio..."
Was the outpost on the Medina still being maintained, and were the Texians taken by surprise because Sesma's lancers took out the picket which should have warned them? Was one of them Trinidad Coy?
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Post by jrboddie on Jul 22, 2010 18:56:21 GMT -5
Here are the spy references that I found in the newspaper article that published Almonte's journal: - Almonte, himself, was a spy. Before the war, he traveled through Texas as a spy. [Hansen 2.2.1 p.358]
- He also corresponded with influential people in New York and Philadelphia who may have been allied with the Mexican interests in Texas. [Hansen 2.2.1 p.361]
- A Texian spy was captured by the Mexicans on Feb 23 who led them to believe that there would be 'an advance of the enemy." [Hansen 2.2.1 p.362]
- A spy informed the Mexicans that four of the enemy were killed in the action of Feb. 24. [Hansen 2.2.1 p.363] (A Mar 3 letter from Travis claims that to that date, there were no casualties, however. [Hansen 1.1.6 p.35])
- The same night, a spy told of the arrival of 30 men from Gonzales. [Hansen 2.2.1 p.363]
- On Feb 28, they received a (false) report that 200 men were coming to reinforce the garrison. [Hansen 2.2.1 p.364]
- Mar 15, a Mexican informed them that Gonzalez had been abandoned and that Texas independence declared. [Hansen 2.2.1 p.368]
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 23:55:42 GMT -5
I have no doubt whatsoever that Almonte was an intelligence agent of the Mexican government both before, probably during, and long after the Alamo. Was he not the Mexican ambassador to the United States just before the Mexican War. I think that is true.
He evidently was a very smart guy who had the trust of Santa Anna. While intelligence then as a military career field was not what we think of it today, it would not take much to convince me that everything of that nature either passed through his hands or he was aware of it while he served Santa Anna.
Bullet point 3 - I wonder what happened to him following capture?
Bullet points 4 and 5 Spy in these instances could very well mean scout or observer.
Bullet point 6 This report was believed enough to send a combined arms task force out to verify the report. Santa Anna was still in a vulnerable position on the 28th having only the vanguard in hand. I think this report had to be taken very seriously for him to split his rather small force and strip away his cavalry screen. I suppose it would be anyones guess where this false information originated.
Bullet 7 stands alone.
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Post by TRK on Jul 23, 2010 7:47:10 GMT -5
Was he not the Mexican ambassador to the United States just before the Mexican War. I think that is true. No too far off. He was minister plentipotentiary to the U.S. just before the Mexican War, and was ambassador to the U.S. from 1853 to '56. The best reference on Almonte, including much on his role in the Texas Revolution, is Jack Jackson, ed., Almonte's Texas: JUan N. Almonte's 1834 Inspection, Secret Report, and Role in the 1836 Campaign (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2003). |
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Post by garyzaboly on Jul 23, 2010 15:14:40 GMT -5
Seguin was getting his cooked meals from a Tejano friend in town, during his time spent in the fort.
The term "spy" in those days generally meant scout, or else a person detached to keep an eye on the enemy, as has already been suggested. But there's enough information in the documentattion to tell us that both sides were being regularly informed of developments in the opposing camps, although I think Santa Anna was the better informaed.
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